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KATE ANDRIAS

& BENJAMIN I. SACHS

Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and
Organizing in an Era of Political Inequality
abstract. This Article proposes an innovative approach to remedying the crisis of political

inequality: using law to facilitate organizing by the poor and working class, not only as workers,
but also as tenants, debtors, welfare beneﬁciaries, and others. The piece draws on the social-movements literature, and the successes and failures of labor law, to show how law can supplement the
deﬁcient regimes of campaign ﬁnance and lobbying reform and enable lower-income groups to
build organizations capable of countervailing the political power of the wealthy. As such, the Article oﬀers a new direction forward for the public-law literature on political power and political
inequality. It also oﬀers critical lessons for government oﬃcials, organizers, and advocates seeking
to respond to the inequalities made painfully evident by the COVID-19 pandemic.
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introduction
Among the painful truths made evident by COVID-19 are the deep inequality of American society and the profound inadequacy of our social-welfare infrastructure. The nation’s lack of comprehensive health care, 1 its underfunded and
ineﬃcient system of unemployment insurance, 2 and weak workplace safety and
health guarantees, 3 along with nearly nonexistent paid sick leave, 4 debtor-forgiveness rules, 5 and tenant protections 6 leave poor and working-class communities—particularly communities of color—dangerously exposed to the ravages
of this pandemic, both physical and economic. 7 America’s weak social safety net
is, in turn, a product of a profound failure that has plagued American democracy
for decades now: the wealthy exercising vastly disproportionate power over politics and government. 8
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.
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See Aaron van Dorn, Rebecca E. Cooney & Miriam L. Sabin, COVID-19 Exacerbating Inequalities in the US, 395 LANCET 1243, 1243-44 (2020).
See Kathryn A. Edwards, Millions Need Unemployment Beneﬁts. Unfortunately, the Delivery System Is Broken, RAND BLOG (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/04/millionsneed-unemployment-beneﬁts-unfortunately-the.html [https://perma.cc/7566-3WHA].
See Emily Schwing, How OSHA Has Failed to Protect America’s Workers from COVID-19, REVEAL (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.revealnews.org/article/how-osha-has-failed-to-protectamericas-workers-from-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/C3P5-454A].
See 179 Countries Have Paid Sick Leave. Not the US, WORLD (Mar. 13, 2020, 3:30 PM EDT),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-03-13/179-countries-have-paid-sick-leave-not-us
[https://perma.cc/FP5J-7C4K].
See Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, If You Want a Quick Recovery, Forgive Debts, BARRON’S
(Apr. 15, 2020, 1:14 PM EDT), https://www.barrons.com/articles/if-you-want-a-quick-recovery-forgive-debts-51586969309 [https://perma.cc/T99X-99T6].
See Dan Keating & Lauren Tierney, Which States Are Doing a Better Job Protecting Renters from
Being Evicted During the Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/04/29/which-states-are-doing-better-jobprotecting-renters-being-evicted-during-coronavirus-pandemic [https://perma.cc/BJ7HSSCM]; COVID-19 Housing Policy Scorecard, EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/covidpolicy-scorecard [https://perma.cc/8WHW-4AA8].
See Matt Apuzzo & Monika Pronczuk, COVID-19’s Economic Pain Is Universal. But Relief? Depends on Where You Live, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/world/europe/coronavirus-economic-relief-wages.html
[https:
//perma.cc/8VYU-LC87]; Chris McGreal, The Inequality Virus: How the Pandemic Hit America’s Poorest, GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2020, 2:09 PM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/09/america-inequality-laid-bare-coronavirus
[https://perma.cc/35Q2-RXPC].
Even in the midst of the pandemic, as unemployment soared and poor and working-class
Americans suﬀered enormous ﬁnancial pain, the power of the wealthy was manifest in the
relief bills that emerged from Washington. For example, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and

constructing countervailing power

Indeed, public faith in American democracy is at near-record lows, and increasing numbers of Americans report that they no longer feel conﬁdent in the
health of their democratic institutions. When asked why, many say that money
has too much of an inﬂuence on politics and that politicians are unresponsive to
the concerns of regular Americans. 9 Research supports these fears, showing both
that wealthy individuals are spending record sums on electoral politics 10 and that
elected oﬃcials are at best only weakly accountable to nonwealthy constituents. 11
Economic Security (CARES) Act suspended the limit on losses that can be used to oﬀset, for
tax purposes, nonbusiness income. This provision helps only individuals with more than
$250,000 in nonbusiness income, and the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that 82% of the beneﬁts of this part of the Act will go to individuals earning more than
$1 million a year. Moreover, “[a]ccording to Congress’s oﬃcial revenue estimators, the beneﬁts of this CARES Act provision this year will go to 43,000 millionaires who receive a total of
$70.3 billion from this break alone.” Steve Wamhoﬀ, The CARES Act Provision for High-Income
Business Owners Looks Worse and Worse, JUST TAXES BLOG (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://itep.org/the-cares-act-provision-for-high-income-business-owners-looks-worseand-worse [https://perma.cc/M9SH-CQCE].
9. See Americans’ Views on Money in Politics, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/02/us/politics/money-in-politics-poll.html [https://perma
.cc/E7NK-ZMVM]; see also Nathaniel Persily & Jon Cohen, Americans Are Losing Faith in Democracy—and in Each Other, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/americans-are-losing-faith-in-democracy--and-in-each-other/2016
/10/14/b35234ea-90c6-11e6-9c52-0b10449e33c4_story.html
[https://perma.cc/559PW7LA]; Greg Sargent, Why Did Trump Win? New Research by Democrats Oﬀers a Worrisome
Answer, WASH. POST (May 1, 2017, 8:44 AM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/05/01/why-did-trump-win-new-research-by-democrats-oﬀers-a-worrisome-answer [https://perma.cc/7LNX-WXF6]; Richard Wike, Laura
Silver & Alexandra Castillo, Many Across the Globe Are Dissatisﬁed with How Democracy Is Working, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019
/04/29/many-across-the-globe-are-dissatisﬁed-with-how-democracy-is-working [https://
perma.cc/5ZN9-5M6F]. For a more in-depth account, see ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD,
STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT (2016).
10. See Matea Gold & Anu Narayanswamy, How 10 Mega-Donors Already Helped Pour a Record $1.1
Billion into Super PACs, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-10-mega-donors-already-helped-pour-a-record-11-billion-into-super-pacs/2016
/10/05/d2d51d44-8a60-11e6-875e-2c1bfe943b66_story.html [https://perma.cc/S78T-KVS6]
(describing record contributions from “rich donors on both sides of the aisle”); Donor Demographics, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-overview/donor-demographics?cycle=2020&display=A [https://perma.cc/6NEB-8HZK] (showing group of
donors comprising 1.11% of U.S. population gave 75.43% of all political contributions in the
2020 cycle); see also Lobbying Data Summary, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby [https://perma.cc/7ZKA-RGQ8] (showing spending on lobbying was highest ever in 2019).
11. See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED
AGE 2 (1st ed. 2008); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 12 (2012); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 565
(2014).
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As political scientist Martin Gilens has observed, “[W]hen preferences between
the well-oﬀ and the poor diverge, government policy bears absolutely no relationship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor.” 12
Of course, democracy does not require that policymaking always follow majority will or the median voter’s preferences. But democracy, as well as the faith
citizens have in their government, falters when lawmakers persistently disregard
the priorities of nonwealthy citizens.
Much of the legal scholarship (and public commentary) concerned with this
democracy deﬁcit focuses on the increased ﬂow of money into electoral politics
and advocates for stemming that ﬂow. 13 Scholars writing in this vein criticize the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, exempliﬁed by Citizens United v. FEC, that has
enabled unfettered campaign spending. 14 They oﬀer a range of reforms designed
to limit the ﬂow of money into elections, many of which would require a change
in the composition of the Supreme Court or the ratiﬁcation of a constitutional
amendment. 15 A related group of scholars advocates for shielding the legislative
and administrative process from money’s inﬂuence through, for example, lobbying restrictions and disclosure requirements. 16

12.
13.

14.
15.

16.

550

GILENS, supra note 11, at 81; see also infra Section I.B (discussing empirical ﬁndings).
See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 6 (2016); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST:
HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 7 (1st ed. 2011).
558 U.S. 310 (2010); see, e.g., HASEN, supra note 13, at 247-48; LESSIG, supra note 13, at 238-39;
Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012).
See HASEN, supra note 13, at 247-50; LESSIG, supra note 13, at 271-72; Michael S. Kang, The
Brave New World of Party Campaign Finance Law, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 576-77 (2016);
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1429
(2015). Other election-law scholars are less concerned with money’s inﬂuence and more concerned with mounting partisanship and political fragmentation. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoﬀ,
Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeover of Our Hollowed-Out Political Parties, 54 HOUS. L. REV.
845, 845-46 (2017) (bemoaning the weakened political party); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard
H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2316-30 (2006) (describing
the problem of partisanship); Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 809 (2014) (arguing for
strengthening party organization and leadership to reduce the inﬂuence of other partisan actors); see also infra notes 135-136 (describing proposals to reform the outsized eﬀect of money
in politics).
See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text. Lobbying restrictions, too, would be subject
to constitutional challenge. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (stating
that “the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment—freedom to speak, publish, and petition the Government” are involved in the assessment of lobbying regulation); Autor v. Pritzker, 740 F.3d 176, 182-84 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasizing that registered lobbyists are protected
by the First Amendment, and remanding for the district court to consider whether the policy
barring government service by registered lobbyists was nonetheless justiﬁed).

constructing countervailing power

A second robust body of scholarship focuses not on insulating the political
process from money but on trying to ensure equal rights of individuals to participate in the governance process through elections. These scholars criticize barriers to equal voting rights, including contemporary uses of gerrymandering and
legislation that impose hurdles on individual voters’ ability to exercise the franchise or minimize the eﬀective voting power of particular constituents. 17 Scholars urge both doctrinal and legislative reform that would ensure more equal
rights of participation.
In the last few years, a third approach has begun to emerge in the legal scholarship. This approach begins by recognizing the diﬃculty—both practical and
constitutional—of keeping money out of politics. It also recognizes that while
equal voting and participation rights are critical to the goal of combatting political inequality, they are not enough to ensure political equality in a system where
wealth functions so prominently as an independent source of political inﬂuence.
Thus, this third approach moves beyond campaign ﬁnance and individual participation rights and focuses instead on what we will call countervailing power.
In particular, this approach is concerned with the ability of mass-membership
organizations to equalize the political voice of citizens who lack the political inﬂuence that comes from wealth. 18
The beneﬁcial eﬀects of countervailing, mass-membership organizations are
well known to theorists and researchers of democracy. 19 Put simply, such groups
increase political equality by building and consolidating political power for the
17.

See, e.g., Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413,
1418-26 (1991) (using the Voting Rights Act to conceptualize the nature of minority-voting
exclusion); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Diﬀerent, 84 CALIF. L. REV.
1201, 1216-20, 1227-32 (1996) (arguing for race-conscious districting); Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 304-23 (2014) (arguing that the key
issue for districting should be whether district lines properly align the jurisdiction’s median
voter with the legislature’s median member).
18. See, e.g., K. SABEEL RAHMAN & HOLLIE RUSSON GILMAN, CIVIC POWER: REBUILDING AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY IN AN ERA OF CRISIS 142-68 (2019); Kate Andrias, Hollowed-Out Democracy, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 48 (2014) [hereina�er Andrias, Hollowed-Out Democracy]; Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and Balances, 18 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 419, 493-503 (2015) [hereina�er Andrias, Separations of Wealth]; Tabatha Abu ElHaj, Making and Unmaking of Citizens: Law and the Shaping of Civic Capacity, 53 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 63, 98-136 (2019); Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148, 168-76 (2013). Some scholars oﬀer more radical approaches
to furthering countervailing power in governance, for example reserving a signiﬁcant fraction
of seats in the legislature for representatives from disadvantaged socioeconomic groups. See
JULIA CAGÉ, THE PRICE OF DEMOCRACY: HOW MONEY SHAPES POLITICS AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 253-323 (2020); cf. AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION 1-24 (1977) (arguing that a system of consociational democracy can help
produce stability in plural societies).
19. See infra Part I.
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nonwealthy, thus serving as counterweights to the political inﬂuence of the rich.
Mass-membership organizations can serve in this capacity because, at bottom,
they aggregate the political resources and political power of people who, acting
as individuals, are disempowered relative to wealthy individuals and institutions. 20 More particularly, mass-membership organizations enable pooling of
politically relevant resources, including money, among individuals with few such
resources; they provide information to decisionmakers about ordinary citizens’
views; they navigate opaque and fragmented government structures, thereby enabling citizens to monitor government behavior; and they allow citizens to hold
decisionmakers accountable. And, in fact, when citizens are organized into massmembership associations that are active in the political sphere, researchers ﬁnd
an exception to the general rule that policymakers are disproportionally responsive to the preferences and concerns of the wealthy. 21
Over recent decades, however, there has been a decline in broad-based, massmembership organizations of low- and middle-income Americans. 22 This decline in countervailing organizations has exacerbated the political distortions
caused by the increase in political spending by the wealthy. But the capacity for
countervailing organizations to address the distorting eﬀects of wealth raises a
critical question for legal scholars: How can law facilitate the construction of
countervailing organizations among the nonwealthy? Put diﬀerently, how can
law facilitate political organizing among Americans whose voices are drowned
out by the distorting eﬀects of wealth? That is the question we address in this
Article.
Recently, legal scholars have begun to address related topics. For example,
K. Sabeel Rahman and Miriam Sei�er have written about ways that participation
in administrative processes can improve the organizational strength of citizen
groups. Thus, Rahman argues for designing administrative processes in ways
that enhance the countervailing power of ordinary citizens, 23 while Sei�er urges
administrative-law scholars to pay attention to the characteristics of interest
groups participating in the administrative process and to consider “looking

20.

See, e.g., Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance, 20
POL. & SOC’Y 393, 424 (1992) (noting that such organizations help remedy political inequality
“by permitting individuals with low per capita resources to pool those resources through organization”).
21. GILENS, supra note 11, at 121, 157-58.
22. See infra Section I.A.
23. K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 97-180 (2016); K. Sabeel Rahman,
From Civic Tech to Civic Capacity: The Case of Citizen Audits, 50 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 751, 751
(2017); K. Sabeel Rahman, Policymaking as Power-Building, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 315, 33340 (2018) [hereina�er Rahman, Power-Building]; see also infra note 137 (discussing earlier
work in administrative law on citizen engagement).

552
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within interest groups,” referencing the manner by which interest groups determine the views of their constituents, “to illuminate the quality and nature of
participation in administrative governance.” 24 Tabatha Abu El-Haj has urged
greater use of universal beneﬁts and targeted philanthropy, to encourage the
growth of mass-membership organizations, since both “create reasons to organize on the part of beneﬁciaries.” 25 Both of us have written about the countervailing role that labor organizations can play in politics. 26 And Daryl Levinson and
one of us have written about the ways in which ordinary public policy o�en has
the eﬀect—and at times the intent—of mobilizing political organization around
the policy. 27
Meanwhile, another group of legal scholars has highlighted the importance
of social movements and their organizations in legal change, focusing on how
movements shape decisionmaking by courts, legislatures, and administrative
agencies. 28 In particular, a rich literature has developed on the relationship between popular mobilization and evolving constitutional principles, 29 and on

24.

25.

26.
27.
28.

29.

Miriam Sei�er, Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1300, 1304
(2016); see also Miriam Sei�er, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93
N.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 146 (2018) (“The weakness of civil society oversight in the states undermines the notion that state governments are closer to the people; in turn, it highlights their
vulnerability to regulatory failures and factional inﬂuence.”).
Abu El-Haj, supra note 18, at 71; see also Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Finance Reform,
57 B.C. L. REV. 1127, 1129-30, 1132-33 (2016) (“[T]hose concerned about the outsized political
inﬂuence of moneyed elites . . . should shi� [the focus] to ways the law might encourage civic
reorganization.”).
See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 84-88 (2016); Sachs, supra note 18, at
168-82.
Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400,
430-48 (2015).
See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW
REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 2-3 (1978); Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind:
Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2756-57 (2014);
Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001).
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 503-11 (2007); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social
Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 946-50 (2006); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Aﬃrmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1501-11 (2005);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 419, 419-20 (2001) [hereina�er Eskridge, Channeling]; William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Some Eﬀects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century,
100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2194-2353 (2002); Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—
Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 47-59 (2008); Reva B. Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conﬂict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De
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how “cause lawyers” can best serve social movements. 30 More recently, there has
been a resurgence of scholarship that “cogenerates legal meaning alongside le�
social movements, their organizing, and their visions.” 31 This work builds on an
older tradition of critical legal studies and critical race theory that interrogates
the limits of traditional legal rights in bringing about progressive social change
given the political, economic, and social conditions that systematically disadvantage poor people and people of color. 32
To date, however, no one has tackled directly the question that we pose
here. 33 Rather than asking how the enactment of substantive legislation or administrative-participation mechanisms might boost organizing, how social

30.

31.

32.

33.

554

Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1364 (2006); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 307-28 (2001). For a
helpful synthesis of the literature, see Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and
Social Movements, 111 MICH. L. REV. 877, 878 nn.4-6 (2013).
See, e.g., CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 2-3 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold
eds., 2006); JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
4-9, 74-76, 148-236 (2005); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reﬂection on Law
and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 447 (2001).
See Amna Akbar, Sameer Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3) (on ﬁle with authors); see also infra note 44 (citing legal scholarship that engages with contemporary organizing eﬀorts among workers, tenants, debtors,
and others).
See, e.g., STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 5-6, 14-21, 218-19 (2d ed. 2004) (arguing that the “myth of rights,” including
the related focus on courts, legitimates existing social arrangements and is unlikely to produce
fundamental change); Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 512-13, 516 (1976) (critiquing the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense and Education
Fund’s school desegregation-litigation strategy and its focus on “symbolic manifestations of
new rights”); Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J.
2176, 2178 (2013) (arguing that Gideon demonstrates that rights are indeterminate and regressive, failing to improve the situation of most poor people and in some ways worsening their
plight); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363-64 (1984) (describing
rights as unstable, indeterminate, and overly abstract); cf. Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1331, 1334, 1356 (1988) (ﬁnding the critique of rights compelling but “incomplete”
because it fails “to appreciate fully the transformative signiﬁcance of the civil rights movement
in mobilizing Black Americans and generating new demands”).
In prior work we have each made the case that legal scholars and reformers should pay more
attention to “facilitating the participation of countervailing organizations in government,” Andrias, Separations of Wealth, supra note 18, at 495, and have argued that “reforms designed to
facilitate political organizing are more likely to avoid the problems of circumvention that have
undermined traditional modes of regulation,” Sachs, supra note 18, at 157; see also Andrias,
Hollowed-Out Democracy, supra note 18. But the extant analysis—including our own—has been
insuﬃciently informed by careful consideration of where and how law can successfully facilitate and empower mass-membership organizations of nonelites.

constructing countervailing power

movements can or hope to reshape law, or how a focus on traditional legal rights
disables fundamental social change, we ask how law could be used explicitly and
directly to enable low- and middle-income Americans to build their own socialmovement organizations for political power.
The question is particularly urgent today as the COVID-19 pandemic has
exacerbated society’s existing inequalities. Working-class communities, especially low- and middle-income people of color, have experienced hardships as a
result of the disease to a far greater extent than the wealthy—from massive unemployment to dangerous working conditions, from food insecurity to rising
debt and risk of eviction. 34 The suﬀering wrought by the pandemic, as well as
by the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, has led to an upsurge in protests by low- and
middle-income Americans, particularly among workers, tenants, and debtors. 35
At the same time, endemic violence against Black communities, including the
recent killing of George Floyd, has led to widespread organizing around issues
of racial justice. 36 These movements demand that government respond to the
34.

See Max Fisher & Emma Bubola, As Coronavirus Deepens Inequality, Inequality Worsens Its
Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/europe
/coronavirus-inequality.html [https://perma.cc/9R3V-AMFB]; Adriana Gallardo & Ariel
Goodman, Los New Yorkers: Essential and Underprotected in the Pandemic’s Epicenter, PROPUBLICA (May 2, 2020, 5:00 AM EDT), https://www.propublica.org/article/los-new-yorkers-essential-and-underprotected-in-the-pandemics-epicenter [https://perma.cc/BBJ4-WBQU];
Dylan Scott, Covid-19’s Devastating Toll on Black and Latino Americans, in One Chart, VOX (Apr.
17, 2020, 4:10 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/17/21225610/us-coronavirus-deathrates-blacks-latinos-whites [https://perma.cc/53C4-Q7PW].
35. See, e.g., Harold Meyerson, The Renters’ Revolution, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://prospect.org/blogs/tap/the-renters-revolution
[https://perma.cc/5789-MNVE];
Noam Scheiber & Kate Conger, Strikes at Instacart and Amazon over Coronavirus Health Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/business/economy/coronavirus-instacart-amazon.html [https://perma.cc/QPC3-2HHE]. On the upsurge
in organizing and strikes prior to the pandemic, see, for example, Alexia Fernández Campbell,
A Record Number of US Workers Went on Strike in 2018, VOX (Feb. 13, 2019, 3:00 PM EST),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/2/13/18223211/worker-teacher-strikes2018-record [https://perma.cc/X9RU-HV6H]; Aaron Ross Coleman, How a Group of Student
Debtors Took on Their Banks—and Won, GQ (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.gq.com/story/debtcollective-union-organizing [https://perma.cc/HUM5-MUJY]; Noam Scheiber, In a Strong
Economy, Why Are So Many Workers on Strike?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/19/business/economy/workers-strike-economy.html [https://perma.cc
/3WEQ-XLKJ]; and Jimmy Tobias, Meet the Rising New Housing Movement that Wants to Create Homes for All, NATION (May 24, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/theway-home [https://perma.cc/E5C5-YXGN].
36. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-ﬂoyd-protests-crowd-size.html
[https://perma.cc/B9QUB3D6]; see Amna Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for Police Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781, 1787
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concerns of ordinary Americans and attempt to elicit better treatment from powerful actors. Yet, despite their promise, such movements face signiﬁcant obstacles in translating their members’ anger into robust and lasting political power. 37
A pressing task, therefore, is to ask how law can facilitate and protect these new
and revived protest movements, helping to create durable organizations that can
exercise sustained power in the political economy.
We start from the premise that the robustness of countervailing, mass-membership organizations should be understood as a problem both of and for law.
The shape of civil society and organizational life is already a product of legal
structures and rules. 38 And although law has frequently been a tool of oppression, rather than of empowerment, of poor and working-class people and movements, 39 alternative legal regimes that encourage the growth of and the exercise
of power by social-movement organizations of the poor and working class are
possible. Indeed, for those who are committed to decreasing political inequality,
alternative legal structures that encourage the growth of countervailing organizations are imperative.
In analyzing how legal and institutional reforms could facilitate a diﬀerent
picture of organizational and political life in the United States, we draw from the
successes and failures of labor law—the area of U.S. law that most explicitly and
directly creates a right to collective organization for working people—while also
moving beyond that context to literature considering “how, in what forms, and
under what conditions social movements become a force for social and political
change.” 40 We do not attempt to adjudicate priority among factors that

37.

38.
39.
40.
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(2020) (arguing that the racial-justice abolitionist movement “aims to contest and then to
shrink the role of police, ultimately seeking to transform our political, economic, and social
order to achieve broader social provision for human needs”).
See Steven Greenhouse, Turning Worker Anger into Worker Power, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 29,
2020), https://prospect.org/labor/turning-worker-anger-into-worker-power [https://
perma.cc/9G87-HTQ J] (discussing the recent upsurge in worker organizing and challenges
in creating long-term power); Meyerson, supra note 35 (“Over the course of the Great Depression, the tenant organizations and leagues of the unemployed won occasional local victories over speciﬁc demands, but failed to become ongoing institutions.”).
See infra notes 147-165 and accompanying text.
See supra note 32 and infra notes 90-91, 162-165.
Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes and Transformation of the Women’s Movement in the 1960s, 111 AM. J. SOC. 1718, 1753 (2006); see also Doug
McAdam, Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 24-25 (Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald
eds., 1996) (considering deﬁnitions and interpretations of the term “political opportunity”);
sources cited supra notes 38-39. This Article thus seeks to incorporate insights from social
science into legal scholarship on social movements. See Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 29
(identifying three social-movement-theory frameworks); NeJaime, supra note 29, at 879
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contribute to successful organizing, nor do we attempt to build an exhaustive list
of such factors. Instead, we consolidate factors that have two attributes: (1) they
are likely to contribute to the successful building of membership organizations
among poor and working-class people, and (2) their existence or development
might be enabled by law.
We recognize that some factors, undoubtedly critical to successful organizing, are beyond the reach of our proposal. For example, sociologists and historians have demonstrated that several structural opportunities helped facilitate the
growth of the Civil Rights movement, including the collapse of cotton; the increase in Black migration and electoral strength; and the advent of World War
II and the Cold War. 41 These kinds of objective structural conditions, exogenous
to movements themselves, are frequently important to movement formation, but
they cannot be directly aﬀected by the kinds of legal reforms we suggest. Likewise, sociologists have shown that strategic leadership within organizations is
critical to movement success, 42 but internal leadership dynamics are not easily
aﬀected through legal regulation. 43
Three additional principles guide our analysis. First, because small-scale,
concrete victories are essential to successful organizing, and because organizing
tends to be most successful among people with shared identities and existing
relationships, we focus on reforms that enable organizing within particular
structures of authority and resource relations. By way of examples, we consider
organizing among workers, tenants, debtors, and recipients of public beneﬁts.
We pick these contexts in part because they are ones rife with exploitation and
(arguing that social-movement scholarship could enable legal scholars to better assess the
possibilities and limitations of law and courts for contributing to social change); Rubin, supra
note 28 (describing a divergence between legal scholarship and social-movement scholarship); cf. Lauren B. Edelman, Gwendolyn Leachman & Doug McAdam, On Law, Organizations, and Social Movements, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 653, 654-55 (2010) (reviewing literature
and arguing for a synthetic approach to the study of law, social movements, and organization); Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 17, 19-20 (2006) (arguing that sociolegal theory and social-movement theory
should take greater account of one another in part to understand better the eﬃcacy and legacy
of legal mobilization).
41. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 11-17 (rev. ed. 2011); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 4 (2004); DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL
PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930-1970, at 73-83 (2d ed. 1999);
FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 181-84 (1979).
42. See Marshall Ganz, Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of California Agriculture, 1959-1966, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1003, 1019 (2000).
43. That said, some of our proposals may have an indirect eﬀect on factors like strategic-leadership development and political opportunities.
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power imbalances and populated by the relevant income groups, and in part because they are home to important organizing eﬀorts, both historical and contemporary. 44 We do not suggest that these are the only relevant contexts in which
our suggestions might be explored, nor do we in any sense imply that broader
organizational development encompassing poor and working-class people as a
whole is impossible or ineﬀective. In fact, the context-speciﬁc organizing regimes we envision might well facilitate broader community-based and political
organization. However, we leave for another day exploration of how the law
might directly enable broad-based political organization—say, a political organization of all poor people or a political-party system that incentivizes grassroots
participation among nonwealthy individuals. 45
Second, we focus on how law can build organization, as opposed to more
amorphous conﬁgurations of insurgency. The organizations our reforms seek to
facilitate are very much social-movement actors, in that they seek to change “elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society.” 46 But the
goal is to encourage enduring organization that can wield sustained,

44.

See, e.g., Lisa T. Alexander, Occupying the Constitutional Right to Housing, 94 NEB. L. REV. 245,
269 (2015) (“These movements explicitly use the human right to housing as an organizing
framework. . . . These movements deﬁne their actions as ‘liberating’ homes from the shackles
of an unjust and immoral housing system that privileges proﬁts over people.”); Luke Herrine,
The Law and Political Economy of a Student Debt Jubilee, 68 U. BUFF. L. REV. 281, 325 (2020)
(“In recent years, there have been some signs that more and more student debtors have begun
to understand their plight not as an individual responsibility but as a collective failure.”). On
labor exploitation and new worker-organizing eﬀorts, see, for example, Andrias, supra note
26, at 6, 40-44; and Veena B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of
Legal Worker Identities, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 67 (2017). Cf. Beatrix Hoﬀman, Health Care Reform and Social Movements in the United States, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 75, 75 (2003) (asking
“why there has never been such a movement for universal health care, and whether and how
one may emerge now and in the future”).
45. For earlier scholarship examining the relationship between law and the makeup and organization of political parties, see, for example, Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s
Over: McCutcheon, Shadow Parties, and the Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 175,
175-79; Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131,
146-59 (2005); and Pildes, supra note 15, at 828-33.
46. John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial
Theory, 82 AM. J. SOC. 1212, 1217-18 (1977). We refer to the organizations interchangeably as
mass-membership organizations and as social-movement organizations (SMOs). Social-science scholars broadly deﬁne a social movement as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population
which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society.” Id.; see also Brown-Nagin, supra note 29, at 1503 (deﬁning social
movements as persistent, interactive campaigns that make “sustained, collective claims for
relief or redistribution in response to social marginalization, dislocation, change, or crisis”
(emphasis omitted)); Guinier & Torres, supra note 28, at 2756-57 (deﬁning social movements).
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countervailing power. 47 Thus, our approach rejects the idea that formal structures facilitated by law are necessarily deradicalizing and inimical to social
change. 48
Finally, our focus is on how law can facilitate organizations of working-class
and poor Americans—not on either of two other questions: one, how law could
be designed speciﬁcally to enhance the political power of communities of color,
or two, how law could encourage the formation of interest groups generally. The
ﬁrst question could not be more critical. Just as our government is disproportionately responsive to the wealthy, it is also disproportionately responsive to
white people, 49 and the crisis of structural racism is perhaps the most acute we
face as a nation. As such, a program for building political power among communities of color is just as necessary as a program for building power among workers and the poor. But it is also true that our focus on working and poor Americans
ought, in practice, and in part due to the crisis of structural racism itself, to
amount to a program for building power among and by communities of color.
This is not the exclusive reach of our proposals, and continued attention must
be paid to ensure that racial inequities do not infect the political organizing we
aspire to enable. But because people of color are over-represented in the sectors
of the population that we do address—low-income workers, tenants, government-beneﬁts recipients, debtors—these communities would likely beneﬁt from
the success of our proposals. As to the second question, while a more expansive
civil society may bring a host of beneﬁts, including greater social cohesion and
civic education, this Article’s concern is with building organizations that can
serve as a countervailing force to the extraordinary power of economic elites in
our political economy. 50

47.

See MCADAM, supra note 41, at 54-56 (emphasizing the importance of enduring organization).
Cf. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 41 (providing a history of four disruptive social movements,
and arguing that organization is o�en antithetical to movement success among poor people).
For further discussion, see infra note 370 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER, JESSE H. RHODES & RAYMOND J. LA RAJA, HOMETOWN INEQUALITY: RACE, CLASS, AND REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN LOCAL POLITICS 13-14 (2020) (“Whites
and wealthier people receive substantially more ideological representation both from local
government oﬃcials and from municipal policy outputs than do nonwhites and less wealthy
individuals. The inequities in representation we identify are frequently shocking in their magnitude.”); John Griﬃn, Zoltan Hajnal, Brian Newman & David Searle, Political Inequality in
America: Who Loses on Spending Policy? When Is Policy Less Biased?, 7 POL. GROUPS & IDENTITIES 367, 368 (2019) (“[T]he racial inequalities we uncover are as large as, and o�en larger
than, income-based bias.”).
50. Other work examines the value of robust civil society more broadly. E.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); THEDA
SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN CIVIL
LIFE (2003).
48.
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We argue that a legal regime designed to enable this kind of organizing
should have several components. First, the law should grant collective rights in
an explicit and direct way so as to create a “frame” that encourages organizing.
Second, as importantly, though more prosaically, the law should provide for a
reliable, administrable, and sustainable source of ﬁnancial, informational, human, and other relevant resources. Third, the law should guarantee free spaces—
both physical and digital—in which movement organization can occur, free from
surveillance or control. Fourth, the law should remove barriers to participation,
both by protecting all those involved from retaliation—no worker may be ﬁred,
no tenant evicted, no debtor penalized, and no welfare recipient deprived of beneﬁts because they are active in or supportive of the movement’s eﬀorts—and by
removing material obstacles that make it diﬃcult for poor and working people
to organize. Fi�h, the law should provide the organizations with ways to make
material change in their members’ lives and should create mechanisms for the
exercise of real political and economic power, for example by providing the right
to “bargain” with the relevant set of private actors and by facilitating organizational participation in governmental processes. Finally, the law should enable
contestation and disruption, oﬀering protections for the right to protest and
strike. 51
The particulars necessarily vary by context. For example, a law designed to
generate organizing among tenants would start by aﬃrmatively granting tenants
the right to form and join tenant unions. It would grant such unions the right to
access information and landlord property for organizational purposes. It would
vest the organization with authority to collect dues payments through deductions from rent payments. It would mandate that landlords negotiate with tenants’ organizations over rent and housing conditions. It would ensure that organizations have special rights of participation in administrative processes
related to housing policy. And it would provide for the right of tenants to engage
in rent strikes and protests, free from retaliation. A law designed to facilitate organizing among debtors would similarly create a collective frame, provide a
mechanism for funding, protect against retaliation, mandate bargaining and

51.
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Some, though not all, of the interventions we propose might require the state to determine
which organizations are entitled to the law’s beneﬁts. For example, if the government directly
funds organizations, or requires bargaining with organizations, or mandates access to property for organizations, the law might need to establish criteria according to which organizations qualify (or don’t) for the entitlements in question. Current labor law oﬀers one, quite
imperfect model: many legal entitlements (the employers’ bargaining obligation, for example) are granted when, and only when, a union can demonstrate support from a majority of
the relevant group of workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2018). This model could be modiﬁed
so that some threshold showing of support—short of a majority—is required before the organization could avail itself of the relevant legal right. This administrability question is an
important one but is beyond the scope of the current Article.
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rights of participation in governance, and protect the right to protest and strike,
but a debtor-organizing law might not provide for access to physical spaces, instead putting more emphasis on providing information and enabling online organizing.
Some of our proposals will generate resistance—theoretical, legal, and political. And, indeed, we concede that our approach has limitations. For example,
we do not attempt to articulate the optimal level of political inﬂuence that the
organizations in question ought to enjoy, nor a way of measuring when and
whether they have become suﬃciently strong. As Richard Pildes has written in
a related context, we believe it is possible to “identify what is troublingly unfair,
unequal, or wrong without a precise standard of what is optimally fair, equal, or
right.” 52 In addition, the scope of our inquiry is limited to problems of economic
inequality. Yet we do not mean in any way to minimize other aspects of inequality, including racial and gender discrimination and hierarchy, which are both inseparable from economic inequality and worthy of separate examination and intervention. To that end, we believe law ought to require inclusion and
nondiscrimination among poor and working people’s social-movement organizations. 53
Finally, we recognize both that our recommendations will not provide a panacea to the imbalance in power that characterizes our political economy and that
our proposals will be diﬃcult to enact. Indeed, although we suggest a range of
possible reforms and explain how they could be achieved, the goal is to illuminate law’s constitutive potential and to suggest a path for further work, not to
provide a comprehensive blueprint. 54 In short, analysis of what makes poor and
working people’s social-movement organizations succeed helps show that law

52.

Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1612 (1999).
Labor law provides a useful example for much in this Article, including the profound risk of
racial and gender exclusion. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), for example, entrenched and perpetuated certain forms of race- and gender-based oppression by excluding
from statutory coverage occupational groups—like domestic workers and agricultural workers—where Black, Latino, and women workers are disproportionately represented. See IRA
KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 53-61 (2005); see also infra note 384 (describing
requirements of nondiscrimination, inclusion, and antisubordination that might be imposed
on social-movement organizations to prevent internal domination along lines of race, class,
and gender).
54. A host of institutional-design questions, speciﬁc to particular constituencies and contexts, are
thus beyond the scope of this paper.
53.
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can make a diﬀerence—and that the absence of such law is a choice, one we believe our society cannot aﬀord to make. 55
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the problem by tracing the relationship between rising economic inequality and the decline of mass-membership organizations, on the one hand, and political responsiveness on the other. It also explains why this form of inequality is a problem,
theoretically, for a democratic republic, and describes existing approaches to using law as a mechanism for addressing political inequality. Part II details, at a
high level of generality, the promise of legal intervention to encourage organization, drawing on historical and contemporary examples and underlining the extent to which the absence of such regimes is a political choice that favors a particular distribution of power. Part III uses social-science research and lessons
from labor law to elaborate the conditions necessary for poor and working-class
organizations to thrive and explains how law can facilitate the existence of such
conditions in a range of contexts. Finally, in conclusion, we explain why progress
toward a law of organizing might be feasible, notwithstanding signiﬁcant obstacles.
i. inequality, democracy, and countervailing
organizations
A. The Unequal Landscape of Political Organization
At every stage of the electoral and governing process, wealthy Americans
dominate. 56 They vote at higher rates, they contribute more frequently and in
greater amounts to campaigns, they volunteer more o�en on political campaigns, and they are more likely to contact a representative about an issue. 57 In

55.

The legal reforms we suggest are targeted to generate organizing among people in speciﬁc
income classes but not targeted to generate political organizing among people who hold speciﬁc political views. As a result, it is possible that our reforms would facilitate organizing by
those who hold reactionary views as well as those who hold progressive ones. Of course, it
will remain critical to combat discriminatory and exclusionary political developments through
other means.
56. KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 6-8, 14 (2012);
see also id. at 122 & n.8, 136, 169, 197 (demonstrating that the higher the socioeconomic-status
quintile to which a person belongs, the more likely he or she is to vote, contribute money to a
campaign, engage in political discussion daily, be more persistently politically active over time,
and to have come from a politically engaged family).
57. See id. at 136.
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addition, wealthy individuals are, and have always been, far more likely to serve
as elected and appointed leaders than are working-class and poor Americans. 58
The story of how economic elites, as individuals, dominate campaign spending, lobbying, and elected oﬃce is likely familiar to most readers. Less well
known is the relationship between inequality and political organization. Here,
too, the picture is one of domination by the wealthy. Those in the top income
quintile, for example, are far more active in organized political groups. 59 They
can more easily bear the economic costs of organization, and they are more likely
to possess the skills, information, resources, and media savvy essential to the
successful functioning of such groups. 60 Similarly, business organizations are
dominant in both federal- and state-level politics. Indeed, the majority of organized, national political groups focus on economic issues, and of these, more
than three-quarters represent business interests. 61 Over three-fourths of lobbying expenditures are made on behalf of corporate America. 62 Political participation by business and the wealthy, moreover, vastly outpaces participation by organizations of the nonwealthy: business groups outnumber and far outspend
organizations of working-class and poor Americans. 63
58.
59.

60.

61.

62.

63.

NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE-COLLAR GOVERNMENT: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CLASS IN ECONOMIC
POLICY MAKING 107-08 (2013).
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 259-61; see also id. at 276 (“[B]arriers to entry into the
political fray have potential consequences for the representation—and, in particular, for the
equal representation—of citizen interests.”).
For discussion of why the wealthy are better able to organize, see id. at 316-17; see also E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 35 (1960) (discussing the disproportionate role that the wealthy play in political organizing).
See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 320, 322 (noting that “[m]ore than two-thirds of the
organized interests in Washington are institutions or membership associations directly related
to the joint political concerns that arise from economic roles and interests” and those representing business constitute more than three-quarters of these).
LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME POLITICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE 8-9 (2015). In fact, these numbers signiﬁcantly undercount the true corporate investments in politics, because many activities seeking
to inﬂuence the political process are not captured by lobbying-disclosure rules. See id. at 9.
Id. But see SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 419 (noting that participation in litigation via
amicus briefs is one exception). One study found that “72 percent of expenditures on lobbying
originate with organizations representing business.” SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 442.
Another concluded that “[l]obbying expenditures by corporations and trade associations represent more than 84% of total interest group lobbying expenditures at the US federal level.”
John M. de Figueiredo & Brian Kelleher Richter, Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying,
17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 163, 165 (2014). A single business group, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, spent $1.62 billion lobbying the federal government between 1998 and 2020, Top
Spenders, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?
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This inequality in political organization has not always been so severe. In the
years a�er the Civil War until the mid-twentieth century, American civil society
was made up of numerous federated organizations with membership from the
working class. 64 In the early twentieth century, labor organizations like the
Knights of Labor, the American Federation of Labor, and the early industrial unions, along with civic organizations like the National Consumers League and
National Urban League, engaged millions of low- and middle-income Americans and immigrants in grassroots political activity. Members participated in organizational meetings, decisionmaking, and leadership, as well as in political action at the local, state, and federal levels. Notably, these organizations were
primarily member-funded. They were by no means perfect—some were exclusionary or segregated on the basis of race or gender—but they engaged Americans in democratic, political activity at all levels. 65
Progressive era intellectuals, writing against the background of a political
economy with signiﬁcant parallels to today’s, understood that working people’s
organizations could redistribute power over political decisionmaking and
thereby could ensure a more egalitarian political economy. 66 John Dewey, for example, wrote of a society of citizens whose equality was guaranteed by their participation in voluntary associations with real power in the governance process. 67

64.
65.

66.

67.
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showYear=a&indexType=s [https://perma.cc/K8VR-AFK2], compared to $889 million by all
labor unions combined, Ranked Sectors, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/ranked-sectors?cycle=a [https://perma.cc/H9JZ-JZN3]. The top
three healthcare-industry groups spent more than three times as much on lobbying during
this period as the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP). See Top Spenders, supra.
SKOCPOL, supra note 50, at 152-57.
Id. at 98-158; see also SUZANNE METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS: THE G.I. BILL AND THE MAKING OF THE GREATEST GENERATION 2-5 (2005) (noting the ways in which civic organizations
prepared Americans for participation in democratic politics); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note
56, at 148 (discussing the role of labor unions in mobilizing voters).
See DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 50 (1988) (describing progressives’ commitment to encouraging
broad participation in economic decisionmaking in order to achieve fundamental structural
changes in the economy); BILL NOVAK, A NEW DEMOCRACY: LAW AND THE CREATION OF THE
MODERN AMERICAN STATE, 1866-1932 (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 51, 57-65) (on ﬁle
with authors) (arguing that Progressive era “reformers had a thicker and more substantive
conception of what was entailed by democracy than the comparatively thin renderings of deliberation, representation, voting, or oﬃce that prevail at present”); MARC STEARS, DEMANDING DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN RADICALS IN SEARCH OF A NEW POLITICS 94-97, 105-14 (2010)
(describing the rise of industrial unions and their relationship to Progressive era democratic
theory); ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 434-39 (1991)
(discussing Dewey’s eﬀorts to develop a workable form of democratic socialism).
John Dewey, What Are We Fighting for?, INDEPENDENT, Apr.-June 1918, at 482. For further
discussion of progressive and New Deal approaches to working-class membership
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Public opinion and the ballot, he argued, were insuﬃcient tools to achieve
change. For the public to solve its problems, organizations of citizens, and organizations of working-class Americans in particular, “needed concrete ways to
exercise power over the range of economic and political decision making.” 68
Following the Great Depression and the resulting protest movements among
the unemployed and industrial workers, the New Deal fostered a rapid growth
in the organization of the working class. 69 In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which guaranteed workers the right to organize and bargain collectively with their employers. 70 In 1935, John Lewis of the
United Mineworkers and Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Textile Workers
Union formed the new Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO), with the
goal of organizing all workers, immigrant and native-born, male and female. 71
The CIO’s success was remarkable. In the year following the United Auto Workers strike at General Motors in Michigan, nearly ﬁve million workers took part
in industrial action, and almost three million joined a union. 72 Over the next
decade, unions continued to grow, with some becoming a vehicle for the empowerment of Black Americans as well as a force for rising living standards,
workplace democracy, and political change. 73
The 1950s and 60s saw the rise of several new transformative social movements among low- and middle-income Americans. 74 In particular, the Civil
Rights movement organized Black Americans and their allies, engaging them in
a political struggle against racial injustice, including its economic dimensions. 75

68.
69.

70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.

organizations and their role in government, see Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social
Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616, 625-33
(2019).
Andrias, supra note 67, at 648.
See IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1933-1941,
at 37-61 (1970); NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 18 (2013); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 41, at 44-76; ROBERT H. ZIEGER, THE CIO 19351955, at 16-17 (1995).
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2018).
See, e.g., MELVYN DUBOFSKY & WARREN VAN TINE, JOHN L. LEWIS: A BIOGRAPHY 162-63
(1986); LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 69, at 43-53. See generally STEVEN FRASER, LABOR WILL
RULE: SIDNEY HILLMAN AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN LABOR 329-48 (1991) (describing Hillman’s founding goals for the Committee for Industrial Organization).
LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 69, at 51-52.
Id. at 78-85, 104.
SKOCPOL, supra note 50, at 127-38.
See TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS: 1963-65, at 210-11 (1998);
MICHAEL K. HONEY, TO THE PROMISED LAND: MARTIN LUTHER KING AND THE FIGHT FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE 1-16 (2018); MCADAM, supra note 41, at 75-84; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note
41, at 181-211.
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The National Welfare Rights Organization and numerous related communitybased groups organized welfare recipients and the poor more generally. 76 Union
organization among service workers and public-sector workers expanded during
this period as well. 77
By the 1970s, however, membership organizations began to decline in prominence. 78 Theda Skocpol estimates that membership in the federated massmembership organizations built in the Progressive and New Deal eras dropped
by sixty percent between 1974 and 1994. 79 Today, less than a third of the organizational advocates operating in Washington are membership associations of any
kind, and only about an eighth are membership associations of individuals. 80
Although groups associated with the 1960s social movements have survived,
they are no longer democratically governed mass-membership organizations.
Most are now professionally managed advocacy groups, organized as charitable
nonproﬁts funded mainly by wealthy donors. 81
Labor unions stand as an exception to this dominant model. Their membership and funding are still drawn from working Americans, and unions are still
federated, national organizations whose members have governance rights and
the organizational capacity to exercise power in the political economy. 82 Unions
provide voice for millions of Americans, enabling workers to improve collectively

76.
77.

78.

79.
80.
81.

82.
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See NICK KOTZ & MARY LYNN KOTZ, A PASSION FOR EQUALITY: GEORGE A. WILEY AND THE
MOVEMENT 15-21 (1977); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 41, at 264-96.
See, e.g., LEON FINK & BRIAN GREENBERG, UPHEAVAL IN THE QUIET ZONE: A HISTORY OF HOSPITAL WORKERS’ UNION, LOCAL 1199, at 17-27 (1989); MARJORIE MURPHY, BLACKBOARD UNIONS: THE AFT AND THE NEA, 1900-1980, at 213-29 (1990); JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900-1962, at 1-12 (2004).
See SKOCPOL, supra note 50, at 135-38; see also PUTNAM, supra note 50, at 27, 48-64 (showing
Americans have become increasingly disconnected from one another and that institutions
have disintegrated); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 320, 322 (describing the relative lack
of organization among lower-income groups and the overwhelming dominance of elites and
business interests in lobbying).
SKOCPOL, supra note 50, at 212-19.
Id. at 212-19; see SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 319.
See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 319; SKOCPOL, supra note 50, at 212-19; David Pozen,
The Tax-Code Shi� That’s Changing Liberal Activism, ATLANTIC (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/501c3-501c4-activists-and-tax-code
/576364 [https://perma.cc/V8WA-MZX4]; see also DANA R. FISHER, ACTIVISM, INC.: HOW
THE OUTSOURCING OF GRASSROOTS CAMPAIGNS IS STRANGLING PROGRESSIVE POLITICS IN
AMERICA 73 (2006) (describing the outsourcing of grassroots organizing). For further discussion of funding dynamics, see infra Section III.B.1.
The other major exceptions include the AARP and the National Riﬂe Association, which
maintain federated membership structures and continue to wield signiﬁcant power, but neither focuses on organizing working-class or poor Americans on the basis of their class interests. See Abu El-Haj, supra note 18, at 95-97.
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their wages, beneﬁts, and working conditions. 83 They also have signiﬁcant political and civic impact by educating workers about political issues, mobilizing
them to support political candidates, contributing ﬁnancially to political campaigns, and successfully advocating for policy changes at the local, state, and federal levels. 84 Researchers have found that unions are remarkably eﬀective at
boosting voter turnout, particularly among the least educated and least well-represented in the electorate. 85 States with higher union density tend to have higher
turnout rates among the working class. 86 And union members, as a result of their
experience with politically impactful and democratic organizations, tend to join
more civic associations. 87 In short, unions enable workers to participate

83.

84.

85.

86.
87.

See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984); JAKE ROSENWHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO (2014); David Card, The Eﬀect of Unions on Wage Inequality in the U.S. Labor Market, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 296 (2001); Bruce Western & Jake
Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513 (2011);
Henry S. Farber, Daniel Herbst, Ilyana Kuziemko & Suresh Naidu, Unions and Inequality over
the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24587, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24587.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3HV2-74WP]; Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, William Kimball & Thomas Kochan,
How U.S. Workers Think About Workplace Democracy: The Structure of Individual Worker
Preferences for Labor Representation (Aug. 28, 2019) (unpublished working paper) (on ﬁle
with the Washington Center for Equitable Growth), https://equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/WP-Workplace-Democracy-Hertel-Fernandez-Kimball-Kochan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JS47-5NZ6]. For a philosophical account that elaborates the harm to democratic society when workers lack basic rights at work, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE
GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT)
(2017).
See JOHN S. AHLQUIST & MARGARET LEVI, IN THE INTEREST OF OTHERS: ORGANIZATIONS AND
SOCIAL ACTIVISM (2013); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56; DANIEL SCHLOZMAN, WHEN
MOVEMENTS ANCHOR PARTIES: ELECTORAL ALIGNMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2015); Hertel-Fernandez et al., supra note 83; Sung Eun Kim & Yotam Margalit, Informed Preferences? The
Impact of Unions on Workers’ Policy Views, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 728 (2017); Jan E. Leighley &
Jonathan Nagler, Unions, Voter Turnout, and Class Bias in the U.S. Electorate, 1964-2004, 69 J.
POL. 430 (2007).
ROSENFELD, supra note 83, at 170, 173; Richard B. Freeman, What, Me Vote?, in 1 SOCIAL INEQUALITY 714-15 (Kathryn M. Neckerman ed., 2004); see also Sean McElwee, How Unions Boost
Democratic Participation, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 16, 2015), https://prospect.org/labor/unionsboost-democratic-participation [https://perma.cc/Q6ET-5E8M] (collecting research that
shows a positive correlation between union membership and voting).
Benjamin Radcliﬀ & Patricia Davis, Labor Organization and Electoral Participation in Industrial
Democracies, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 132, 136-38 (2000).
See McElwee, supra note 85.
FELD,

567

the yale law journal

130:546

2021

collectively at every level of politics and government, equalizing power in the
political economy and providing a countervailing voice to organized business
groups. 88
At their high point in the 1950s, unions represented about a third of work89
ers. Since the 1970s, however, the labor movement’s size and power have declined considerably. This is partly a result of weaknesses in the original NLRA,
antiunion reforms in the 1947 Ta�-Hartley Act, and a host of Supreme Court
decisions that privilege employers’ managerial and property rights over workers’
right to organize. A�er decades of capital ﬂight, the ﬁssuring of the employment
relationship, and intense managerial resistance, unions now represent only
about six percent of employees in the private sector and ten percent of the labor
force overall. 90 Recently enacted antiunion laws in previously union-dense
states, along with the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. American Federation
of State, County & Municipal Employees, further threaten unions’ ability to exercise eﬀective political voice. 91 In short, unions remain politically active and continue to provide substantial resources to proworker candidates, but because

88.

See JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON
MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 57 (2010)
(“[O]rganized labor’s role is not limited to union participation in the determination of wages.
Much more fundamental is the potential for unions to oﬀer an organizational counterweight
to the power of those at the top.”); ROSENFELD, supra note 83, at 4-8. For theoretical accounts
of the importance of collective rights to democracy, see ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 5-6 (1985), which states that, “of the various kinds of equality that might
exist in a good society, political equality is surely one of the most crucial, . . . including . . . the
freedom to help determine, in cooperation with others, the laws and rules that one must
obey”; and Alex Gourevitch, The Right to Strike: A Radical View, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 905,
905, 909-15 (2018), which argues that “every liberal democracy recognizes that workers have
a right to strike” because workers need the ability to resist “the oppression that workers face
in the standard liberal capitalist economy.”
89. GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32553, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2004) (“As a percent of wage and salary employment and a percent of total
employment, union membership peaked in 1954 at 34.8% and 28.3%, respectively.”).
90. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members Summary, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Jan. 22, 2020, 10:00
AM EST), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/36B56EFF]. For a discussion of the causes of the decline, including the role of a weak legal regime,
see ROSENFELD, supra note 83, at 10-30; LANE WINDHAM, KNOCKING ON LABOR’S DOOR: UNION ORGANIZING IN THE 1970S AND THE ROOTS OF A NEW ECONOMIC DIVIDE 6-9 (2017); Andrias, supra note 26, at 6-7; and Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and
the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 266-67 (1978).
91. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). See generally Kate Andrias, Janus’s Two Faces, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 21
(discussing recently enacted antiunion laws, as well as the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine).
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there are so few of them and their funding is increasingly under attack, they represent a declining share of organizational activity in politics and governance. 92
B. Political Inequality in a Democratic Republic
The impact of these developments on the health of American democracy is
stark. Political scientists including Larry Bartels, Martin Gilens, and Benjamin
Page are ﬁnding that government policymaking is responsive to the views of
poor- and middle-income Americans only in settings where the balance of interest-group power aligns with the preferences of these income groups. 93 This
ﬁnding conﬁrms the critical role played by political organization, but it also conﬁrms that in contemporary America—where the wealthy dominate political organization—government is by and large unresponsive to the views of the vast
majority of citizens. 94
By examining two thousand public-opinion surveys conducted between 1981
and 2002, and federal policy adoption during that same period, Gilens estimated
the extent to which diﬀerent income groups inﬂuence policy outcomes. 95 His
ﬁndings are unambiguous: with a single exception, “when preferences between
the well-oﬀ and the poor diverge, government policy bears absolutely no

92.

See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 88, at 179-80; SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 36869. In 2012, corporations spent $2.57 billion on reportable lobbying expenditures, which
amounted to ﬁ�y-six times the amount spent by unions. DRUTMAN, supra note 62, at 8-9, 14.
Recent court decisions prohibiting unions from collecting fees from objecting workers, while
maintaining the obligation that unions represent such workers, further weaken unions’ economic and political position. See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448; Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616
(2014).
93. See BARTELS, supra note 11; GILENS, supra note 11; Gilens & Page, supra note 11.
94. As with all empirical ﬁndings, there is debate about the extent to which Gilens’s and Page’s
ﬁndings hold up. See Dylan Matthews, Remember that Study Saying America Is an Oligarchy? 3
Rebuttals Say It’s Wrong., VOX (May 9, 2016, 8:00 AM EDT), https://www.vox
.com/2016/5/9/11502464/gilens-page-oligarchy-study
[https://perma.cc/HCT5-ALN9]
(summarizing the critiques). But see Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Critics Argued with
Our Analysis of U.S. Political Inequality. Here Are 5 Ways They’re Wrong., WASH. POST (May 23,
2016 12:00 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016
/05/23/critics-challenge-our-portrait-of-americas-political-inequality-heres-5-ways-theyare-wrong [https://perma.cc/ELP9-JX2A] (responding to critics); Sean McElwee, To Inﬂuence Policy, You Have to Be More than Rich, WASH. MONTHLY (Feb. 16, 2016), https://washingtonmonthly.com/2016/02/16/to-inﬂuence-policy-you-have-to-be-more-than-rich
[https://perma.cc/JN3S-QMKT] (“[A] full accounting of the evidence leaves the core ﬁnding
of Gilens and Page standing: the views of the wealthy are disproportionately represented by
policymakers, and representation for low and middle income Americans primarily comes
from their congruence with the wealthy.”).
95. GILENS, supra note 11, at 53.
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relationship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor.” 96 Moreover, even when the poor and middle class agree with each other and disagree
with the wealthy, it is still the views of the wealthy that predominate. Hence, “for
Americans below the top of the income distribution, any association between
preferences and policy outcomes is likely to reﬂect the extent to which their preferences coincide with those of the aﬄuent.” 97 The rare exception occurs when
organized political-group power is aligned with the preferences of the poor and
middle class. 98
The Gilens ﬁndings, moreover, hardly stand alone. Other recent work reveals
that “the views of constituents in the bottom third of the income distribution
receive[] no weight at all in the voting decisions of their [S]enators.” 99 Likewise,
Presidents o�en respond to the “narrow political and economic interests” of the
wealthy. 100 And, at the state level, “the poor have next to no inﬂuence
over . . . policy.” 101 Summarizing these ﬁndings, Gilens and Page conclude
bluntly that in twenty-ﬁrst-century America, “the majority does not rule—at
least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes.” 102
A political system in which government policy is responsive to the preferences of the wealthy few rather than to the majority of citizens may be more
accurately categorized as an oligarchy than as a democracy or a republic. 103
96.
97.
98.
99.

100.
101.

102.
103.
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Id. at 81.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 122-23.
BARTELS, supra note 11, at 254.
JAMES N. DRUCKMAN & LAWRENCE R. JACOBS, WHO GOVERNS?: PRESIDENTS, PUBLIC OPINION, AND MANIPULATION, at xiii (2015).
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527, 1578 (2015); see
also Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Political Parties and Representation of the Poor in the
American States, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 552, 552 (2013) (ﬁnding that low-income preferences rarely
“get incorporated in parties’ campaign appeals at [the] early stage in the policymaking process”). Scholars are beginning to examine how race and gender interact with income for purposes of representation, with early studies suggesting that Black Americans are particularly
likely to be ignored by policymakers. See Griﬃn et al., supra note 49, at 368.
Gilens & Page, supra note 11, at 576.
Like the political-science literature on which we rely, we use the term “preferences.” However,
we are not of the view that preferences are in any sense static or that the relationship between
preferences and policymaking is unidirectional. Indeed, our analysis proceeds on the assumption that preferences are dynamic and subject to change through processes that include organizing. Put diﬀerently, the idea that government should respond to the preferences, priorities, and concerns of constituents is consistent with the idea that those preferences change
over time through deliberation, contestation, and collective debate. Cf. Lisa Disch, Democratic
Representation and the Constituency Paradox, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 599, 610 (2012) (challenging
the focus on responsiveness to preferences and concluding that “[t]he fundamental
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Indeed, in an inﬂuential recent book, political-science professor Jeﬀrey Winters
defends the claim that the United States is now functioning as an oligarchy. As
he describes the current political reality, “regardless of the other ways in which
political power might be equal—such as one-person-one-vote or an equal right
to speak or participate—yawning diﬀerences in material power create enormous
inequalities in political inﬂuence and account for key political outcomes won by
oligarchs.” 104 But, whether best described as an oligarchy or not, the lack of government responsiveness to the views and desires of the vast majority of citizens
is a serious problem for a democratic republic.
Indeed, nearly all democratic theorists consider responsiveness to constituents as an important feature of a functioning democracy. 105 As Robert Dahl put
it, “[A] key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the
government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals.” 106
Hannah Pitkin, explicating the complicated nature of representation, concluded
that, at the very least, representatives “must not be found persistently at odds
with the wishes of the represented.” 107 So, too, the Supreme Court, even as it has
struck down campaign-ﬁnance regulations, has reiterated that “responsiveness
is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected oﬃcials.” 108 Nicholas Stephanopoulos puts this widely accepted point in terms of political “alignment,” arguing that alignment occurs when “the preferences of voters are congruent with the preferences of their elected representatives,” with respect to
partisan aﬃliation, public-policy views, and public-policy outcomes. 109 He argues that Madisonian, minimalist, pluralist, participatory, and deliberative democrats all put some version of alignment between voter preferences and representative behavior as an important component of their views of what comprises
“democracy.” 110

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

democratic deﬁciency of US politics is that it has taken on an organizational form that gives
wealthy interests a signiﬁcant strategic advantage while at the same time making it increasingly unlikely that opposition would mobilize through electoral politics”).
JEFFREY A. WINTERS, OLIGARCHY 214 (2011).
We do not believe that responsiveness is the only important normative goal in a democracy,
nor is it the only goal served by our proposals. See infra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971).
HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 209 (1967). Pitkin allows, however, for divergence with “good reason in terms of the[] interest” of the represented. Id.
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 227 (2014).
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 287.
Id. at 313-16.
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Although the relationship between preferences and policymakers in a democracy is neither simple nor unidirectional, 111 the current U.S. government described by Bartels, Gilens, Page, and others is one deﬁned, quite simply, by misalignment and unresponsiveness: the concerns of the majority are rarely reﬂected
in government policy unless by coincidence, and instead that policy aligns with
the preferences and priorities of a small, wealthy minority. This mismatch is a
problem, moreover, not just from the perspective of democratic government, but
from the perspective of republican government as well. 112
The Constitution, of course, requires that the “United States . . . guarantee
to every state in this Union a Republican Form of Government,” 113 a guarantee
taken to extend to the structure of the federal government as well. 114 As with
democracy, there is robust debate about the particular characteristics of a “republican form of government,” but widespread agreement exists about its core

111.

See Lisa Disch, Toward a Mobilization Conception of Democratic Representation, 105 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 100, 101-12 (2011) (exploring the reﬂexive process that sets claims about preferences in
play); Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515, 518 (2003)
(analogizing legislators to market entrepreneurs insofar as they are both “active . . . in searching out and sometimes even creating preferences”).
112. The reforms we urge also serve other important democratic goals, including that of increasing
and equalizing participation. As democracy-law scholars have argued, participation enhances
the legitimacy of electoral outcomes, exposes government oﬃcials to more of the public’s
views, and connects voters more closely to their representatives. See, e.g., Christopher S.
Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures for a Structural Theory of the
Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 677 (2008); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote:
Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709-11 (1993); see also Steven L. Winter, ‘Down Freedom’s Main Line,’ 41 NETH. J. LEGAL PHIL. 202, 203 (2012) (“Democracy’s moral
appeal lies not in the promise of an impossible radical freedom, but in the commitment to
equal participation in determining the terms and conditions of social life—what, even before
the currency of the term ‘democracy,’ the ancient Greeks called isonomia.”). As such, the reforms urged in this paper should appeal even to those scholars who argue that because public
opinion is “a continuous process” that is “never deﬁnitively represented,” “[t]here is thus no
‘baseline’ from which ‘distortion’ can be assessed.” ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 53 (2014). Moreover, though adequate discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, normative theories of nondomination, self-determination, and agonism also lend support to the kinds of organizational reforms this Article
advocates. On nondomination, see Harry Arthurs, Labor Law as the Law of Economic Subordination and Resistance: A Thought Experiment, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 585, 602 (2013); and
ANDERSON, supra note 83, at 64-71. On self-determination, see, for example, Hanoch Dagan,
Autonomy and Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 185-86, 187-88,
199-202 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky eds., 2020). On agonism and the importance of contestation, see CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS: THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY 5-9 (2013); and Disch, supra note 103, at 610-11.
113. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
114. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Republicanism and the Constitution of Opportunity, 94 TEX. L. REV.
1427, 1429 (2016).
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features. Akhil Amar, for example, concludes that “majority rule popular sovereignty” is a “central pillar” and the “central meaning” of Republican government. 115 Quoting from Federalist No. 39, Amar concludes, “Republicanism must
be deﬁned as against aristocracy and monarchy—as ‘a government which derives
all its powers . . . from the great body of the people.’” 116
Like Amar, both Jack Balkin and William Forbath deﬁne republican government by way of contrast to aristocracy and, of particular relevance here, to oligarchy. Balkin explains, “[T]he Founders opposed republicanism . . . to monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy. A republic is therefore an antimonarchical,
antiaristocratic, and anti-oligarchical form of government.” 117 And Forbath
warns, “You cannot have a constitutional republic, or what the Framers called a
‘republican form of government’ . . . in the context of gross material inequality
among citizens [because] gross economic inequality produces an oligarchy in
which the wealthy rule.” 118
C. Extant Approaches to Using Law to Combat Political Inequality
In light of the problems for democratic and republican government posed by
the current unresponsiveness of American government, legal interventions designed to rebalance political power as between the wealthy and the nonwealthy
are essential. 119 The public-law literature has identiﬁed ways in which extant law
115.

116.
117.
118.

119.

Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority
Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749, 751 (1994). In support, Amar
draws extensively on Hamilton who wrote in Federalist No. 22, for example, that “a fundamental maxim of republican government . . . requires that the sense of the majority should prevail.” Id. at 763 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
Id. at 764 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 240-41 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
Balkin, supra note 114, at 1432.
William E. Forbath, The Distributive Constitution and Workers’ Rights, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1115,
1118 (2011); see also ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH: LABOR AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 38-46 (2014) (emphasizing that republican freedom must be realized under conditions of equal liberty in the
economic sphere); GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION:
WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC 3-5 (2017) (arguing that the U.S.
Constitution assumes relative economic equality but that such equality is now absent); Joseph
Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669, 670-71
(2014) (urging that avoiding oligarchy and building a robust middle class are constitutional
principles).
While we focus on reforms to build countervailing political organization, we recognize that
also important are reforms that would more equitably distribute economic power and

573

the yale law journal

130:546

2021

works to redistribute political power. In his Harvard Law Review Foreword,
Daryl Levinson lays out four areas of public law that are concerned with “distributing power among political interests”: election law, judicial intervention on
behalf of groups lacking political power, campaign-ﬁnance law, and anticapture
judicial review (along with institutional design) in administrative and constitutional law. 120 Although these areas are not designed to facilitate organizing
among working-class voters, they all share an ambition of equalizing political
power so as to correct for imbalances that would otherwise plague democratic
participation. 121
For example, Levinson shows how parts of election law—or, the law of democracy—advance this goal. He explains that “the ideal of equalizing political
power continues to serve as a normative touchstone in debates about how electoral rules and institutional structures should be designed” 122 and that “in at
least one area of election law the goal of redistributing political power has always
been front and center: the enfranchisement and political empowerment of previously excluded black voters.” 123 To ensure that Black voters not only have the
formal right to vote but are also “eﬀective[ly] represent[ed],” the federal government banned at-large election systems that diluted the power of Black minorities
and also required the construction of majority-minority districts to empower
these minorities actually to elect their desired representatives. 124 Levinson also
shows how judicial enforcement of constitutional rights to protect “politically
powerless” groups, à la Carolene Products and political-process theory, is a second

120.

121.

122.
123.
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resources, including tax reform, antitrust reform, and banking and corporate-law reform. For
some recent scholarly eﬀorts to that end, see, for example, KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF
CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 21-22 (2019); TIM WU, THE
CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 1-3 (2018); and Lily Batchelder &
David Kamin, Taxing the Rich: Issues and Options 1 (Sept. 11, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3452274 [https://perma.cc/G9M7-G9CX].
Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law,
130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 38, 112 (2016) (arguing that structural constitutional law should be more
attentive to power as it manifests in democratic-level interests, as opposed to the power of
government institutions); cf. Kate Andrias, Response, Confronting Power in Public Law, 130
HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2016) (critiquing Levinson for remaining agnostic on existing maldistributions of power and for oﬀering as a prescription only that “‘pockets of public law’ ought to
be linked to one another and to structural constitutionalism ‘by a common concern with balancing and diﬀusing power’”).
Levinson, supra note 120, at 113.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 124.
See id. (quoting Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1363-65
(1995)).

constructing countervailing power

area where law redistributes political power. 125 Indeed, the essence of the Carolene Products footnote—and of political-process theory—is that certain groups
lack an appropriate level of political power and that the law ought to step in to
compensate for that absence. Thus, the Supreme Court has long held that a
group’s political powerlessness is a relevant factor in determining whether that
group qualiﬁes as a suspect class and is therefore entitled to heightened judicial
protection. As Levinson writes,
In the ﬁrst instance, the Carolene Products approach calls for courts to rearrange the democratic process in order to fully empower disenfranchised groups. Failing that, however, courts are then charged with replicating the policy outcomes that would have resulted from an idealized
process in which all groups exercised their fair share of power. 126
What we propose are legal interventions of a diﬀerent sort but with the related goal of rebalancing political power in the direction of political equality. In
essence, we suggest multiple ways that the law might enable low- and middleincome people to build organizations with political power—organizations aiming to increase the responsiveness of government to the policy preferences of
low- and middle-income Americans, while at the same time shi�ing power relations between powerless individuals and powerful economic actors like employers, landlords, welfare agencies, and banks. These organizations would aggregate the political voice and resources—ﬁnancial and human—of their members.
125.

See id. at 129 & n.553 (discussing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938)).
126. Levinson, supra note 120, at 129; see also Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98
HARV. L. REV. 713, 745 (1985) (“[I]f we are to remain faithful to Carolene’s concern with the
fairness of pluralist politics, we must repudiate the bad political science that allows us to ignore . . . victims of poverty and sexual discrimination who ﬁnd it most diﬃcult to protect their
fundamental interests through eﬀective political organization.”); Stephanopoulos, supra note
101, at 1577-79 (describing studies showing group-based powerlessness for low-income
Americans). On the role of campaign-ﬁnance law in equalizing political power, see Levinson,
supra note 120, at 135-36. See also HASEN, supra note 13, at 7 (arguing that limiting money in
politics “would be a reasonable step” toward “equality in political power”); David A. Strauss,
What Is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 158 (arguing that
campaign-ﬁnance reform can be justiﬁed by “[t]he promotion of equality”). On administrative law and institutional design, see Levinson, supra note 120, at 113-18. See also Rachel E.
Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15,
17 (2010) (addressing the “overlooked elements of agency design that are particularly wellsuited to addressing the problem of capture when interest groups line up on one side of an
issue”); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures
as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 264-66 (1987) (describing ways to
enhance constituency voices in agency administration); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1760 (1975) (developing an account of
“administrative law as interest representation”).
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It is through such aggregation that these organizations would amass political
power and could thereby serve as a counterweight to the political inﬂuence that
ﬂows from wealth. As Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers have explained,
[I]nequalities in material advantage . . . translate directly to inequalities
in political power. Groups can help remedy these inequalities by permitting individuals with low per capita resources to pool those resources
through organization. In making the beneﬁts of organization available to
those whose inﬂuence on policy is negligible without it, groups help to
satisfy the norm of political equality. 127
The closest extant analogue to what we propose in this Article is federal labor
law. As we have explained previously, “In the United States, the legal regime that
has most successfully facilitated lower- and middle-class political organizing has
been labor law.” 128 Despite its many ﬂaws, which we explore below, labor law
has helped workers build powerful political organizations (i.e., labor unions)
through several basic mechanisms. First, labor law explicitly grants workers the
right to organize and strike, creating a “frame” for collective action. Second, labor law has historically provided workers with a viable and sustainable organizational funding mechanism by requiring employers to bargain over payroll-deduction systems, and it has provided workers access to some of the information
necessary for organizing. Third, the law provides workers the right to use the
workplace as a geographical site for organizing by, for example, granting employees the right to discuss unionization on company property and, in limited
contexts, allowing nonemployee union organizers to do the same. Fourth, the
law plays a critical role in facilitating organizing by promising to insulate workers from employer retaliation. 129 Fi�h, the law grants workers the collective right
to bargain with employers over terms of employment, including their wages,
hours and working conditions. Finally, once organized into unions, low- and
middle-income workers are positioned to exercise collective political power
through electoral and administrative channels—and also through collective direct action and protest when those traditional channels fail. 130
127.

Cohen & Rogers, supra note 20, at 424.
128. Sachs, supra note 18, at 152; see also Andrias, Separations of Wealth, supra note 18, at 500 (discussing the importance of labor unions for low- and middle-income Americans).
129. See Sachs, supra note 18, at 172-75. Of course, the statutory labor-law regime only needs to
grant these rights because common law ﬁrst grants employers near authoritarian control over
workers while on employer property. The prior distribution of power is neither natural nor
neutral. See infra notes 147-150.
130. See supra notes 82-88; see also Alison D. Morantz, What Unions Do for Regulation, 13 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 515, 520 (2017) (discussing how “[u]nion involvement has helped secure the
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To be sure, labor law has signiﬁcant limitations, many of which we have
highlighted in our own previous work: labor law excludes large numbers of
workers, many of whom are women and people of color; it is characterized by
weak enforcement mechanisms, leaving workers eﬀectively unprotected from retaliation when they organize or engage in protests, strikes, or other collective
activity; the law places multiple limitations on the form and content of the right
to strike; and, although the law provides a right to bargain, it mandates that such
bargaining occur only at the worksite level (as opposed to the sectoral or industry
level, where power over working conditions is frequently exercised). 131
Despite these very real shortcomings, however, labor law has served as a critical legal mechanism for facilitating the growth of powerful, collective political
organizations of working people. In this way, it has been an important tool for
rebalancing political power between wealthy and nonwealthy citizens. The ambition of this Article is to suggest how law might do this for low- and middleincome people more broadly and even more eﬀectively.
ii. urgency and promise of a law of organizing
Such a project is necessary because the democracy-reform proposals that
have captured scholarly or political attention to date would do little to build
countervailing social-movement organization among working-class and poor
Americans. Instead, most scholars and advocates propose reforms to campaignﬁnance and lobbying law, increasing the voting rights of individual citizens, and
improving transparency in politics and government. 132 While important, such
proposals have limited capacity to create a more equal political economy. Limitations on the ability of the wealthy to fund campaigns or lobbying, in particular,
would require the Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine to be overruled
by a new alignment on the Court or by constitutional amendment. 133 Moreover,
such reform faces signiﬁcant practical hurdles. Money ﬁnds new channels when
campaign-ﬁnance and lobbying regulators shut down one avenue; therefore,
capping contributions or even expenditures is unlikely to have much eﬀect. 134

131.
132.
133.
134.

passage of federal protective legislation in areas such as Occupational Safety & Health, fair
labor standards, and equal employment opportunity” and has produced higher levels of regulatory compliance).
See Andrias, supra note 26, at 33.
See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
See Samuel Issacharoﬀ & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708-17 (1999) (arguing that money ﬁnds new channels when existing
routes are closed oﬀ ); Kang, supra note 14, at 40 (detailing recent Court decisions and
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Disclosure and transparency regimes, while valuable, have done little to counterbalance wealth’s inﬂuence. 135
So, too, eﬀorts to protect the right to vote at the individual level are essential.
But participation through voting is only one small way in which citizens participate in politics and governance. Likewise, making it easier for a diverse range of
participants to lobby, 136 or to engage in the regulatory process more broadly, 137
are worthy goals. But without greater organization, poor and working-class
Americans are unlikely to engage their legislators or the administrative state effectively.
Legal interventions designed to facilitate and increase the power of countervailing mass-membership organizations are a necessary complement to
describing “reverse hydraulics” whereby the Court rolled back campaign-ﬁnance law as it
stood for decades and “political money has rushed back to newly deregulated channels like
water ﬁnding its own level”); Sachs, supra note 18, at 165 & n.68 (discussing the limitations
of lobbying reform).
135. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Heerwig & Katherine Shaw, Through a Glass, Darkly: The Rhetoric and
Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 102 GEO. L.J. 1443, 1443 (2014) (ﬁnding that “compliance with existing disclosure regulations is inconsistent and that the current regime fails to
identify the most potentially inﬂuential players in the campaign ﬁnance system”). Proposals
for expanded public ﬁnancing or “democracy vouchers” are perhaps more promising, but they
have yet to gain political traction, and, in any event, on their own, would be insuﬃcient to
counterbalance the power of wealth throughout the political system. See CAGÉ, supra note 18,
at 253-323 (arguing for a public voucher system to give each voter an equal amount to spend
in support of political parties, as a complement to other reforms); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 266-70 (2011) (urging
the use of “democracy vouchers”).
136. In recent years, election-law scholars have increasingly turned their attention to lobbying law.
E.g., Richard Briﬀault, The Anxiety of Inﬂuence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 160 (2014); Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance,
27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1147, 1155, 1157 (2011); Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the
Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2012); Zephyr Teachout, The Forgotten Law of Lobbying, 13
ELECTION L.J. 4 (2014); cf. Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV.
1131, 1132 (2016) (analyzing the history of the Petition Clause and “argu[ing] for a stronger
petition right, especially a right to consideration and response”).
137. For proposals to increase participation in the administrative state, see, for example, Nina A.
Mendelson, Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1343, 1380 (2011); and Wendy Wagner, The Participation-Centered Model Meets Administrative
Process, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 671, 677-78, 692. Cf. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 15-16 (Donald R. Harris, Keith
Hawkins, Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Doreen McBarnet eds., 1992) (proposing regulatory regimes
more responsive to industry and consumer associations); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the
Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339 (2012)
(analyzing the ways in which federal spending programs promote the robust participation
and inclusion of varied groups to further civil-rights norms); Charles F. Sabel & William H.
Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 56 (2011)
(analyzing minimalist and experimentalist models of public intervention).
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proposals that have thus far dominated reform debates. Organizations permit
low- and middle-income individuals to pool resources and speak with a stronger
voice. 138 Organizations can turn out voters, involve citizens in lobbying, and inﬂuence public debate. 139 They can also help shape regulatory agendas, comment
on proposed rules, press for agency-enforcement activity, and navigate the complicated and fragmented processes of government. When political organizations
are membership groups, rather than professionally managed “check-book” organizations, their participation helps facilitate more equal political involvement,
while giving Americans a chance to practice democracy on a more regular basis. 140
Historians have illuminated the instrumental role mass-membership organizations played in the passage of a host of legislation—including labor legislation, the GI bill, and civil-rights legislation—even in the face of staunch opposition from elites. 141 Social-movement theorists and legal scholars of movements
have likewise demonstrated the critical role that movement organizations played
in winning changes in law and policy. 142 Recent quantitative empirical work
supports the conclusion that organization is essential to achieving a more equitable democracy. As we have noted, Gilens ﬁnds an exception to the general rule
that policymakers are far more responsive to the preferences of the wealthy:
where countervailing interest-group power is exerted, government policy no
longer simply tracks the preferences of the wealthy. 143 Rather, on issues where
138.

139.
140.
141.

142.
143.

See Cohen & Rogers, supra note 20, at 424; see also Clause Oﬀe, Some Skeptical Considerations
on the Malleability of Representative Institutions, in ASSOCIATIONS AND DEMOCRACY 114, 126-27
(Erik Olin Wright ed., 1995) (describing the conventional view of associative action and interest-group formation); JOHN D. STEPHENS, THE TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM 49-50 (Michael Mann ed., 1980) (discussing the importance of labor unions and other
organizations in strengthening the welfare state and facilitating movement from capitalism to
socialism); David Bradley, Evelyne Huber, Stephanie Moller, François Neilsen & John D. Stephens, Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies, 55 WORLD POL. 193, 197
(2003) (“Organization in unions results in a shi� of power in the market toward the union
members.”).
See Sachs, supra note 18, at 152, 157, 169.
See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
For a few examples from the rich historical literature, see LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 69, at 12228, which discusses the role of labor unions in enacting wage legislation; GARY MAY, BENDING
TOWARD JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2013), which describes the role of Civil Rights movement in the passage of the Voting Rights Act; and METTLER, supra note 65, at 18-22, which details the role of the American
Legion in the passage of the GI Bill. See also BRANCH, supra note 75 (providing an account of
the role played by civil-rights mass-movement organizations in enacting legislative change).
See infra Part III (collecting and analyzing sociology literature); supra notes 28-31 (citing legal
literature on social movements).
See GILENS, supra note 11, at 121-22, 157-58.
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organized groups advance the preferences of low- and middle-income Americans, government outcomes more o�en correspond to the preferences of lowand middle-income Americans. 144 Consistent with these ﬁndings, the state and
local governments that have been most active in attempting to redress wealth
inequality of late are those operating in regions with higher levels of organization
among working people. 145
The legal literature frequently treats the paucity of collective organization
among nonelites as an inevitable collective-action problem, a natural occurrence. 146 In reality, however, the lack of organization among low- and middleincome Americans—along with the strength of organization among elites—is, in
part, a product of law. As Lauren Edelman and Mark Suchman have written,
“[O]rganizations are not ‘real’ primordial creatures, but are social constructions,
deﬁned and given meaning in large part by legal institutions.” 147 Legal forms
sometimes directly inﬂuence organizational behavior and performance. 148 On
other occasions, law shapes organizational practices less directly, by contributing
to an underlying cultural logic of “legal-rationality.” 149 As legal realists, critical
legal scholars, and, more recently, the burgeoning Law and Political Economy
movement, have pointed out, law constructs economic and political power. 150
144.
145.
146.

147.

148.

149.
150.
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For example, Martin Gilens found that unions are among the most important forces moving
policy in a direction desired by the less well-oﬀ. Id. at 158.
See supra notes 85-87 (collecting political-science research on unions and governmental responsiveness).
See notes 231-232 and accompanying text; cf. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized
Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284-91 (2006) (discussing the
history of capture theory in administrative law). Meanwhile, the leading scholarship on the
shape of civil society focuses little attention on the role of law, instead examining how factors
such as technology and evolving cultural norms have eroded connections among Americans,
making them less likely to join organizations. See, e.g., MARC J. DUNKELMAN, THE VANISHING
NEIGHBOR: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 3-78 (2014); ROBERT D. PUTMAN, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 183-286
(2000).
Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN.
REV. SOC. 479, 504 (1997) (paraphrasing W. Richard Scott, Law and Organizations, in THE
LEGALISTIC ORGANIZATION 3, 12 (Sim B. Sitkin & Robert J. Bies eds., 1994)).
Id. (ﬁrst citing Heather A. Haveman, Organizational Size and Change: Diversiﬁcation in the Savings and Loan Industry A�er Deregulation, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 20, 35-36 (1993); and then citing
Hayagreeva Rao & Eric H. Neilsen, An Ecology of Agency Arrangements: Mortality of Savings and
Loan Associations, 1960-1987, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 448, 448 (1992)).
Id. (citing MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 329-41 (A.M.
Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., The Free Press 1968) (1947)).
For just a few examples of these insights from the legal realists, see Morris R. Cohen, The
Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 568-70 (1933), which argues that, because of
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So, too, the landscape of organizational life—and the rights and power wielded
by diﬀerent organizations—are neither natural nor neutral.
Thus, law has played a critical role in constructing the modern corporation; 151 in shaping the boundaries between private ﬁrms, public agencies, collective enterprises, and nonproﬁt organizations; 152 in empowering and constraining the modern trade union; 153 and in enabling some forms of economic
coordination, while disabling others under antitrust law. 154 Ultimately, it is a

151.

152.

153.
154.

background economic and social conditions, formal freedom of contract did not reﬂect a truly
free choice. See also Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 472, 478 (1923) (“To take this control by law from the owner of the plant
and to vest it in public oﬃcials or in a guild or in a union organization elected by the workers
would neither add to nor subtract from the constraint which is exercised with the aid of the
government. It would merely transfer the constraining power to a diﬀerent set of persons.”).
From the subsequent generation of critical legal scholars, see, for example, Hanoch Dagan,
The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 660 (2007), which emphasizes, as law’s
most signiﬁcant feature, “its diﬃcult, but inevitable, accommodation of power and reason”;
and Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 958-68 (1985), which critiques the standard treatment of law
in neoclassical microeconomic theory. See also Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market
Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1988) (“[A]ll markets
are based on and constituted by a structure of legal rules . . . [which] are intimately involved
in shaping substantive outcomes, and therefore the distributive results of all bargaining processes.”). And from the newly revived ﬁeld of Law and Political Economy, see Jedediah Britton-Purdy, Amy Kapczynski & David Singh Grewal, Law and Political Economy: Toward a Manifesto, LAW & POL. ECON. PROJECT (Nov. 6, 2017), https://lpeblog.org/2017/11/06/law-andpolitical-economy-toward-a-manifesto [https://perma.cc/AEU5-HHBV].
KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE
POSSIBILITIES 30, 35, 41 (2007) (critiquing the dominant view that corporate law is private law,
deﬁned by agency relationships and contracts).
John L. Campbell & Leon N. Lindberg, Property Rights and the Organization of Economic Activity
by the State, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 634, 634-35 (1990); Edelman & Suchman, supra note 147, at 504
(ﬁrst citing Victor Nee, Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition: Hybrid Forms, Property
Rights, and Mixed Economy in China, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 2 (1992); and then citing HENRY
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 3-5 (2000)).
See Andrias, supra note 26, at 36-40; Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?,
114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 169 (2015).
Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. 378, 380 (2020).
As Katharina Pistor has recently detailed, under our current system, the legal construction of
organization tends to beneﬁt capital. Capital is coded “in institutions of private law, including
property, collateral, trust, corporate, bankruptcy law, and contract law . . . [all of which] bestow critical legal attributes on the select assets that give them a comparative advantage over
others in creating new and protecting old wealth.” PISTOR, supra note 119, at 21.
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matter of political choice which organizations deserve status, protection, and
rights under law. 155
In circumstances when the political choice has been to facilitate poor and
working people’s organizations, that choice has had eﬀect. Indeed, recent empirical work on constitutions suggests that protecting organizational rights, including the right to form labor unions and political parties, has greater eﬀect than
granting individual rights because such organizations have both incentives and
means to protect substantive rights. 156 The labor context in particular provides
numerous examples of how law can further organization building. For example,
in the ﬁve months following congressional recognition of the right to organize
in the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act, 1.5 million workers joined unions,
an increase described by one scholar of the period as “dramatic.” 157 In just six
years following the enactment of the NLRA in 1935, more than six million workers organized, 158 a massive increase from the earlier period in which law punished collective action among workers rather than facilitating it. 159 The subsequent passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)—which in its initial form
gave unions a privileged position in negotiating wage minimums on an industry-by-industry basis and empowered them to bring collective actions against
wage violations—further buoyed organizing among workers. 160 And during
World War II, the tripartite War Labor Board, which aﬀorded labor a relatively
unprecedented role in setting national labor and employment policy, along with
pro-union decisions from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), helped

155.

156.

157.
158.
159.

160.
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See PISTOR, supra note 119, at 21; cf. Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 413, 418 (David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990) (explaining that people tend to perceive legal prescriptions as “natural and necessary” or, at least,
as “basically uncontroversial, neutral, acceptable”).
Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Do Constitutional Rights Make a Diﬀerence?, 60 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 575, 583 (2016) (explaining that the distinctive feature of organizational rights is that they
aid the establishment of organizations that have the incentives and means to safeguard rights
as well as the means to act strategically to protect them from government repression).
PHILIP DRAY, THERE IS POWER IN A UNION: THE EPIC STORY OF LABOR IN AMERICA 421 (2010).
See MAYER, supra note 89, at 23 tbl.A1.
On the use of courts against labor, see WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991). To be clear, our claim is not that law was the only, or
even the primary, factor driving the rise and fall of unionization over the course of the twentieth century. As one of us has detailed in prior work, and as numerous scholars have documented, the legal regime was but one of multiple factors playing a role in the rise and fall of
unions. See Andrias, supra note 26, at 13-46.
Andrias, supra note 67, at 667.
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produce an explosion in union density, with the number of workers in unions
growing from nine to ﬁ�een million over the course of World War II. 161
Conversely, the passage of the Ta�-Hartley Act, which signiﬁcantly constrained union rights, the repeal of the FLSA industry committees, and numerous subsequent doctrinal developments narrowing labor rights, correlate with a
decline in union organization. 162 In particular, the Ta�-Hartley Act altered federal policy so that it no longer expressly favored workers’ collective rights, instead balancing those rights with employees’ “full freedom” to refrain from engaging in union activity. 163 Moreover, the Act codiﬁed employers’ right to
campaign against unionization, permitted individual states to pass “right to
work” laws banning union-security agreements, and limited workers’ ability to
exercise power over the economy by forbidding unions from engaging in secondary boycotts. 164 Though scholars disagree on the extent to which Ta�-Hartley was a turning point or a codiﬁcation of preexisting court precedent, little disagreement exists that the statutory amendments weakened labor unions, the
social-movement organizations that prior law had previously helped facilitate. 165
161.

162.
163.
164.
165.

See JOSIAH BARTLETT LAMBERT, “IF THE WORKERS TOOK A NOTION”: THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 110 (2018); Clyde Summers, Book Review, 2 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 375, 375 (1999) (reviewing JAMES B. ATLESON, LABOR AND THE WARTIME
STATE (1998)); Steve Fraser, The Good War and the Workers, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 20, 2009),

https://prospect.org/special-report/good-war-workers [https://perma.cc/TEE7-RMMP].
Membership in the United Auto Workers and the United Steelworkers increased twofold and
in the Electric Workers fourfold, surpassing ninety percent, rivaling union coverage rates in
the social democracies of Europe. LAMBERT, supra, at 106.
See LAMBERT, supra note 161, at 105.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2018).
Id. § 158(b)(4) (prohibiting secondary boycotts); id. § 158(c) (protecting employer speech);
id. § 165(b) (enabling state “right to work” laws).
See Nelson Lichtenstein, Ta�-Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763, 763-65
(1998). Although beyond the scope here, comparative analysis provides further support for
the conclusion that law can facilitate organization among low-income groups. In numerous
other jurisdictions, law facilitates organization among students and tenants, in addition to
workers. For example, French law expressly recognizes and empowers a range of “representative” organizations beyond labor unions, including consumer-protection associations; environmental-protection associations; associations for parents of students; family associations;
and tenants associations. See Edith Archambault, Historical Roots of the Nonproﬁt Sector in
France, 30 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 204, 215 (2001); Nicolas Farvaque, The Implementation of the Emplois d’Avenir in France: The Role of Local Actors, EUR. COMMISSION 1
(Nov. 2013), https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1047&newsId=2028
&furtherNews=yes [https://perma.cc/H7BJ-R7XB] (follow “Host Country Paper Peer Review on ‘Emplois d’avenir’” hyperlink); Associations de Locataires, SERV.-PUB.FR (May 20,
2019), https://www.service-public.fr/associations/vosdroits/F1218 [https://perma.cc/A95RZ5EL]; Associations de Parents D’élèves, SERV.-PUB.FR (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.service-
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Law thus matters to the possibility of organizing for countervailing power.
But the question remains, what would a legal regime explicitly designed to facilitate organizing by the poor and working class in contexts beyond labor look
like? We oﬀer ways to approach that question in the next Part, and to animate
the analysis to come, we conclude this Part with a thought experiment—by imagining what a law designed to facilitate organizing would look like in a realworld context. For these purposes, consider housing. Today, when local zoning
commissions, city councils, state legislatures, state and federal agencies, and
Congress discuss housing policy, real-estate developers and landlords spend millions on lobbying. 166 Aﬄuent, single-family home owners turn out in force. 167
The mortgage and construction industries are typically active as well. 168 But Section 8 recipients, poor renters, and the homeless—a group that is growing again
a�er a decade of decline 169—rarely participate equally in the discussion, let alone
exercise signiﬁcant inﬂuence over decisionmaking. 170 Meanwhile, rents and
home purchase prices are rising much faster than income, with the median home
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/N19508 [https://perma.cc/22H7-7TY2]. Both German law and British law facilitate the organization of tenant unions by, inter alia, providing for formal recognition of such unions and
mandating that landlords provide contact information of renters to such unions. See Landlord
& Tenant Act 1985, c. 70, § 29; Housing and Planning Act 2016, c. 22, § 29A; Welcome to Berlin
Tenants’ Association, BERLINER MIETERVEREIN, https://www.berliner-mieterverein.de/sprachen/englisch.htm [https://perma.cc/T3R7-P4UK]. And Canadian law contributes signiﬁcantly to the organization of student unions through a series of statutes that are o�en patterned on the labor code. See Finn Makela & Sophie Audette-Chapdelaine, The Legal
Regulation of University Student Associations in Canada, 22 EDUC. & L.J. 267, 287-91 (2013).
See Agency Proﬁle: Dept of Housing & Urban Development, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/agencysum.php?id=035 [https://perma.cc/E6EQ-356V].
See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Building Coalitions out of Thin Air: Transferable
Development Rights and “Constituency Eﬀects” in Land Use Law, 12 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 79, 80 (describing the political economy of housing policy).
For data on lobbying by these industries, see Construction: Lobbying, 2020, OPENSECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying.php?ind=C [https://perma.cc/4ALW52ZC]; Mortgage Bankers & Brokers: Lobbying, 2020, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets
.org/industries/lobbying.php?cycle=2020&ind=F4600 [https://perma.cc/8XRY-UBWC].
The State of Homelessness in America, NAT’L ALLIANCE END HOMELESSNESS, https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-of-homelessness-report
-legacy [https://perma.cc/LR8Y-CYWJ].
See Hills & Schleicher, supra note 167, at 80-81; cf. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY
AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2016) (following families in Milwaukee as they struggle
to maintain housing).
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price in some 200 cities approaching $1 million and “almost half of all renters
pa[ying] more than 30 percent of their income in rent.” 171
In numerous cities and states, faced with unaﬀordable rents and substandard
housing, tenants are organizing. 172 Indeed, in response to mass unemployment
and economic distress resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, tenant groups
have organized numerous protests and rent strikes, while also pushing for new
laws that commit funds to housing construction and restrict the unfettered ability of landlords to raise rents. 173 But the groups are typically local, they struggle
for funding, and they are most active in a few urban centers like Los Angeles,
San Francisco, and New York. 174 In many areas of the country, particularly in
suburbs and rural communities, there is little organization among tenants or the
homeless, and there is no legal infrastructure for their mobilization and political
success.
Imagine, then, a new law of tenants’ unions that would foster incipient organizing. What should such a law look like? The discussion below suggests that
the law should explicitly convey that substandard and unaﬀordable housing is
an injustice and that tenants have a collective right to organize to achieve fair housing for all. The legal regime should guarantee safe spaces in which tenants and
organizers could meet and discuss concerns about their housing conditions; give
organizers the right to access properties to engage tenants in organizing; and
171.

Tanza Loudenback, The US Has More Million-Dollar Real Estate Markets than Ever—Here Are
23 Cities Where the Typical Home Will Be $1 Million by Next Year, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2018,
1:16 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/us-cities-median-home-value-1-million-sanfrancisco-california-2018-8 [https://perma.cc/NT59-KNLW]. “Almost all the new rental
housing built in the past decade has been high-end luxury units . . . . The number of renters
paying over half their income for rent is expected to increase from 11.8 million in 2015 to 13.1
million in 2025.” Peter Dreier, Housing and the Working Poor, DEMOCRACY (Mar. 29, 2016, 4:30
PM), https://democracyjournal.org/arguments/housing-and-the-working-poor [https://
perma.cc/6TJE-SUJ9].
172. See 2018 Annual Report, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION (2018),
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/ﬁles/AR-2018/Annual-Report_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc
/TN74-TL96]; Lillian M. Ortiz, Tenant Power: Organizing for Rent Strikes and Landlord Negotiations, SHELTERFORCE (July 30, 2018), https://shelterforce.org/2018/07/30/tenant-powerorganizing-for-rent-strikes-and-landlord-negotiations [https://perma.cc/3T7Q-YC2U]; Tobias, supra note 35.
173. See Samuel Stein, Tenants Won This Round, JACOBIN (June 18, 2019), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/06/new-york-housing-tenants-universal-rent-control
[https://perma.cc
/DPQ7-KM7N].
174. See, e.g., Who We Are, HOUSING JUST. FOR ALL, https://www.housingjusticeforall.org/whowe-are-1 [https://perma.cc/X5DS-STSZ]; see also Jimmy Tobias, A New Housing-Rights
Movement Has the Real-Estate Industry Running Scared, NATION (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/a-new-housing-rights-movement-has-the-realestate-industry-running-scared [https://perma.cc/ABG7-L3T6] (describing local eﬀorts and
recognition among organizers of the need to build a national campaign).
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provide organizers with information, such as tenants’ names and contact information, as well as information about the housing market. As important, the law
should create new mechanisms to fund tenant organizations, supplementing charitable donations with a dues system paid through rent check-oﬀ and subsidies
from the government and landlords themselves. It should provide resources to
train tenant leaders and allow them leave from their jobs so they could engage
in housing organizing and policy work. It should allow tenants to bargain collectively with their landlords about problems in their buildings, while also giving
tenant organizations a seat at the table during administrative processes regarding
housing policy. By creating federated organizations, the tenant organizations
could develop suﬃcient power to challenge local, national, and multinational
corporate entities that inﬂuence housing policy.
Such organizations could also deploy their newly developed political power
in ways that go beyond the particular issues around which they formed: just as
labor unions speak across a range of policy questions broader than “labor” issues,
tenants’ unions could as well, using their resources to further broader-based political organizing. The law should protect such “bargaining for the common
good.” 175 It also should guarantee the right to protest and to strike, free from
retaliation by the government or the private landlord. 176
To be sure, this legal regime would not spontaneously or inevitably create
robust social-movement organizations with political power at the local, state,
and federal level. Many factors beyond the reach of law inﬂuence the ability of
social-movement organizations to form and to thrive, including political opportunities, underlying economic trends, leadership capacity, and the commitment
and energy of individual organizers. 177 But law matters, and in the next Part we
suggest a host of ways in which law can be structured to facilitate organizing for
countervailing power.
iii. factors and facilitators
Having illustrated in the last Part the importance of stronger countervailing
social-movement organizations and the plausibility of legal intervention to encourage their growth, in this Part, we show how law can facilitate organization
175.

See Joseph A. McCartin, Bargaining for the Common Good, DISSENT (Spring 2016),
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/bargaining-common-good-community-unionalignment [https://perma.cc/28YW-PXRY].
176. In turn, the law might require the organizations to commit to independence, to democratic
governance, to ﬁnancial disclosure, and to nondiscrimination, inclusion, and a duty of fair
representation. For a brief discussion of duties, see infra note 384.
177. See supra notes 41-42; see also McAdam, supra note 40, at 24-25 (describing the concept of
“political opportunities”).
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in contexts that are populated by low- and middle-income Americans and rife
with exploitation and power imbalances. To do so, we draw from the social-science literature, as well as from the experiences of labor law, to oﬀer a more nuanced and theoretically grounded picture of how a diﬀerent set of legal choices
could help facilitate conditions critical to organizing success. We undertake this
analysis with the recognition that while this literature is revealing and suggestive, it does not aspire to be ﬁrmly predictive. 178 We begin, in other words, with
the premise of Saul Alinsky’s seminal work on organizing theory: “At no time in
any discussion or analysis of mass movements, tactics, or any other phase of the
problem, can it be said that if this is done then that will result. The most we can
hope to achieve is an understanding of the probabilities consequent to certain
actions.” 179 In this spirit, the discussion that follows aims to illuminate a series
of legal interventions that would make organizing by the poor and working class
more probable even if not certain.
A. Framing
A prominent strand in the social-movement literature stresses the importance of a symbolic or social-psychological requisite for successful collective
action. 180 Put simply, this school of thought is concerned with understanding
the cognitive work that goes into translating the raw “events or occurrences” of
everyday life into issues around which people organize collectively. 181 This body
of work thus examines the role played by “collective action frames,” which are
“action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization.” 182
Although the framing literature is now vast, the leading work in the ﬁeld can
be productively condensed by focusing on four core aspects—or “tasks”—of collective-action frames: diagnostic framing (which involves both problem
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See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Diﬀerence Does Representation (Oﬀer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2121
(2012) (referring to randomized control trials as the “gold-standard” for empirical research).
SAUL D. ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS: A PRACTICAL PRIMER FOR REALISTIC RADICALS 17
(1971).
See generally Pedriana, supra note 40, at 1719 (analyzing the “legal framing of the women’s
movement in the 1960s” to “further develop theoretical knowledge on the cultural and symbolic processes that enable, constrain, and transform social movements”).
David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden & Robert D. Benford, Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464, 464
(1986).
Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and
Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 614 (2000).
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identiﬁcation and blame attribution and which is alternatively named “injustice”
framing in the literature); prognostic framing (which involves developing a potential collective approach to addressing the identiﬁed problem); motivational or
agency framing (through which the collective eﬃcacy of the group to carry out
the approach is implied); and identity framing (in which the collective identity
of the group that will carry out the approach is developed). 183 Taken as a whole,
the literature suggests that successful political organizing is enabled by collective-action frames that diagnose injustices, suggest collective solutions, motivate
collective responses, and generate collective identity. In this Section, we review
each of these four core framing tasks and then move to discuss ways in which
law might be deployed to facilitate each of them.
According to Robert Benford and David Snow, the ﬁrst thing a collectiveaction frame must do if it is to enable collective action is help potential-movement participants diagnose some set of conditions as a problem that ought to be
remedied, rather than as a set of conditions that, although undesirable, is a natural, perhaps unavoidable part of life. 184 For William Gamson, such diagnostic
work in the context of political action and mobilization necessarily involves diagnosing a set of conditions as an injustice. 185 This is critical because injustice,
unlike a mere problem, brings forth what Gamson calls “hot cognition, not
merely an abstract intellectual judgment about what is equitable,” but “righteous
anger that puts ﬁre in the belly and iron in the soul.” 186 For both sets of authors,
problem identiﬁcation is not enough: diagnosis must also involve blame attribution. In Benford and Snow’s words, “[s]ince social movements seek to remedy
or alter some problematic situation or issue, it follows that directed action is contingent on identiﬁcation of the source(s) of causality, blame, and/or culpable
agents.” 187 For Gamson, “[a]n injustice frame requires a consciousness of motivated human actors who carry some of the onus for bringing about harm and
suﬀering.” 188
Gamson, moreover, usefully distinguishes between diﬀerent types of agents
that might be blamed for the injustice diagnosed in a collective-action frame. At
one end of the spectrum lie abstract, structural forces like the economic system,
the political order, and the government. At the other end of the spectrum are
individual human actors like a particular manager or landlord. Blaming an abstraction like the market or the political system risks diﬀusing the “indignation”
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
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that Gamson ﬁnds essential to successful diagnostic framing. On the other hand,
blaming particular agents risks shi�ing attention from structural forces that are
legitimately responsible for people’s suﬀering. Thus, Gamson concludes that
frames, to facilitate collective action, must work to attribute blame somewhere
between broad, abstract structural forces and discrete human actors. As he
writes:
To sustain collective action, the targets identiﬁed by the frame must
successfully bridge abstract and concrete. By connecting broader sociocultural forces with human agents who are appropriate targets of collective action, one can get the heat into the cognition. By making sure that
the concrete targets are linked to and can aﬀect the broader forces, one
can make sure that the heat isn’t misdirected in ways that will leave the
underlying source of injustice untouched. 189
So, perhaps, the injustice of low wages is laid at the feet of neither capitalism
nor the factory superintendent, but the corporation that controls the employment relationship or even the corporations that make up the relevant economic
sector. And the injustice of high rent and poor living conditions is laid at the feet
of neither the market nor a particular building owner, but the landlords who
have undue inﬂuence at the city council and state legislature.
Once an injustice is identiﬁed, and blame properly attributed, a successful
collective-action frame then must identify and communicate an approach to
remedying the injustice: it must, according to Benford and Snow, “articulat[e] . . . a proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, and the
strategies for carrying out the plan.” 190 Importantly, although there must be a
connection between prognosis and diagnosis—how to address a problem depends on the nature of the problem to be addressed—the articulation of injustice
and attribution of blame narrows but does not determine how to address the
injustice. 191 This point may be obvious, but it is worth noting. Take the injustice
of low wages in the fast-food industry as attributed to the ﬁve largest corporations controlling that industry. A range of approaches to remedying the injustice
are plausible. Workers might, for example, sue the corporations under wageand-hour laws, picket their restaurants as a means of pressuring the corporations, or organize into unions and attempt to bargain collectively wage increases.
Any of these approaches would constitute a plausible approach to the injustice.
The prognostic work of a collective-action frame involves articulating one or
189.

Id. at 33.
Benford & Snow, supra note 182, at 616.
191. See id. at 616-17; see, e.g., David A. Snow & Scott C. Byrd, Ideology, Framing Processes, and
Islamic Terrorist Movements, 12 MOBILIZATION: INT’L Q. REV. 119, 126-27 (2007).
190.
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more of these approaches: this allows participants to formulate a viable plan of
attack.
The ﬁrst two framing tasks—diagnostic and prognostic—involve cognitive
work about dynamics external to the mobilizing group: what is the injustice and
who is causing it. The second two tasks—motivational and identity—involve
cognitive work internal to the mobilizing group. This is work focused on bringing participants into motion and struggle, in an eﬀort to build a collective identity. For Benford and Snow, motivational framing involves a call to action, the
“construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive” that provide prods to action
by, among other things, overcoming both the fear of the risks o�en associated
with collective action and Olson’s vaunted free-rider problem. 192 Gamson, who
names this framing task “agency,” describes its function in terms of eﬃcacy.
Thus, to fulﬁll the agency task, a collective-action frame must give participants
a sense both that they are capable of redressing the injustice in question and that
their opposition is vulnerable to challenge. The frame must imply that “it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective action” and must “deny the
immutability of some undesirable situation.” 193 In even simpler terms, the motivational task involves a communication to potential participants that “we can
do this.”
As the above suggests, however, there remains a ﬁnal task for the frame: deﬁning, or creating, the “we” that can successfully act collectively against the articulated injustice. Gamson names this framing task “identity”: the process by
which a collective identity among movement participants is constructed. 194 Indeed, in stressing the importance of this kind of collective identity, this aspect of
framing theory is resonant with other strands of social-movement theory which
are centered around the observation that successful movement building and mobilization are enabled by the existence of a collective identity among movement
participants. For example, Bert Klandermans, a leading scholar of identity and
movement participation, writes that “[t]he basic hypothesis regarding collective
identity and movement participation is fairly straightforward: a strong identiﬁcation with a group makes participation in collective political action on behalf of
that group more likely.” 195
Here, the identity-construction task of a collective-action frame is connected
closely to the blame-attribution task. As Gamson explains, in the political
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GAMSON, supra note 185, at 7.
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context, collective identities are o�en oppositional: the “we” exists in opposition
to a “they,” where “they” are the agents responsible for the injustice. 196 Thus, if
the injustice of low wages paid to fast-food workers is attributed to a particular
manager, the “we” who can ﬁght that injustice will be a narrow group, probably
just those impacted by this particular manager’s actions. On the other hand, if
low wages are attributed to the ﬁve largest corporations in the fast-food industry,
the “we” can be all fast-food workers.
This is not to imply that collective identity ﬂows ineluctably from successful
blame attribution. However, collective-action frames can contribute to collective-identity construction, not only by identifying an oppositional “they,” but
also by increasing the salience of certain aspects of potential participants’ identities. Because identities “exist in a hierarchy of salience,” the more salient an aspect of identity is, the more likely it is that the individual will act in accordance
with that identity. 197 For example, all individuals who live in a certain neighborhood will share a collective identity of neighborhood resident. This identity may
remain largely irrelevant for much of an individual’s life and never form the basis
for action of any kind. But, as Klandermans teaches, if the government constructs a waste-disposal plant in the neighborhood, “[c]hances are that within a
very short time the collective identity of the people living in that neighborhood
becomes salient.” 198 Finally, we know from Bernd Simon’s work that a shared
sense of unjust treatment can increase the salience of a collective identity that is
the basis of that unjust treatment. 199 For example, racial- and religious-based
discrimination has functioned throughout history to increase the salience of collective identities based around racial- and religious-group membership. 200
Thus, by framing certain events or occurrences as injustices, a frame can increase
the salience of a collective identity built around the shared experience of that
injustice. Framing low wages in the fast-food industry as an injustice suﬀered by
all fast-food workers can contribute to the activation of a collective identity
among fast-food workers. Framing high rents as an injustice suﬀered by tenants
in a city can activate a collective identity of city tenants.
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In sum, then, theorists posit that successful collective action can be enabled
by collective-action frames that accomplish four interrelated tasks: they diagnose an injustice and attribute blame for it; they elaborate a means of remedying
the injustice; they motivate participants to ﬁght for that remedy; and they help
activate the identity of the collective who will do the ﬁghting. As some socialmovement theorists recognize, moreover, law has the capacity to serve as a powerful collective-action frame. Indeed, civil-rights law is o�en identiﬁed in the
social-movement literature as a “master frame”—a frame that “resonate[s]
deeply across social movements and protest cycles.” 201 In the workplace-rights
context, legal scholar Jennifer Gordon describes the powerful way that rights
have served as a collective-action frame:
The idea that employers were supposed to be acting diﬀerently—that in
paying so little and demanding so much they were ignoring a set of established norms, codiﬁed as rights—suggested a less individualized,
more systemic explanation of the problems immigrant[] [workers] faced
in trying to earn enough money to support themselves and their families. . . . If the problem was systemic, immigrant[] [workers] would
need to respond in kind. 202
And workplace statutes can also fulﬁll the diagnostic and prognostic work of
collective-action framing. 203
But how might we tailor legal interventions in a manner designed to enable
laws to serve as collective-action frames more generally? We think the ideal way
to do so is as follows: couple statutory provisions of substantive standards with
the right to organize collectively to enforce those standards and to achieve greater
substantive protections in the future. For purposes of this discussion, imagine a
statute that aﬃrmed a right to adequate and sustainable housing, granted tenants the right to just-cause eviction, and also granted tenants a right to organize
unions. 204 The organizing right would include, among other things, the right of
organizers to access tenant contact information; the right of organizers to come
onto building property to speak to tenants and a free building space for the tenants’ union to meet; a robust antiretaliation guarantee; an obligation for the
201.
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building owner (or other relevant economic actor, such as real-estate investment
trusts) to bargain with a union once it was formed; and the right of the union to
a seat at the table in administrative processes regarding housing policy. Such a
statute has the potential to fulﬁll all four framing tasks.
With respect to diagnosis, the statute would clearly identify an injustice and
attribute blame: by banning evictions without cause, the law identiﬁes such evictions as unjust; by making building owners liable for damages, the law attributes
blame to the owners. Thus, the provision of right and remedy might in themselves accomplish the diagnostic-framing task. But the law could go much further in the direction of diagnostic framing. For example, in the legislative ﬁndings or statement of purpose, the law could explicitly identify evictions without
cause as an injustice by detailing the harms such evictions cause to families. The
law might also name evictions without cause as one example of a broader injustice, namely the power of landlords unchecked by the collective strength of tenants. In either case, the ﬁndings and purposes can list the unjust beneﬁts that
building owners extract from without-cause evictions and can directly name
owners as the source of the problem. They could go on to detail other deleterious
consequences that ﬂow from unchecked landlord discretion.
Crucially, given its status as a powerful source of social and political legitimacy, the law can oﬀer convincing diagnoses. 205 As a complement to diagnoses
made by tenant organizers themselves, a statutory pronouncement that evictions
without cause are illegal and that building owners are legally liable for violating
this norm provides an additional source of diagnosis, and one that many tenants
would likely credit. These suggestions, moreover, are not at all unprecedented.
For example, when Congress enacted the Wagner Act in 1935, it identiﬁed an
injustice and attributed blame explicitly in the statute. Thus, 29 U.S.C. § 151
states that “[t]he denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize
and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining” had the eﬀect of, inter alia, “depressing wage rates and the purchasing
power of wage earners.”
With respect to prognosis, the statutory grant of organizing rights would
articulate for potential participants a viable plan of attack. Here, again, the grant
of rights itself might be suﬃcient. A law that marries a substantive right with a
protected right to engage in collective action communicates that organizing is a
means of remedying the injustice identiﬁed in the statute. Again, too, the law
might go further in the direction of accomplishing the framing task. In particular, the ﬁndings and statement of purpose could identify the legislature’s faith in
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the power of collective action as a means of carrying out its legislative goals. In
our hypothetical statute, this might include a statement that substantive standards—the right to just-cause evictions—are generally best enforced when the
protected class is organized collectively. More broadly, the ﬁndings and purposes
section of the law might state that organizing would balance bargaining power
between landlords and tenants and thus enable tenants to accomplish important
goals beyond the protection of just-cause eviction. Here, again, there is historical
precedent for law fulﬁlling the task of prognostic framing. Having articulated
injustice and attributed blame, the Wagner Act’s ﬁndings section moves on to
set out a viable plan of attack for workers. Thus, § 151 states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to . . . encourag[e] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise of workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection.
Our hypothetical statute can also perform the task of motivational framing.
As the above discussion reveals, the task involves a combination of “prodding”
participants into action, helping them overcome fears related to participation,
and convincing them of their eﬃcacy in combating the named injustice. With
respect to motivating action, our statute signiﬁes legal legitimation of and thus
legal support for the tenants’ eﬀort to organize unions in order to better their
housing conditions. Such legitimation can motivate subsequent organizing efforts. For example, labor organizers successfully used congressional protection
for the right to organize as a call to action. Thus, John L. Lewis famously translated legal protection for the right to organize into a slogan that was instrumental
to the massive campaign of the United Mine Workers of America to unionize the
coal mines, “The President wants you to join a union.” 206 Our statute also can
help overcome fears of participation by oﬀering robust antiretaliation provisions, including signiﬁcant damages for violations. And the statute can contribute to the interrelated goals of demonstrating the oppositions’ vulnerability and
participants’ eﬃcacy. The existence of the statutory right coupled with meaningful remedies is a step in the direction of establishing that landlords are vulnerable
to challenge. And, as discussed above, the grant of access rights to organizers
strengthens this function of the law.
Finally, the hypothetical statute can contribute to the construction—or activation—of a collective identity. By making landlords legally liable for evictions
206.
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See, e.g., Nelson Lichtenstein, Workers’ Rights Are Civil Rights: How to Put the Labor Movement
Back at the Center of American Political Culture, WORKINGUSA, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 57, 59.
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without cause, and by granting tenants organizing rights, the statute establishes
a “we” and a “they.” “We” are the tenants protected by the statute; “they” are the
landlords governed by it. Of course, much of the identity-activation work will
occur—if it does—as a product of organizing and struggle that the statute might
itself facilitate. As tenants begin to exercise the collective rights that the statute
provides and engage in contestation with their landlords, it is likely that the collective identity of “tenant” will become more salient. The statute’s contribution
to this work should not be underestimated.
The hypothetical tenant-organizing statute imagined here would, of course,
have analogues in multiple contexts. In the labor context, it would involve granting both new substantive standards—say, a just-cause dismissal guarantee—
coupled with more robust protections for organizing than exist under current
law. In the debtor context, it might involve a substantive right—cancellation of
student debt—combined with a new explicit right to organize a debtor’s union.
A broader observation is in order before moving on. The ability of a law like
this to accomplish the four core framing tasks is enhanced by the law’s explicitness. Coupling the grant of a substantive right with explicit protection for collective action makes clear the law’s determination that participants ought to organize to ﬁght the injustice that the law condemns. Statutory ﬁndings and
statements of purpose that name injustices and identify blameworthy agents
make it even more likely that the law will eﬀectively provide a diagnostic frame.
So too, explicit legislative expression of support for organizing as a means of
addressing injustice will increase the eﬀectiveness of the law as a prognostic
frame.
B. Resources
While the foregoing accounts of mobilization and organization stress symbolic factors, the literature suggests that resources of various kinds are equally
important. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, for example, argue that traditionally powerless groups have capacity to sustain movement activity only if they
are able to aggregate resources through social-movement organizations. 207
207.

See McCarthy & Zald, supra note 46, at 1216; John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, The Trend
of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization (Univ. of Mich.
Ctr. for Research on Soc. Org., Working Paper No. 164, 1973), https://deepblue.lib
.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/50939/164.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WL8-P487]; see
also Bob Edwards & John D. McCarthy, Resources and Social Movement Mobilization, in THE
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 195, at 116, 142 (describing the
dynamic, sometimes reciprocal, process of resources supporting collective action which, in
turn, builds more resources); Mayer N. Zald, Looking Backward to Look Forward: Reﬂections on
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Resources enable movements to form and then to engage in eﬀective political
action and protest. 208 They help movements “convert[] adherents into constituents and maintain[] constituent involvement.” 209 Constituents, in turn, create
more resources for the movement. 210 Ultimately, resource aggregation is critical
to the ability of movements to persist over time. 211 Daniel M. Cress and David
A. Snow have observed that “ﬂuctuation in the level of discretionary resources
accounts . . . for variation in the activity levels of social movements.” 212 Sarah
Soule, Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Yang Su have found that resources
matter more for movement formation and collective protest than numerous
other factors, including political opportunities. 213
Empirical work demonstrating the importance of resources cuts across populations, time periods, and geography. 214 To take just a few examples, sociologists have demonstrated the importance of resources to organizing success
among national women’s and civil-rights organizations in the mid-twentieth
century in the United States; 215 homelessness-rights organizations in cities in
the late 1980s and early 1990s; 216 environmental organizations in both the
United States and Western Europe; 217 state-level suﬀrage organizations in the

the Past and Future of the Resource Mobilization Research Program, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL
MOVEMENT THEORY 326 (Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992) (exploring
the developments of resource-mobilization research).
208. See Debra C. Minkoﬀ, The Sequencing of Social Movements, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 779 (1997); Sarah
A. Soule, Doug McAdam, John McCarthy & Yang Su, Protest Events: Cause or Consequence of
State Action? The U.S. Women’s Movement and Federal Congressional Activities, 1956-1979, 4 MOBILIZATION: INT’L J. 239 (1999).
209. McCarthy & Zald, supra note 46, at 1221.
210. Id.
211. MCADAM, supra note 41, at 22-23, 43-48, 54-56.
212. Daniel M. Cress & David A. Snow, Mobilization at the Margins: Resources, Benefactors, and the
Viability of Homeless Social Movement Organizations, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 1089, 1090 (1996).
213. Soule et al., supra note 208, at 249-54.
214. See Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 207, at 116-17 (surveying literature).
215. DEBRA C. MINKOFF, ORGANIZING FOR EQUALITY: THE EVOLUTION OF WOMEN’S AND RACIALETHNIC ORGANIZATIONS IN AMERICA, 1955-1985, at 31-33, 37-40 (1995); Soule et al., supra note
208, at 249-54.
216. Cress & Snow, supra note 212, at 1107.
217. RUSSELL J. DALTON, THE GREEN RAINBOW: ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS IN WESTERN EUROPE 7
(1994); Paul McLaughlin & Marwan Khawaja, The Organizational Dynamics of the U.S. Environmental Movement: Legitimation, Resource Mobilization, and Political Opportunity, 65 RURAL
SOC. 422, 437 (2000).
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nineteenth century; 218 shantytown residents in Chile during the Pinochet regime; 219 and antiapartheid activists in South Africa. 220
Social-movement organizers recognize that a principal antecedent task to effective collective action is resource aggregation. 221 So do their political opponents. Consider the battle over union funding that has persisted over many decades. Though union leaders and union opponents agree on little, they share a
conviction that funding is essential to the success of the labor movement and its
impact on politics. 222
While early work treated resources as an undiﬀerentiated category, subsequent studies oﬀer varying taxonomies of resources, tangible and intangible,
upon which movements depend. 223 Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy provide a ﬁvefold typology: moral, cultural, social organization, human, and material. 224 Michael McCann discusses “instrumental” resources, which can be manipulated or exchanged in a direct way, and “movement culture” resources,
which are associational bonds that contribute to eﬀective communication and
solidarity. 225 Cress and Snow focus on four categories: moral, material, human,
and informational resources. 226 Though the literature has not settled on a single
218.
219.

220.
221.

222.

223.

224.
225.
226.

Holly J. McCammon, Stirring up Suﬀrage Sentiment: The Formation of the State Woman Suﬀrage
Organizations, 1866-1914, 80 SOC. FORCES 449, 472 (2001).
CATHY LISA SCHNEIDER, SHANTYTOWN PROTEST IN PINOCHET’S CHILE 201 (1995).
ANTHONY W. MARX, LESSONS OF STRUGGLE: SOUTH AFRICAN INTERNAL OPPOSITION, 19601990 (1992).
See, e.g., KIM BOBO, JACKIE KENDALL & STEVE MAX, ORGANIZING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: A MANUAL FOR ACTIVISTS IN THE 1990S, at 194-200 (2d ed. 1996); LEE STAPLES, Analyze, Strategize,
and Catalyze, in ROOTS TO POWER: A MANUAL FOR GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING 123, 133-35 (3d
ed. 2016).
See SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW
RIGHT (2014) (detailing history of right-to-work movement); Catherine L. Fisk & Martin H.
Malin, A�er Janus, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1821 (2020) (collecting data on the need for fair share
fees to the success of labor organizations); Hertel-Fernandez et al., supra note 83, at 37
(demonstrating political-party preferences related to right-to-work and collective-bargaining
laws).
John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, The Enduring Vitality of the Resource Mobilization Theory
of Social Movements, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 533, 544-45 (Jonathan H. Turner
ed., 2001).
Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 207, at 117.
MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL
MOBILIZATION 109-110 (1994).
Cress & Snow, supra note 212, at 1094; see also Daniel M. Cress & David A. Snow, The Outcomes
of Homeless Mobilization: The Inﬂuence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and
Framing, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1063, 1067 (2000) (focusing on material resources including money,
oﬃce space, and supplies and their eﬀect on outcomes sought by homeless social-movement
organizations).
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way of unpacking the category of resources, certain types of resources repeatedly
emerge as essential. These include: funding, informational resources, human resources, and spaces—physical and virtual. Other intangible resources, such as
credibility and legitimacy, are important as well.
Obtaining suﬃcient resources to sustain eﬀective organizing and political activity is a signiﬁcant challenge for social-movement organizations. 227 As Mancur
Olson warned in his classic text, when an organization primarily delivers collective goods, individuals will not, on their own, bear the costs of obtaining such
goods. 228 To some extent, this familiar account is overdrawn, as many individuals participate in social movements for ideological or moral reasons, even where
rational-choice theorists would predict indiﬀerence. 229 Nonetheless, few individuals can or will bear the full costs of sustaining social movements. The problem is particularly acute among communities with limited resources. 230
Classic public-choice theory has long recognized the organizational advantages of high-income, well-organized constituencies in the legislative and
regulatory process, but it largely treats these advantages as a given. 231 On this
account, certain interests have an inevitable advantage over a dispersed public
when it comes to resources. Law might shield against these advantages, for example through limiting campaign contributions or adjusting judicial review of
administrative action, but law is not itself responsible for creating the advantages. 232 As the following Section demonstrates, however, the resource problem faced by poor people’s movements is already fundamentally shaped by law—
and can be reshaped by legal intervention.

227.
228.
229.

230.
231.

232.
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See Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 207, at 117.
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 33-35 (1965).
See Rubin, supra note 28, at 16 (describing how “[s]ocial movement scholars soon became
aware that the resource-mobilization approach failed to account for . . . [ideological and
moral] motivations”).
SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 13-16.
See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 5
(1971).
On campaign-ﬁnance regulation, see supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text. On the role
of courts in addressing administrative capture, see, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, Capture
Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997); and Reuel E. Schiller,
Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1139, 1151-55 (2001). See also supra notes 23-24 (citing recent scholarship on how ordinary citizens and interest groups get involved in the administrative process).
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1. Funding
a. Charitable Donations: Limits and Pitfalls
The most obvious resource needed by social-movement organizations for
their operation and survival is money. Currently, the law facilitates fundraising
primarily through grants of nonproﬁt status by state governments and tax-exempt status by the Internal Revenue Service to qualiﬁed organizations. 233 Foundations, philanthropies, and individual donors contribute to qualiﬁed nonproﬁt
organizations of their choice. In the process, donors reduce their own tax burden. Most rights organizations in the United States are organized under section
501(c)(3) of the tax code 234 and receive the bulk of their funding from large donations by foundations and philanthropies. 235
Legal-mobilization scholars largely have viewed this external funding as indispensable to successful rights litigation and social-movement building. 236
Early social-movement theory also emphasized the extent to which professional,
philanthropically funded social-movement organizations contributed to movement building in the 1960s and 1970s. 237
Although the value of donations to low-resourced organizations is substantial, more recent work has demonstrated that reliance on foundation money and
charitable donations also has signiﬁcant drawbacks. First, the tax code puts constraints on the kinds of activities in which recipients of charitable donations can

233.

234.
235.

236.

237.

Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 207, at 121. The law also exempts the nonproﬁt organizations’ income from taxation. See Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonproﬁt Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 357-58 (1976) (discussing
the rationale for nonproﬁt organizations’ exemption from federal income taxation); Henry
Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonproﬁt Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 59, 60 & n.25 (1981) (arguing that the Bittker and Rahdert justiﬁcation
for the exemption is unsatisfying).
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018).
Megan Ming Francis, The Price of Civil Rights: Black Lives, White Funding, and Movement Capture, 53 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 277 (2019).
Id. at 277 (ﬁrst citing CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); then citing Marc Galanter, Why the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95
(1974); then citing STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008); and then citing MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S
LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987)).
See McCarthy & Zald, supra note 46, at 1216-17.
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engage. 238 Organizations respond to these constraints by dividing their political
activity from their nonpolitical tax-exempt activity and by limiting their political
engagement. 239
Accordingly, several scholars who worry about the decline of mass-membership organizations and their engagement in politics argue that the law should be
reformed to permit political activity by 501(c)(3)s or at least those nonproﬁts
that qualify as mass-membership organizations. 240 But such a proposal misses
the mark. Allowing 501(c)(3)s to engage in unfettered political activity would
not address the fundamental problem created by social-movement organizations’ reliance on charitable donations: when most resources ﬂow from elite donors and foundations, those entities inﬂuence which organizations are funded,
shaping the overall organizational landscape. Not surprisingly, social movements that resonate with the concerns of relatively privileged social groups predominate. Groups that focus on the mobilization of the poor receive less funding
and are less numerous than groups that focus on concerns of higher-income
populations. 241
Second, and perhaps more troubling, when poor and working people’s organizations receive most of their funding from elite donors, the democratic character of such organizations can be undermined. 242 Organizations ﬁnd their

238.

Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 207, at 137 (“SMOs that choose to become oﬃcially registered with the US Federal government as nonproﬁt organizations are expected to adopt certain standard operating procedures and may, as a result, adopt ways of doing things that constrain their choice of certain mobilizing technologies and encourage others.”); see also
SKOCPOL, supra note 50, at 206-07 (discussing how “U.S. tax rules encourage foundations,” a
type of organization that, in turn, encourages the development of “advocacy groups with expert professional staﬀs”); Daniel M. Cress, Nonproﬁt Incorporation Among Movements of the
Poor: Pathways and Consequences for Homeless Social Movement Organizations, 38 SOC. Q. 343,
357-58 (1997) (arguing that the relationship between moderation and nonproﬁt incorporation
by homeless social-movement organizations is complicated and context-dependent); John D.
McCarthy, David W. Britt & Mark Wolfson, The Institutional Channeling of Social Movements
by the State in the United States, in 13 RESEARCH IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS AND
CHANGE 45, 52 (Louis Kriesberg & Metta Spencer eds., 1991) (explaining how regulations on
tax-exempt organizations “channel the activities of many modern SMOs”).
239. SKOCPOL, supra note 50, at 206-07; Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 207, at 121.
240. See Abu El-Haj, supra note 18, at 135 n.368; see also Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil
Society: The Social Cost of Internally Undemocratic Nonproﬁts, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 831-32, 89293 (2003) (discussing the signiﬁcant social costs of a trend away from member-driven organizations and suggesting tax beneﬁts for membership organizations as one of several potential
responses to mitigate these costs).
241. Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 207, at 117, 122-23.
242. J. Craig Jenkins & Craig M. Eckert, Channeling Black Insurgency: Elite Patronage and Professional
Social Movement Organizations in the Development of the Black Movement, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 812,
827 (1986).
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priorities shaped by elites. 243 Ultimately, such organizations become less likely
to challenge structural inequalities that put elite interests at risk.
Reliance on charitable donations also tends to shi� organizational priorities
and tactics. Elite donors tend to show more interest in supporting litigation and
policy campaigns and show less interest in funding membership mobilization,
new-member organizing, and protest or other confrontational tactics. 244 As a result, organizations develop extensive professional fundraising mechanisms,
shi�ing resources and time away from organizing members and engaging them
in collective action. 245
That is not to say that charitable donations are wholly unhelpful or that elites
have fully captured social-movement organizations. Rather, such donations have
long provided critical funding to struggling, low-income groups. 246 Research
also suggests that donations provide donors inﬂuence rather than full control. 247
Research does suggest, however, that sources of funding inﬂuence an organization’s capacity for eﬀective collective action.
243.

244.

245.

246.
247.

See KAREN FERGUSON, TOP DOWN: THE FORD FOUNDATION, BLACK POWER, AND THE REINVENTION OF RACIAL LIBERALISM 3 (2013) (exploring how the Ford Foundation’s eﬀort to reforge a national consensus on race had the eﬀect of remaking Black-power ideology and accommodating inequality); Francis, supra note 235, at 278 (arguing that private funders
“operate like interest groups or private ﬁrms, to buy inﬂuence over the goals and strategies of
activists and cause lawyers,” and that, in the case of the NAACP, the Garland Fund shi�ed the
organization’s “agenda away from racial violence,” criminal justice, and labor rights “to education,” with both positive and negative consequences); Benjamin Marquez, Mexican-American Political Organizations and Philanthropy: Bankrolling a Social Movement, 77 SOC. SERV. REV.
329, 330 (2003) (showing that gi�s and grants underwrite Mexican American groups, but
only when they pursue political activities favored by corporations, foundations, and wealthy
individuals); cf. RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 190 (2007) (highlighting the indeterminate nature of the NAACP’s legal agenda in the mid-twentieth century
and the initial focus on economic justice, subsequently lost).
Sameer M. Ashar & Catherine L. Fisk, Democratic Norms and Governance Experimentalism in
Worker Centers, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 182-83 (2019) (discussing this problem in the
context of worker centers and labor unions); Francis, supra note 235, at 276-281 (discussing
the dynamic of movement capture). A potential solution would be to impose more stringent
caps on charitable donations, but this would result in an overall decline in funding and in an
additional investment in fundraising rather than organizing.
Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 207, at 138-40; see also PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 41, at 5
(arguing that professionalized social-movement organizations deradicalized the movements
from which they were created and led them to adopt less confrontational and more conventional tactics in social-change campaigns); Jenkins & Eckert, supra note 242, at 819, 826-27
(showing that elite patronage professionalized the Black movement, which may have accelerated movement decay but did not transform movement goals or tactics).
Ashar & Fisk, supra note 244, at 156 (noting that “foundation funding has been, and remains,
essential to the operations of worker centers”).
See id. at 157, 182-83 (noting that worker-center leaders reported that “foundations have not
dictated their agenda” but that they “can impact priorities”).
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Finally, it is worth noting that not all tax-exempt contributions carry the
same level of capture risk. Daniel Cress and David Snow have found that when
low-income groups receive a signiﬁcant portion of their donations from “social
gospelite” organizations or related social movements (e.g., religious institutions
or labor unions), the risk of elite capture is reduced. 248 In such cases, the institutions that are providing resources are themselves membership organizations,
o�en part of the same social movement. Thus, homeless organizations have been
successful by partnering with churches, 249 while worker centers representing
poor, vulnerable workers have been successful by partnering with unions. 250 The
more resource-rich social-movement organizations have enabled organizing
among their impoverished counterparts. Still, overall resources available are limited under this model. 251
b. Self-Funding Facilitated by Law
The previous Section shows that donations are unlikely, alone, to sustain
mass-membership organizations that eﬀectively counterbalance the power of the
wealthy in our democracy. There may be good reasons to maintain the ﬂow of
donations to nonproﬁt organizations, but a mechanism for organizations to engage in what sociologists refer to as “indigenous” funding—that is, dues or
membership-based funding—is a critical supplement.

248.

Cress & Snow, supra note 212, at 1106.
249. Id. at 1098-99, 1105-07.
250. See Ashar & Fisk, supra note 244, at 141-44, 186.
251. Notably, in recent years, some nonproﬁts have begun to deemphasize their reliance on taxexempt charitable donations. See Pozen, supra note 81. One reason is that, under the recent
overhaul of the tax code, most taxpayers will no longer itemize deductions, reducing the incentive to donate to 501(c)(3)s and rendering public-charity status less relevant to fundraising. Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11021, 131 Stat. 2054, 2072-73 (codiﬁed
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (increasing the standard deduction substantially for single
and joint ﬁlers); see Joseph Rosenberg & Philip Stallworth, The House Tax Bill Is Not Very
Charitable to Nonproﬁts, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org
/taxvox/house-tax-bill-not-very-charitable-nonproﬁts
[https://perma.cc/L9CS-5WXA]
(predicting a substantial decline in itemized deductions). In addition, social-justice organizations have begun to question whether a 501(c)(3) model, and its required focus on litigation
and courts over politics and grass-roots organizing, is capable of producing lasting social
change, and have created new 501(c)(4) branches that can engage in political action. Pozen,
supra note 81. Although the shi� to 501(c)(4) “social-welfare” organizations might enable organizations to change their tactics, the change will not necessarily weaken the inﬂuence of
elite donors on these organizations. Indeed, social-welfare organizations, like charitable nonproﬁts, are likely to derive much of their funding from elites. David S. Miller, Social Welfare
Organizations as Grantmakers, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 413, 417 (2018).
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A dues model has the advantage of aligning an organization’s funding stream
with basic commitments to democracy and self-governance. Organizations that
are self-funded tend to be more accountable to their members, more democratically governed, and less at risk of a decline in funding due to changes in donorgiving patterns or foundation priorities. 252 The labor movement, in particular,
has achieved independence and relative ﬁnancial stability through a dues
model. 253 Numerous grassroots-organizing groups have recently begun to experiment with dues systems in order to reduce their reliance on philanthropic
donations. 254
In order for a dues model to sustain an organization, however, the Mancur
Olson collective-action problem must be overcome. Absent a legal mechanism
to mandate or facilitate dues, constituents are likely to free-ride, either for selfinterested (albeit rational) reasons or simply because of the logistical diﬃculty
of contributing. Indeed, low-income individuals who, in principle, are willing to
pay to support their organization frequently cannot do so easily because of limited access to banking or formal ﬁnancial services. 255
The most direct way to remedy the collective-action problem is through legal
reforms that mandate contributions. However, a legal requirement that landlords transfer a mandatory tenant fee to a membership-based tenant organization, or that public-beneﬁts providers transfer a mandatory recipient fee to welfare-rights organizations, would likely be deemed unconstitutional, even if
tenants or beneﬁciaries were given the option not to become organization members. In Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, the Supreme Court concluded that a public-sector employer cannot require that all workers covered by a collective-bargaining agreement pay an agency fee to a labor organization to cover the cost of
collective bargaining and grievance handling; such payment constitutes impermissible compelled speech. 256 Under Janus’s logic, a government requirement
that individuals contribute to a representative housing, welfare-rights, or debtors organization would also likely violate the First Amendment.

252.

253.
254.

255.
256.

See Shayna Strom, Organizing’s Business Model Problem, CENTURY FOUND. 15-17 (Oct. 26
2016), https://production-tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2016/10/31124103/organizings-business-model-problem.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5EC-6Q JA].
See Fisk & Malin, supra note 222, at 1826-33.
See Strom, supra note 252, at 6 (describing dues eﬀorts of such groups as National Domestic
Workers Alliance, the Restaurant Opportunities Centers United, and Kentuckians for the
Commonwealth, as well as other innovative mechanisms of fundraising by grassroots organizing groups).
Ashar & Fisk, supra note 244, at 182.
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459-60 (2018).
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In separate articles, each of us has argued that the Janus majority’s First
Amendment analysis is incorrect. 257 But accepting the doctrine as binding, there
are still several ways law can facilitate self-funding. First, the law could permit
private entities and social-movement organizations to enter into contracts that
require fees and that facilitate the fee transfers, as is permitted under the NLRA
for private-sector employers and unions. 258 For example, the law could enable
membership-based tenant organizations of low-income renters to negotiate contracts with private landlords that require tenants to pay a small percentage of
their monthly rent to their tenant organization in exchange for services provided
by that organization. Because the state itself would not be compelling fees under
this approach, state action would not be suﬃcient to trigger the First Amendment. 259
A second approach would be for the law to require private entities to facilitate
the transfer of voluntary dues. This approach is unlikely to solve fully the collective-action problems discussed above. Comparative data on labor unions
strongly suggest that voluntary dues, even when paired with services available
only to members, result in a signiﬁcant free-rider dynamic. 260 But a facilitative
model does vastly improve upon the status quo, solving some of the logistical
hurdles that exist when organizations seek to fundraise internally. One promising example is the recently enacted New York City law that gives employees the
option of deducting contributions to qualiﬁed nonproﬁt organizations that will
advocate for nonunion workers; if employees exercise this option, the law requires employers to facilitate such transfers. 261 Another example is the voluntary-dues campaigns that many unions have engaged in the a�ermath of Janus,
where unions obtain dues authorization and the public employer subsequently
transfers money to the union. 262 In order to ensure stability, many states allow
257.

258.
259.
260.
261.

262.

604

Andrias, supra note 91, at 29-30; Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the First Amendment, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1046, 1076 (2018); see also, e.g., William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled
Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 HARV. L. REV. 171, 171 (2018) (“The better view, we
think, is that requiring people only to pay money, whether to private organizations or to the
government, is not a First Amendment problem at all.”).
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2018); NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 741-42 (1963).
See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486 (reserving the question whether private-sector agency fees violate
the Constitution).
See Fisk & Malin, supra note 222, at 1926-30.
Rest. Law Ctr. v. City of New York, 360 F. Supp. 3d 192, 239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Justin Miller,
In New York City, Fast-Food Workers May Soon Have a Permanent Voice, AM. PROSPECT (June
16, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/new-york-city-fast-food-workers-may-soon-have-permanent-voice [https://perma.cc/8BAA-5XNH].
Ian Kullgren & Aaron Kessler, Unions Fend Oﬀ Membership Exodus in 2 Years Since Janus Ruling, BLOOMBERG L. (June 26, 2020, 6:15 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-
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revocation of authorization only during designated windows. 263 A similar model
could facilitate transfers to tenant organizations, debtors’ unions, and organizations of public-beneﬁts recipients. Finally, to encourage membership, organizations can combine the voluntary-dues model with provision of beneﬁts and services, such as insurance, education, discount cards, and legal assistance; the
National Riﬂe Association and the American Association of Retired People have
both successfully used this approach. 264 Indeed, government could empower organizations to serve as providers of social-welfare beneﬁts, as in the Ghent system in Europe, where unions administer unemployment insurance, thereby
providing organizations additional opportunities to recruit voluntary-dues payments. 265
To be sure, self-funding models are not a panacea, particularly when members can aﬀord only minimal donations. 266 Self-funding models can also have
demobilizing eﬀects, creating a transactional model in which members pay dues
in exchange for services but do not engage in the broader movement work.
Nonetheless, even movement organizations skeptical of a transactional-dues approach recognize that a membership-funding system helps safeguard against
elite domination and, if combined with other organizational commitments,
builds a more participatory and eﬀective organization. 267 The model should thus
be one part of a multipronged approach to facilitating resource aggregation.
c. Cost-Shi�ing
A variation on a self-funding model would shi� costs to the entity around
which the social-movement organization is organizing. That is, the law could
require those entities to pay for a portion of the organizing activity. For example,
landlords of low-income residents could be required to contribute a small percentage of monthly gross rents to the representative tenant organizations.
report/unions-fend-oﬀ-membership-exodus-in-2-years-since-janus-ruling [https://perma
.cc/8BCZ-JVEB].
263. See Fisk & Malin, supra note 222, at 1858-60.
264. Peter Murray, The Secret of Scale: How Powerful Civic Organizations like the NRA and AARP
Build Membership, Make Money, and Sway Public Policy, 2013 STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 32,
34-35.
265. See Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, New Governance, and the Ghent System, 90 N.C. L. REV. 319,
324-25 (2012).
266. See Ashar & Fisk, supra note 244, at 182-83 (reporting that dues requirements for workercenter members were thought to be “terribly onerous”); Cress & Snow, supra note 212, at
1094-1107 (demonstrating that for homeless social-movement organizations to be viable, external resources are essential, and explaining that homeless organizations have been particularly successful where their external funders were “social gospelite” organizations, not elites).
267. Ashar & Fisk, supra note 244, at 166, 183.
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Public-beneﬁts programs could contribute a small percentage of their budget to
the representative welfare-rights organizations. Lenders could be required to
contribute a percentage of proﬁts to debtor organizations.
One problem with this approach is that, as applied to private payors, it would
likely face constitutional challenge under the Supreme Court’s evolving compelled-speech doctrine. 268 A potential alternative would permit social-movement organizations to bargain for such transfers without mandating them by
law. Still, skeptics might worry that if a social-movement organization’s funding
comes from one of its targets and opponents, the organization may be more
likely to curb its tactics and demands. 269 The organization could even become
dependent on the entity with whom it negotiates and against whom it advocates.
However, this concern can be mitigated by ensuring that only a portion of funds
are from this stream and, to the extent constitutionally permitted, by making
cost transfers mandatory by law, or bargained through arms-length transactions,
rather than at the discretion of the funder. 270
d. State Subsidies
Another helpful (and constitutionally permissible) legal intervention would
be to provide for government funding of social-movement organizations as a
supplement to self-funding and charitable donations. 271 Public funding has historically been an important part of social movements’ funding base. For example, since the 1960s, a large number of women’s movement groups have taken

268.

See Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
323, 323-39 (2016) (detailing the developing compelled-speech doctrine); cf. Jedediah Purdy,
Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195,
198-203 (2014) (identifying constitutional expression of neoliberalism in judicial interpretations of the First Amendment).
269. See Fisk & Malin, supra note 222, at 1350-57.
270. See Cress & Snow, supra note 212, at 1094-1107 (demonstrating that for homeless social-movement organizations to be viable, external resources are essential and explaining that homeless
organizations have been particularly successful where their external funders were “social gospelite” organizations, not elites); Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 207, at 118, 135 (emphasizing the importance of multiple funding streams).
271. On the constitutionality of governmental funding for entities with particular viewpoints, see,
for example, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648-52 (2002); and Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 194 (1991). Cf. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548
(1983) (holding that Congress has not violated the First Amendment by choosing not to subsidize charities’ lobbying).
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on social-service functions in exchange for funding from the government. 272
Also during the mid-1960s, as part of President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty, Congress established the Community Action Program, charged with helping the poor develop “autonomous and self-managed organizations which are
competent to exert political inﬂuence on behalf of their own self-interest.” 273
Government-funded Community Action Agencies (CAA) recruited “issue-oriented community organizers” and provided “ﬁnancial assistance to indigenous
community organizations.” 274 More recently, worker centers representing lowwage workers have “collaborat[ed] with government agencies, particularly on
enforcement campaigns in progressive jurisdictions with expansive, but underenforced legal protections for workers,” which has “generated . . . ﬁnancial support” for the centers “in the form of government grants to facilitate investigation
and enforcement . . . and training in know-your-rights programs.” 275
A challenge is that state subsidies usually come with strings attached. Thus,
an organization “seeking aﬃrmative state assistance invites a political debate
over whether or how much such assistance is justiﬁed” and “about the conditions

272.

See Myra Marx Ferree & Patricia Yancey Martin, Doing the Work of the Movement: Feminist
Organizations, in FEMINIST ORGANIZATIONS: HARVEST OF THE NEW WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 19,
21 (Myra Marx Ferree & Patricia Yancey Martin eds., 1995) (discussing the impact on select
feminist organizations of receiving funding from the government).
273. J. DAVID GREENSTONE & PAUL E. PETERSON, RACE AND AUTHORITY IN URBAN POLITICS: COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND THE WAR ON POVERTY 5 (1973) (quoting Oﬃce of Econ. Opportunity, Workbook: Community Action Program, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH (Mar. 18, 1965),
https://ﬁles.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED103502.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK25-4UKE]); see id. at 7
(“[T]he fundamental political objective was generally understood to be the organization and
consequent institutionalization of black (and other minority group) interests.”); see also Tara
J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor: New Governance, New Accountability, and
a 21st Century War on the Sources of Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 8-12 (2010) (discussing successes and failures of community action programs (CAPs) and urging a contemporary equivalent); Paul E. Peterson & J. David Greenstone, Racial Change and Citizen Participation: The Mobilization of Low-Income Communities Through Community Action, in A DECADE
OF FEDERAL ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS: ACHIEVEMENTS, FAILURES, AND LESSONS 241 (Robert H.
Haveman ed., 1977) (arguing that community action was primarily an attack on the exclusion
of Black Americans).
274. Peterson & Greenstone, supra note 273, at 264.
275. Ashar & Fisk, supra note 244, at 158-59; see Janice Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards in Partnership
with Civil Society: Can Co-Enforcement Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed?, 45 POL. &
SOC’Y 359, 361 (2017); Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement Through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 569 (2010); Seema
N. Patel & Catherine L. Fisk, California Co-Enforcement Initiatives that Facilitate Worker Organizing, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE (2017).
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that should be attached to the assistance.” 276 This debate is one worth having
and should become less burdensome as mass-membership organizations grow.
Moreover, while relying exclusively on state funding would leave organizations
vulnerable to changes in the political climate, state funding can be one important
part of a mixed-funding regime and can help serve as “seed” money while organizations build their indigenous funding. Improving upon past eﬀorts, state
funding could be targeted to organizations that meet particular criteria. For example, grants could take into account organizational mission, leadership-development practices, and whether the organization is governed by members, federated in structure, and inclusive. 277
2. Physical and Virtual Spaces
In addition to funding, physical and virtual spaces for organizing are essential to the success of mass-membership organizations. As Daniel Cress and David
Snow write, “A regular place to meet and adequate supplies are requisites for
doing regular organizational business.” 278 They quote a supporter of the Detroit
Union of the Homeless, who observes that “[t]here is a kind of franticness when
you don’t really have a place where you can invite anybody into. But when you
do, people can ﬁnd you. Strategies can be developed. You can get a sense of your
own identity.” 279
Sociologists have demonstrated that natural gathering spaces, where people
are in close proximity, are the most fruitful locations for social-movement building. 280 Yet many of the spaces in which poor people naturally congregate are controlled not by those people themselves, nor by their social-movement organizations, but rather by governmental or corporate entities. Providing access to these
276.

277.
278.

279.

280.
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Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 29, at 524. On the clash between the state and rape-crisis
providers, see Nancy Matthews, Feminist Clashes with the State: Tactical Choices by State-Funded
Rape Crisis Centers, in FEMINIST ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 272, at 291-92. On the backlash
against legal-aid lawyers and their advocacy on behalf of the poor, see John Kilwein, The Decline of the Legal Services Corporation: ‘It’s Ideological, Stupid!,’ in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDIES 41, 41-42 (Francis Regan, Alan Paterson,
Don Fleming, & Tamara Goriely eds., 1999); and Deborah M. Weissman, Law as Largess:
Shi�ing Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 737, 754-55 (2002).
On the duties that might be imposed on organizations in conjunction with state funding, see
infra note 384 and accompanying text.
Cress & Snow, supra note 212, at 1098.
Id.
Aldon Morris, Black Southern Student Sit-in Movement: An Analysis of Internal Organization, 46
AM. SOC. REV. 744, 759-62 (1981); Dingxin Zhao, Ecologies of Social Movements: Student Mobilization During the 1989 Prodemocracy Movement in Beijing, 103 AM. J. SOC. 1493, 1501-23
(1998).
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spaces can be particularly helpful for organization building: access communicates acquisition and control of a space in which poor and working people typically have little authority and thereby helps legitimize the social-movement organization. 281
In the contemporary era, the availability of digital—that is, internet-based—
“space” can be just as important as the availability of physical space. In the labor
context, for instance, workers o�en no longer share a common workplace and
thus simply have no shared physical space in which to congregate, discuss, and
organize. The same is true for debtors, who may live dispersed across the entire
nation and for whom no feasible central physical meeting location exists. 282 In
these settings, access to email, text, social media, and other “digital meeting
spaces” can be critical, 283 and, in fact, access to such digital resources for organizing purposes is a hotly contested question in NLRB law. 284 This is true for the
simple reason that digital resources can be powerful substitutes for physical
spaces. Take, for example, the recent Google walkouts—protest actions engaged
in by workers across the globe whose only contact with one another was through
online forums and tools. 285 It is also the case that teachers involved in organizing
the RedforEd movement gathered on a Facebook page, as well as in person. 286
Indeed, digital spaces can be important to organizing even where physical
space is available, especially in contexts where meeting online is more practicable

281.

282.

283.

284.
285.

286.

See Cress & Snow, supra note 212, at 1098.
See, e.g., Nick Martin, The Radical Possibilities of Not Paying Your Student Loans, NEW REPUBLIC
(Feb. 7, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/156468/radical-possibilities-not-paying-student-loans [https://perma.cc/D2D9-BWNX] (reporting on debt-strike activism and quoting
one organizer describing debtors as “a collectivity; we just haven’t seen one another yet”).
See, e.g., Sharon Block & Benjamin Sachs, Clean Slate for Worker Power: Building a Just Economy
and Democracy, LAB. & WORKLIFE PROGRAM, HARV. L. SCH. 53-54 (2020), https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/ﬁles/lwp/ﬁles/full_report_clean_slate_for_worker_power.pdf
[https://perma
.cc/C78K-F7WS].
See Caesars Entm’t, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 143 (Dec. 17, 2019) overturning Purple Commc’ns, Inc.,
361 N.L.R.B. 1050 (2014).
See Alexia Fernández Campbell, Why Thousands of Google Employees Are Protesting Across the
World, VOX (Nov. 1, 2018, 2:10 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/1/18051884/googleemployee-walkouts-explained [https://perma.cc/Q5JC-9KFR].
Caroline O’Donovan, Facebook Played a Pivotal Role in the West Virginia Teacher Strike,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 7, 2018, 7:47 PM ET), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/carolineodonovan/facebook-group-west-virginia-teachers-strike
[https://perma.cc/NBR3744M]; Labor Leaders—Randi Weingarten ’80, WORK! EXPLORING FUTURE WORK, LAB. &
EMP’T (Apr. 28, 2020), http://work.ilr.cornell.edu/692043/3537832-labor-leaders-randi-wein
garten [https://perma.cc/SAB7-RF3X].
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or advantageous than gathering together in a single physical location. 287 This
principle has been most apparent in the era of COVID-19, when the need for
social distancing means that in-person meetings, especially large ones, are a public-health threat. Unions are recommending that workers who can no longer organize in person gather on Zoom instead. 288 And tenant activists are turning to
the internet to organize rent protests and strikes during the economic crisis that
the pandemic has produced. According to one organizer, “If you’re bringing new
people into your movement right now, you’re doing it online.” 289
The potential for legal intervention to provide access to both physical and
digital spaces is signiﬁcant. The law could provide a legal right for both paid
organizers and organization members to access the relevant constituency groups
in person and online. It could grant the right to come onto employer property,
to enter building lobbies and common areas, and to hold meetings in welfare
centers. The law could also provide access to digital meeting spaces, requiring
employers, landlords, beneﬁt providers, and lenders to provide digital resources
to workers, tenants, beneﬁt recipients, and borrowers for organizing purposes. 290 We discuss some of these options in more detail below when we take
up the need for “free” associative spaces. 291
3. Information
Another critical resource for social-movement organizations is information,
particularly information about the organization’s constituency. 292 Organizers
need to know who the relevant constituency is and where they can be contacted:
Who are the workers in a given ﬁrm, the tenants in a given building, or the recipients of a given welfare beneﬁt?

287.

For instance, tenants have harnessed digital spaces to organize for rent relief during the
COVID-19 crisis. See, e.g., Conor Dougherty & John Eligon, How to Protest When You’re Ordered Not to Gather, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/business/economy/coronavirus-tenants-rent-protests.html [https://perma.cc/J6TP-X7M8].
288. 5 Steps to Organizing for Protection at Work, UE UNION, https://ﬁght.ueunion.org/ﬁve-steps
[https://perma.cc/GZR6-64K7].
289. Dougherty & Eligon, supra note 287.
290. See, e.g., Block & Sachs, supra note 283, at 53. But see Mark Engler, The Limits of Internet Organizing, DISSENT BLOG (Oct. 5, 2010), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/the-limitsof-internet-organizing [https://perma.cc/457L-LCTJ] (emphasizing that the internet is a
useful tool but no substitute for in-person organizing).
291. See infra Section III.C.
292. Cress & Snow, supra note 212, at 1095 tbl.3, 1098-99 (dividing information into strategic support, technical support, and referrals).
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The NLRA again provides a partial model. It requires employers to provide
an Excelsior list of bargaining-unit members to a union that makes a showing of
employee interest in being represented by that union. 293 The list includes both
names and contact information. Similar informational rights exist under several
states’ public-sector bargaining systems, requiring, for example, that unions be
notiﬁed when new members join the bargaining unit and aﬀorded the opportunity to meet with new unit members (on the clock). 294 Statutes could create
parallel rights for tenant organizations, debtor organizations, public-beneﬁts organizations, and so on.
In addition to information about the constituency, organizations also need
information about the broader political and economic context in which they are
organizing. To some extent, the internet has made such information more accessible, facilitating movement activity. 295 Yet, much information remains proprietary and inaccessible to workers, tenants, debtors, welfare beneﬁciaries, and their
social-movement organizations. For example, a recent study found that only four
percent of workers have access to information about compensation of senior executives, managers, supervisors, and colleagues, as well as information about
how well their organization is doing. 296
Here, legal intervention could again be valuable. Law could require the disclosure of relevant information about the relevant entity, industry, or program
to inform the strategic work of the social-movement organization. For example,
the NLRA has been interpreted to require that employers provide information
to unions about their ﬁnances to the extent such information is relevant to the
employer’s bargaining positions. 297 Law could impose similar obligations in the
context of housing, public beneﬁts, and education debt. Or, even better, it could
require more expansive disclosure that does not hinge on bargaining positions
or organizational requests. Washington, D.C.’s tenant law provides a partial
model: it provides tenant organizations the right to information about new

293.

Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239-40 (1966).
See Michael Wasser, Making the Case for Union Membership: The Strategic Value of New Hire
Orientations, JOBS WITH JUST. EDUC. FUND (Sept. 2016), http://www.jwj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/JWJEDU_BestPractice_Report_2016_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma
.cc/P4RJ-MWCN]; see, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3558 (West 2019); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §
6-407.1 (West 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:13A-5.13(c) (West 2018); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW
§ 208(4)(a) (McKinney 2019).
295. See Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 207, at 120.
296. Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, American Workers’ Experiences with Power, Information, and Rights
on the Job: A Roadmap for Reform, ROOSEVELT INST. 17-18 (Apr. 2020), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI_WorkplaceVoice_Report_202004.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E4GM-A5L7].
297. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-54 (1956).
294.
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development and the right to an appraisal during any sale process. 298 Ultimately,
disclosure of information is critical not only to engaging with the private entity
but also to social-movement organizations’ engaging in the political process in
an informed way.
4. Human Resources
A ﬁnal category of resources that is essential to organization success is human
resources—including labor, leadership, and expertise. 299 Yet a movement’s ability to deploy human resources is limited by the time and skill available to its
constituents. Poor and working-class people tend to have less leisure time to donate to organizations; they also frequently have fewer technical skills to provide
(though no less potential). 300
Here too, law could make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence. It could guarantee paid
time oﬀ for individuals to participate in the organization and to attend leadership
or technical training, possibly reimbursing employers, or allowing them to deduct from taxes the amount of wages they pay to people for participation. Juryduty laws provide one model. Eight states require an employer to pay employees
while serving on jury duty. 301 Labor law also provides some examples. Under
numerous private collective-bargaining agreements and under several publicsector labor-relations statutes, employees are permitted to perform organization
functions on oﬃcial time (i.e., release time with pay from their regular duties).
The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, for example, requires
that union representatives who are also employees of the agency be granted
298.

D.C. CODE § 42-3404.02 (2020).
Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 207, at 127.
300. A signiﬁcant literature in sociology examines the importance of both leadership development
and rank-and-ﬁle militancy and participation in poor people’s organizations. See, e.g., Stuart
Eimer, The Crisis of New Labor and Alinsky’s Legacy: Some Questions, Comments, and Problems,
43 POL. & SOC’Y 443, 444-45 (2015); Paul Osterman, Building Progressive Organizations: An
Alternative View, 43 POL. & SOC’Y 447, 449 (2015); see also Paul Osterman, Evading the Iron
Law: Culture and Ritual in Social Movement Organizations, MASS. INST. TECH. 22-27 (Mar.
2004), http://web.mit.edu/osterman/www/Evading-Iron-Law-Osterman.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y2RV-KZ44] (arguing that successful social-movement leadership potentially requires an adversarial culture within the organization and an enhanced sense of capacity and
agency within the membership). We recognize that the legal interventions we propose do
little to build leadership or rank-and-ﬁle militancy directly beyond creating the time and
funds for development. That is not because we believe those goals are unimportant but rather
because we are skeptical the law has much to oﬀer.
301. See ALA. CODE § 12-16-8 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-126 (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51247a (2012); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:965 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 234A, § 49 (2017); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-1640 (2015); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 519 (McKinney 2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 224-106 (2009).
299.
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oﬃcial time for negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement, including participation in impasse proceedings. 302 Numerous state systems, even those that are
“right-to-work,” similarly mandate paid release time. 303 Other collective-bargaining agreements provide education funds so that workers can increase their
skills. 304
The precise design of a release-time requirement would vary depending on
the context. For example, a tenant-related law could require unpaid release time
for workers to participate in tenant-organizing eﬀorts and in training programs,
with the member able to recoup lost wages up to a designated amount from the
landlord. In the public-beneﬁts context, to the extent states require public-beneﬁts recipients to work, labor performed for movement organizations could
count as qualiﬁed work. 305
C. Free Spaces
Another prominent strand of social-movement theory suggests that successful political organizing depends on the availability of “free spaces” open to and
suitable for organizational work. 306 The literature takes a capacious view of what
such spaces may consist of, and it includes discussion of both literal physical

302.

5 U.S.C. § 7131(a) (2018); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Fed. Labor Relations
Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 94-95 (1983).
303. See, e.g., Fisk & Malin, supra note 222, at 1846 n.124 (citing Cheatham v. DiCiccio, 379 P.3d
211, 213 (Ariz. 2016)) (describing the cited case as “holding that a provision in Phoenix police
collective bargaining agreement granting oﬃcial time to employees to perform representational functions, including 100 percent oﬃcial time to several, did not violate the Gi�s Clause
of the Arizona Constitution”); Martin H. Malin, Life A�er Act 10?: Is There a Future for Collective Representation of Wisconsin Public Employees?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 623, 657 (2012) (discussing union-release practices in Tennessee).
304. See generally Training and Employment, 1199SEIU FUNDS, https://www.1199seiubeneﬁts
.org/funds-and-services/training-and-employment [https://perma.cc/6B53-X22K].
305. Cf. Noah D. Zatz, Get to Work or Go to Jail: State Violence and the Racialized Production of Precarious Work, 45 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 304, 328-30 (2020) (addressing the coercive nature of
state-mandated work).
306. See SARA M. EVANS & HARRY C. BOYTE, FREE SPACES: THE SOURCES OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
IN AMERICA 18 (1986) (“Democratic action depends upon these free spaces, where people experience a schooling in citizenship and learn a vision of the common good in the course of
struggling for change.”).
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spaces—for example, churches, 307 mosques, 308 student dormitories, 309 and union halls 310 —but also more abstract ﬁgurative spaces including linguistic
codes 311 and artistic performance. 312 Despite the breadth of concepts encompassed in the deﬁnition of free space, however, there is some agreement on core
elements of the deﬁnition. In summarizing work on the question, for example,
Rick Fantasia and Eric L. Hirsch conclude that “[o]n the most basic level” free
spaces are
meeting places where communication can be facilitated without deference to those in power, representing “liberated zones” to which people
can retreat, spatial “preserves” where oppositional culture and group solidarity can be nourished, tested, and protected. It is in such relatively
“free” social spaces that members of subordinate groups discover their
common problems, construct a collective deﬁnition of the sources of
their oppression, and note the limits of routine means of redressing
grievances, where collective identity and solidarity are cultivated in practices, values, and social relations. 313
Similarly, William A. Gamson writes that free spaces are “limited access public spaces that permit the development of an oppositional culture.” 314 And Francesca Polletta, although critical of aspects of the free-space literature, concludes
that there is broad agreement among scholars that in identifying the unifying
characteristic of a free space, “freedom from the surveillance of authorities is essential.” 315 In sum, then, the free-space literature suggests that political organizing requires space in which groups can assemble to discuss their grievances and

307.

See, e.g., ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE, at xii-xiii, 6 (1984).
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See, e.g., Rick Fantasia & Eric L. Hirsch, Culture in Rebellion: The Appropriation and Transformation of the Veil in the Algerian Revolution, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CULTURE 144, 157
(Hank Johnston & Bert Klandermans eds., 1995).
See Zhao, supra note 280, at 1502-09.
See ERIC L. HIRSCH, URBAN REVOLT: ETHNIC POLITICS IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CHICAGO LABOR MOVEMENT 158-59 (1990).
See, e.g., JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS,
at xi-xiii (1990).
See, e.g., JAMES J. FARRELL, THE SPIRIT OF THE SIXTIES: MAKING POSTWAR RADICALISM 53-54
(1997).
Fantasia & Hirsch, supra note 308, at 146 (citations omitted).
William A. Gamson, Safe Spaces and Social Movements, 8 PERSP. ON SOC. PROBS. 27, 31 (1996).
Francesca Polletta, “Free Spaces” in Collective Action, 28 THEORY & SOC’Y 1, 6 (1999) (footnote
omitted).
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develop their objectives and in which they are free of interference from those in
power who would oppose their organizational eﬀorts.
The theoretical work on free space is complimented by historical analysis of
the role that such spaces have played in social-movement mobilization. Perhaps
the central animating example is the role played by Black churches, both in the
struggle against slavery and in the Civil Rights movement. Thus, Sara M. Evans
and Harry C. Boyte write that successful political mobilization requires “community places . . . where [movement participants] can think and talk and socialize, removed from the scrutiny and control of those who hold power over their
lives. The black church especially has played this crucial role as a free space in
black history.” 316 Aldon D. Morris, in examining the origins of the Civil Rights
movement, observes that the church played a central role by providing “a safe
environment in which to hold political meetings” 317 and “an institutional alternative to, and an escape from, the racism and hostility of the larger society. Behind the church doors was a friendly and warm environment where Black people
could be temporarily at peace with themselves while displaying their talents and
aspirations before an empathetic audience.” 318 Gamson, summarizing Morris’s
historical work, put it more bluntly: “Morris shows the centrality of the Black
churches in the building of the Southern civil rights movement. . . . [T]hey provided a place where Blacks could assemble without whites being present.” 319
Critically, and obviously, the church was more than a “space” for organizational activity: it was, among other things, a rich source of spiritual tradition,
deep community ties, and leadership. The point here is simply that the church
played a crucial role by providing a free space for political organizing.
Similar to the church’s role as a safe space for civil-rights organizing, Fantasia
and Hirsch document the role played by the mosque—and the Casbah—in Algerian resistance to French colonization. 320 Dingxin Zhao writes about the importance of the physical structure of Beijing university campuses to the mobilization of students during the 1989 democracy movement, noting that “the
existence of campus walls”—which separated student living space from the public road system—“was important for the development of the movement,” and
concluding that “the simple existence of walls . . . created a low-risk environment
and facilitated student mobilization.” 321 And Hirsch stresses the importance of
so-called Turner halls as “havens where the Chicago working class . . . could
316.
317.
318.
319.

320.
321.

EVANS & BOYTE, supra note 306, at 27-28.
Morris, supra note 280, at 748.
MORRIS, supra note 307, at 6.
Gamson, supra note 314, at 32 (citation omitted).
See Fantasia & Hirsch, supra note 308, at 157.
Zhao, supra note 280, at 1495.
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develop their politics in relative isolation from the intrusions of the city’s political
and business elite.” 322
Of course, the existence of free spaces is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for
political organization. To state the obvious, much more is required for successful
political organizing than a physical location for meetings free of surveillance. 323
But the literature provides a solid basis for concluding that the presence of free
spaces can be an important contributing factor to the success of political-organizing eﬀorts.
Accordingly, the question for us is what the law might plausibly do to facilitate the creation of free spaces for political organizing. We see two basic categories of possible interventions: (1) the provision of space and (2) prohibitions on
surveillance. Labor law, again, provides an incomplete but important model for
these types of intervention. Under the rules set out in the Supreme Court’s Republic Aviation opinion, employers must allow employees to discuss unionization
eﬀorts in the workplace, so long as those discussions occur during nonworking
time. 324 Moreover, in certain narrow circumstances—in fact, extremely narrow
circumstances under current law—employers must allow nonemployee union
organizers to access company property for the purpose of discussing union organizing with employees. 325 Coupled with these grants of rights to use employer
property for organizational purposes is a ban on employer surveillance of employee-organizing activity. Thus, “[s]ince the earliest days of the Act, surveillance of employees by an employer, whether with supervisors, rank-and-ﬁle employees, or outsiders, has consistently been held to” constitute an unfair labor
practice. 326 Accordingly, federal labor law creates a legal requirement that
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325.

326.

616

HIRSCH, supra note 310, at 159 (emphasis omitted). In the contemporary context, the internet
may also provide opportunities for the construction of free spaces for organizational development. For example, Rosemary Clark-Parsons studied Girl Army—a Philadelphia-based feminist group—which used a closed Facebook group (one open only to Facebook users invited
by current members of the organization and approved by one of six moderators) in an attempt
to construct a space safe for political discourse. Rosemary Clark-Parsons, Building a Digital
Girl Army: The Cultivation of Feminist Safe Spaces Online, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 2125, 212831 (2018).
See Polletta, supra note 315, at 19-20. James Tracy notes, for example, that certain elements of
the radical paciﬁst movement during World War II emerged from organizing done inside
federal prisons. See JAMES TRACY, DIRECT ACTION: RADICAL PACIFISM FROM THE UNION EIGHT
TO THE CHICAGO SEVEN 3 (1996).
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 805 (1945).
See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539 (1992) (discussing an exception to the general
rule restricting nonemployee access “wherever nontrespassory access to employees may be
cumbersome or less-than-ideally eﬀective,” which has been interpreted narrowly).
1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 6-111 (John E. Higgins, Jr. ed., 7th ed. 2017).
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employers cede part of their property rights to the organizational eﬀorts of their
workers and prohibits employers from engaging in surveillance of those eﬀorts.
Still, “only slightly over half of workers report having access to physical spaces”
to meet with other workers (let alone organizers), “and access is more likely for
higher-income and more highly educated workers.” 327
Building on the partial precedent provided by labor law, a law of political
organizing could require the provision of space within the property of the dominant party. As the above discussion anticipates, moreover, this might be space
within the physical property of the dominant party, or it might be “space” within
the digital resources of the dominant party. Thus, for example, tenants and tenant organizations could be entitled to access space within buildings where they
are organizing, or have organized, tenants. 328 Public-beneﬁts recipients could be
provided space in welfare centers. Workers and their organizations—in an expansion of current rights—could be entitled to space on company property. Similarly, the law could mandate that employers, landlords, lenders, or welfare agencies provide workers, tenants, debtors, and beneﬁts recipients the right to use
the dominant party’s online resources (such as email lists, websites, and chat
rooms) for organizing purposes. In addition, or alternatively, the law could require the creation of public spaces—political meeting halls, essentially—funded
by tax dollars and made available to political organizations for organizational
purposes. Here, again, the public spaces could be physical or digital. Finally, the
law might subsidize the cost of procuring such space on the private market: political organizations could receive tax credits for reasonable costs incurred in securing space for organizational eﬀorts.
It is worth noting that there are costs and beneﬁts to each of these approaches. With respect to a legal requirement that organizations be granted
space within the property—physical or digital—of the targets of their organizational activity, the downside is that preventing surveillance may be more

327.

See Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Why Workers Need Physical Spaces for Workplace Discussions—
and What Labor Law Can Do, DATA FOR PROGRESS 2 (Feb. 2020), https://ﬁlesforprogress
.org/memos/worker_places.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YEM-DA8P].
328. Indeed, a few localities already provide some access rights for tenant organizers. For example,
Washington, D.C. provides tenant organizers the right to canvass in multifamily housing.
D.C. CODE § 42-3505.06(b)-(c) (2020). For a discussion of tenant-organizing laws, see Christopher Bangs, Note, A Union for All: Collective Associations Outside the Workplace, 26 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 47 (2018). Access rights, however, raise various First Amendment issues.
See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-54 (1983) (allowing
the teachers’ union exclusive-bargaining representative access to teacher mailboxes and the
interschool mail system, rejecting that such access violated a rival union’s rights under the
First Amendment, and holding that the access granted to the exclusive bargaining representative was reasonable because it enabled the union to perform its obligation to represent all of
the district’s teachers).
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diﬃcult. Moreover, even absent actual surveillance, participants may be more
wary of surveillance in these settings and thus, whether or not they are actually
being surveilled, feel less free to “question the rationalizing ideologies of the
dominant order” 329 and organize. On the other hand, there can be signiﬁcant
symbolic value in allowing organizing to take place on the physical property or
the digital resources of the opposition. For one thing, such access signals to participants that the organizations in question are not outsiders to the relationship
around which organizing is taking place: for example, a worker organization that
meets in a company break room—or a company chat room or listserv—can come
to seem a more natural part of the work relationship than one that meets only
oﬀ-site in a union hall. More important from an organizing perspective, granting
on-site space to organizations can signal the vulnerability of the opposing party in
a way that can be critical to success.
The political-process model of social-movement emergence helps illuminate
this point. 330 As Doug McAdam shows, successful collective action—in our context, successful political organizing—depends on, among other things, the “collective assessment [by participants] of the prospects for successful insurgency.” 331 This assessment, in turn, depends on participants holding two
interrelated views: ﬁrst, they must believe that the organizations they are forming have the potential to exercise eﬀective power, and, second, they must believe
that the status quo—the forces they are contesting—are “vulnerable to challenge.” 332 This perception of vulnerability is accordingly a prerequisite to successful organizing. The point makes intuitive sense. If participants believe that
the current regime is invincible, they are unlikely to participate in an organizing
campaign designed to change those conditions. On the other hand, if individuals
can be shown that the current structure is subject to challenge—that it is vulnerable to the eﬀorts of an organized opposition—then participation becomes more
plausible. As Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward put it, “The social arrangements that are ordinarily perceived [to be] . . . immutable must come to
seem . . . mutable.” 333
The employer’s control over the workplace, like the landlord’s control over
the building, can be an important means for communicating power and thus for
signaling to workers and tenants that neither the employer nor the landlord is
vulnerable to challenge. This suggests, however, that by enabling organizers to
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Fantasia & Hirsch, supra note 308, at 145.
For a more developed version of this argument, see Benjamin I. Sachs, Law, Organizing, and
Status Quo Vulnerability, 96 TEX. L. REV. 351 (2017).
331. MCADAM, supra note 41, at 40.
332. Id. at 49.
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access workplaces and buildings, the law can disrupt these projections of invincibility and communicate that employers and landlords may in fact be vulnerable
to challenge. As one of us explained previously,
As vigorous as employers are when it comes to attempts to prohibit their
own employees from talking union at work, they are even more adamant
when it comes to the ability of full-time union organizers to come onto
employer property to discuss unionization. . . . This opposition stems in
part from the fact that physical presence of union organizers on company
property marks a major incursion into the employer’s control over the
workplace. Excluding union organizers thus reinforces a perception of
employer control. By the same token, a legal requirement that employers
admit union organizers conveys to workers management’s susceptibility
to the law of union organizing. 334
Indeed, a classic scene from the ﬁlm Norma Rae captured this dynamic cinematically. At the outset of that movie—which involved a union-organizing drive
at a textile mill in the southern United States—the union organizer is barred
from the factory by a locked, barbed-wire fence. This exercise of employer property rights clearly conveys employer power and dominance vis-à-vis the union.
But later in the ﬁlm, the organizer is permitted—through the operation of a contempt sanction imposed under federal labor law—to walk through the factory in
order to inspect a company bulletin board. The scene of a union representative
physically present in what had previously been a site of unchallenged employer
authority communicates to workers on the shop ﬂoor a new sense that perhaps
the employer is vulnerable to union challenge. 335
Thus, because perceptions of vulnerability can contribute to the success of
organizing eﬀorts, a legal requirement that organizations be granted on-site
“free spaces” has signiﬁcant virtue. But whether organizing space is granted onsite or oﬀ, a note is in order about the challenges of making sure such space is
genuinely free—the challenges of preventing surveillance in the modern era.
Much of the free-space literature examines social-movement development that
occurred prior to the proliferation of smartphone, internet, and modern surveillance technology. Although, of course, state actors possessed electronic-surveillance capabilities during the Civil Rights era, those technologies were relatively
less available to nonstate actors like employers and landlords. This is no longer
the case. The proliferation of cybertechnology means that nongovernment actors—including employers and landlords—have access to aﬀordable means for
surveilling challengers, should they wish to do so. In today’s environment, an
334.
335.

Sachs, supra note 330, at 375.
NORMA RAE (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1979); see Sachs, supra note 330, at 375 n.134.
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employer or landlord could purchase a device that looks like a cockroach or a
dragonﬂy and provides high-quality video and audio recordings of any organizing meeting. 336 Surveillance capabilities are certainly as great in cyberspace and
thus the challenge of ensuring surveillance-free digital organizing is also a
daunting one.
For our purposes, this means that if the legal regime is to provide free space
for political organizing it must also protect against sophisticated forms of surveillance. At a minimum, the law should establish meaningful sanctions for any
type of surveillance carried out against political-organizing eﬀorts. These sanctions should include punitive damages. Beyond sanctions, the law also could
provide for public funding of antisurveillance technologies, either through direct
provision or tax credits for organizations that incur reasonable expenses purchasing such technologies.
D. Removing Barriers to Participation
Legal reforms to facilitate aggregation of resources and access to spaces are
essential, but they are not suﬃcient to enable organization building among vulnerable populations. As sociologists have documented, a movement organization’s vitality and longevity are dependent on its ability to attract and retain
members. 337 Yet, even when participants are motivated and suﬃcient resources
exist, several barriers to recruitment and retention remain.
A chief obstacle for many individuals is fear of reprisal. As sociologists have
demonstrated, fear of retaliation can jeopardize collective action, particularly in
high-risk environments. 338 Among low-income populations, the risk is high. For
workers, tenants, debtors, and beneﬁt recipients, retaliation might mean the loss
of livelihoods, shelter, future creditworthiness, and emergency support.
Retaliation and repression do not always defeat organization. Movement
identity, solidarity, and social bonds can help individuals resist and challenge
authority. Rick Fantasia, for example, illuminates how organizing and strikes
foster a culture of solidarity that makes it possible for workers to persist, even in
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Len Calderone, Is That a Bug or a Robotic Spy?, ROBOTICS TOMORROW (Dec. 5, 2017, 8:15 AM),
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337. See, e.g., Sharon Erickson Nepstad, Persistent Resistance: Commitment and Community in the
Plowshares Movement, 51 SOC. PROBS. 43, 43 (2004).
338. See Jeﬀ Goodwin & Steven Pfaﬀ, Emotion Work in High-Risk Social Movements: Managing Fear
in the U.S. and East German Civil Rights Movements, in PASSIONATE POLITICS: EMOTIONS AND
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 282, 284-85 (Jeﬀ Goodwin, James M. Jasper & Francesca Polletta eds.,
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the face of antiunion campaigning, intimidation, and arrests. 339 Jeﬀ Goodwin
and Steven Pfaﬀ show that intimate social networks, mass meetings, collective
identities, shaming, and appeals to divine protection all helped mitigate fears of
police repression and encouraged movement participation during both the Civil
Rights movement and the East German Opposition movement. 340 At the same
time, the literature highlights the extent to which repressive action by state and
private actors frequently prevails, impeding successful organizing and even leading to organizational collapse. 341
A second barrier to joining and remaining part of a movement organization
is life responsibility, which can render people, in sociologist Sharon Nepstad’s
terms, “biographically unavailable.” 342 Numerous sociologists observe that fulltime employment, family obligations, lack of transportation, and other material
obstacles can pose signiﬁcant barriers to movement participation. 343 Some individuals overcome these barriers because of deep motivation and allegiance to the
cause or because of connections to other organization members. 344 Yet, sociologists have demonstrated that overcoming barriers need not only be a personal,
individual-level eﬀort. Some social movements have had success by providing
material assistance and family support so that members are free to participate.
Nepstad, for example, has documented how the Catholic Le� Plowshares
339.
340.
341.

342.
343.

344.

RICK FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY: CONSCIOUSNESS, ACTION, AND CONTEMPORARY
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twentieth century); FORBATH, supra note 159, at 105-18 (describing the use of state coercion
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among applicants to the Freedom Rides, those who ultimately participated knew more participants than those who did not).

621

the yale law journal

130:546

2021

movement provided stable childcare so protesters could go to prison if needed;
the organization also provided housing, legal support, transportation, and other
assistance. 345
Law may not be able to increase individual motivation, build social networks,
or foster solidarity, but it can help remove barriers to participation—both by protecting those engaged in organizing work from retaliation and by removing material obstacles to participation.
First and foremost, the law must protect all those involved in organizing efforts from retaliation: no worker may be ﬁred, no tenant evicted, and no welfare
recipient deprived of beneﬁts because they are active in or supportive of the organization’s eﬀorts. Penalties and enforcement mechanisms must be strong
enough to deter violations of law. Indeed, several regimes protect organizing
rights, including the NLRA and several states’ tenant laws, but lack suﬃcient
penalties or enforcement mechanisms to ensure consistent compliance. 346 Private rights of action, compensatory and punitive damages, class relief, prohibitions on mandatory arbitration, and other strong remedies are necessary to truly
remove this barrier to participation. 347
In addition, the law could provide just-cause protections. Under this model,
no worker could be ﬁred, no tenant evicted, no welfare recipient deprived of beneﬁts without the employer, landlord, or beneﬁt provider demonstrating just
cause. 348 The victim would not need to show antiorganizing animus or that opposition to organization was a motivating factor in the adverse action. The advantage of this approach is that it could create a more secure environment, shi�ing the burden to the authority ﬁgure when a dispute about retaliation exists.
Yet, even just-cause provisions are no panacea. General due-process protections
345.
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already exist in several of these areas—in public beneﬁts, for example 349—and
power dynamics still create fear of reprisal. Antiretaliation and just-cause protections, while helpful, must be part of a broader regime enabling organizing.
To that end, law should also work to remove material barriers. Here, the literature on resources is again instructive. 350 As discussed above, the law could
require paid time oﬀ from work; it could also provide subsidized childcare or
other material support for participation in qualiﬁed organization activities. 351
E. Material Changes, Incremental Victories, and Structural Power
Another facilitator of organizing success is success itself. That is, the ability
of people to build powerful organizations depends on their ability, ﬁrst, to win
smaller-scale, incremental victories along the way, and, second, to operate in
structures that enable meaningful large-scale victories.
The origins of the insight about incremental victories can be traced to Saul
Alinsky, a community organizer and author of Rules for Radicals. In that book,
Alinsky lays out a program for building mass political organizations based on his
own experience as an organizer and educator. Alinsky stresses the importance of
winning small-scale victories this way:
The organizer knows . . . that his biggest job is to give the people the
feeling that they can do something, that while they may accept the idea
that organization means power, they have to experience this idea in action. The organizer’s job is to begin to build conﬁdence and hope in the
idea of organization and thus in the people themselves: to win limited
victories, each of which will build conﬁdence and the feeling that “if we
can do so much with what we have now just think what we will be able
to do when we get big and strong.” 352
Alinsky’s thesis is borne out by both sociological accounts of organizing campaigns and the theoretical literature on collective eﬃcacy. Thus, for example, in
his seminal study of the union campaign at Springﬁeld Hospital, Rick Fantasia
reports that workers’ successful engagement in what he calls “mini-insurrections”—small-scale collective actions—increased the likelihood that they would

349.
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participate in more full-scale union organizing eﬀorts. 353 Fantasia concludes that
workers gained a “courageousness” from their experience with small-scale organizing success and that this courageousness was a “crucial component of union
formation, especially in the face of sharp employer resistance.” 354 Similarly, in
her study of the contemporary labor movement, Rachel Meyer concludes that
organizers can increase the prospects for ultimate success by making it “possible
for people to ﬁrst succeed at small collective actions so that they become aware
of their power to make change.” 355
The theoretical literature on eﬃcacy also conﬁrms Alinsky’s insight. This literature suggests that people decide what actions to take in the face of obstacles
based on perceptions of their eﬃcacy in overcoming those obstacles. Crucially,
according to Albert Bandura’s work, people learn to assess their eﬃcacy based on
past experiences: when we succeed at one task, we come to believe that we are
capable of performing similar, but more diﬃcult, tasks in the future. Thus, “partial mastery experiences” facilitate “subsequent performance of threatening tasks
that [one has] never done before.” 356 This form of “eﬃcacy learning,” moreover,
applies at both the individual and the collective levels, suggesting that participation in successful collective endeavors—however modest—increases the prospects for participation in more robust forms of collective activity. 357
What might the law do to facilitate eﬃcacy learning in organizing? In a
sense, all of our recommendations further this goal. A�er all, all of our recommendations are geared to increase the likelihood of organizational success, and
thus all will hopefully make it more likely for participants to experience the kind
of victories that fuel further organizing. But there are speciﬁc things law might
do to make early-stage, tangible, and small-scale organizing victories possible.
First, the law can make small-scale tangible gains more likely by imposing
bargaining obligations in each of our areas of focus. Thus, landlords could be
legally required to bargain with tenants’ unions, welfare agencies with beneﬁtrecipient unions, and employers with workers’ unions. The scope of the obligation should be cra�ed explicitly to allow unions to bargain for a wide range of
353.
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355. Sachs, supra note 203, at 2736 (citing Rachel Meyer, The Irony of Power: Eﬃcacy and Collective Action in Working-Class Struggle 4 (2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with authors)).
356. Albert Bandura, Self-Eﬃcacy Mechanism in Human Agency, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 122, 128
(1982).
357. See ALBERT BANDURA, SELF-EFFICACY: THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL 478 (1997) (stating that
“eﬃcacy beliefs have similar sources, serve similar functions, and operate through similar processes” and that perceptions of self-eﬃcacy “aﬀect how well group members work together
and how much they accomplish collectively”).
354.

624

constructing countervailing power

goals. Thus, in the tenant context, the obligation could cover rent, terms of eviction, environmental standards, and the like, but it could also require landlords
to bargain over details that tenants would ﬁnd meaningful if not transformational. Similarly, in the labor context, the obligation should enable workers’ organizations to bargain over wages, hours, and working conditions, but also over
other aspects of the work relationship that matter to the workers—say, the availability of a water cooler or a coﬀee station.
This suggestion tracks, in part, the current obligation to bargain in good
faith that federal labor law imposes on employers when a union represents that
employer’s employees. 358 Unfortunately, the NLRA’s good-faith requirement
has proven insuﬃcient as a means of encouraging the parties to reach actual
agreement. 359 Thus, a law designed to facilitate small-scale victories might need
to go further than this requirement. The suggestions contained in this Article
aimed at strengthening the right to protest and strike are one avenue to explore.
Another direction worth considering would be to couple the bargaining obligation with the so-called “interest arbitration” of ﬁrst agreements. Under an interest-arbitration procedure, the parties would attempt to conclude negotiations of
a ﬁrst agreement, but in the event they are not successful, the dispute would be
resolved by a neutral arbitrator who could shape the contours of the ﬁrst agreement. This process would thus help ensure that some gains for tenants, beneﬁt
recipients, or workers emerged from the bargaining process. 360 The magnitude
of those gains would depend on how much power the union had built, but since
the goal is to enable participants to have a ﬁrst experience with organizing success, the fact of progress matters more than the degree of it.
While incremental small-scale victories are essential, a system designed to
build countervailing political power among organizations of the poor and working class must also create structures that enable those groups to exercise eﬀective
economic and political power. Thus, the scope of the bargaining obligation
ought to be cra�ed to track the relevant economic and political system in which
the organizations operate. In the labor context, this approach would mean that
bargaining would be required to occur at a sectoral level in addition to the
358.
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worksite level, and with entities that exercise ﬁnancial power in a given industry
or over a given supply chain, as well as with direct employers. 361 For student
debtors, for example, bargaining would be required with for-proﬁt colleges with
exploitative debt practices, lenders, and government regulators. 362 And the topics of bargaining would not be limited by law to exclude, for example, entrepreneurial issues or broader political concerns; instead, these conditions would be
reworked to allow organizations to bargain expansively and for the “common
good.”
A related type of legal intervention would grant policymaking power to organizations of poor and working-class Americans through administrative processes at the local, state, or federal levels of government. 363 Beyond simply encouraging group participation, the law could give organizations the right to
appoint representatives to public administrative bodies based on membership
levels relative to the constituency as a whole. For example, housing law could
require that housing authorities or rent-control boards add seats for each tenant
union that meets a certain threshold number of members. The tenant union’s
membership would then be entitled to elect a representative to the new seat. And
labor law could require that workers’ compensation boards and occupationalhealth boards include members from unions that reach a certain density. Federal,
state, or local government could also facilitate sectoral and regional bargaining
using a tripartite approach, enabling worker organizations and employer
361.

See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 26, at 79 (advocating for “state-supported sectoral bargaining”);
Mark Barenberg, Widening the Scope of Worker Organizing: Legal Reforms to Facilitate MultiEmployer Organizing, Bargaining, and Striking, ROOSEVELT INST. 3 (Oct. 2015), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/RI-Widening-Scope-Worker-Organizing201510-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET48-9NQ2] (noting the “decentralization and fragmentation of collective bargaining,” and canvassing the “four patterns of contractual interconnection
among multiple employers” that characterize that decentralized environment); Block & Sachs,
supra note 283, at 3 (laying out the “three profound shortcomings” of “[o]ur current system
of decentralized bargaining”).
362. See Hannah Appel, Sa Whitley & Caitlin Kline, The Power of Debt: Identity and Collective Action
in the Age of Finance, SHUTTLEWORTH FOUND. & UCLA INST. ON INEQ. & DEMOCRACY 51-72
(2019), https://challengeinequality.luskin.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2019/03
/Appel-Hannah-THE-POWER-OF-DEBT.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7JN-TPX3] (describing
and drawing lessons from a movement of debtors to for-proﬁt colleges who organized and
achieved over one billion dollars in debt discharge as of early 2019).
363. For existing and historical examples of such administrative initiatives, see Andrias, supra note
67, at 683-92, which details the conﬂict over, and eventual demise of, industry committees
established under the Fair Labor Standards Act; and Rahman, Power-Building, supra note 23,
at 340-50, which provides the dual examples of post-2008 ﬁnancial regulation at the national
level and community-development commissions at the local level. See also Johnson, supra note
137, at 1369 (stating that attaching equality directives to numerous federal spending programs
causes those spending programs to “continuously operate in ways that promote the robust
participation and inclusion of varied groups”).
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organizations—or tenant organizations and landlord organizations, debtors and
banks—to establish employment conditions—or housing or lending standards—jointly throughout a given sector, subject to governmental oversight as
required by constitutional delegation and due-process doctrines. 364
Such administrative mechanisms would provide organizations concrete
power in policymaking. To the extent the law conditioned participation on membership levels, it might also have the eﬀect of encouraging organizations to establish federated membership structures in ways that enhance their long-term
ability to exercise political power. 365 Moreover, in providing meaningful interim
victories, such processes could contribute to members’ sense of collective eﬃcacy
and thus to further organizing. 366
F. Contestation and Disruption
Almost everyone agrees that when a political system oﬀers a nondisruptive
means for accomplishing change, such methods are preferable. In theory, the
American pluralist system implies that everyone can engage through nondisruptive means. But a substantial body of sociology work suggests that a degree of
disruption is necessary for movement success, particularly among poor people.
As William A. Gamson observes, “Unruly groups, those that use violence,
strikes, and other constraints, have better than average success” at achieving the
movement’s goals. 367 Charles Tilly has reached similar conclusions, studying
movement actions dating back to food riots in Burgundy, France in the seventeenth century. Tilly explains that repertoires of contention vary depending on
legal and social context—ranging from tax revolts to strikes to mass public meetings—but his study underlines the importance of contention over time and

364.

For discussions of contemporary and historical eﬀorts at sectoral bargaining and the constitutional constraints on such eﬀorts, see Andrias, supra note 67, at 659-95, which discusses
early New Deal attempts at fostering sectoral bargaining through the Fair Labor Standards
Act; and Andrias, supra note 26, at 46-70, 89-92, which discusses eﬀorts of contemporary
worker movements to engage in social bargaining in low-wage industries.
365. See SKOCPOL, supra note 50, at 92-93 (discussing the importance of federated membership
organizations in a federal political system).
366. Government-authorized service provision, discussed in Section III.B.1, also has been shown
to build organization. By providing critical services and beneﬁts, such as unemployment insurance, organizations build connections with members while also demonstrating eﬃcacy and
value. See Dimick, supra note 265, at 356-59.
367. William A. Gamson, The Success of the Unruly, in READINGS ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: ORIGINS,
DYNAMICS AND OUTCOMES 518, 526 (Doug McAdam & David A. Snow eds., 2d ed. 2010).
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across contexts. 368 In work studying the Civil Rights movement, Doug McAdam
similarly ﬁnds that movement success depended on disruptive tactics, though he
ﬁnds that the most eﬀective forms of disruption were temporary and involved
constant innovation to respond to segregationist reprisals. 369
In perhaps the most famous study of poor people’s movements, Frances Fox
Piven and Richard Cloward highlight how insurgent and deﬁant action is critical
to movement success. 370 Protest takes diﬀerent forms depending on institutional
context and the ways in which individuals can withhold cooperation or services—workers can withhold labor, and tenants can withhold rent, whereas the
unemployed must sometimes occupy workplaces and demonstrate en masse. 371
Protest is more likely to be eﬀective if three conditions exist: (1) Protestors are
central to institutions’ functioning; (2) Powerful groups have a stake in those
institutions; and (3) Protesters are able to protect themselves from reprisal. 372
Research from historians and political scientists conﬁrms the account oﬀered
in the sociological literature about the role of disruptive action in movement success. From the early- and mid-twentieth-century industrial-worker strikes and
rent strikes to the 1960s student movements and civil-rights protests and boycotts, disruptive concerted action has been critical to movement success. 373 Contemporary examples tell a similar story. In the spring of 2012, for example, hundreds of thousands of students in Quebec protested a proposed seventy-ﬁve
percent increase in tuition at public universities. Organized by their student unions, over 300,000 students went on strike, with several hundred thousand
368.

369.
370.

371.
372.

373.
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See, e.g., Charles Tilly, Getting It Together in Burgundy, 1675-1975, 4 THEORY & SOC’Y 479, 485
(1977) (discussing the manner in which the “collective action of Burgundy’s ordinary people
[was] changing,” including the seventeenth-century rise of food riots and eighteenth-century
revolution).
Doug McAdam, Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 735, 752 (1983).
See generally PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 41 (examining protest movements among the poor
and working class in the United States in the middle of the twentieth century). According to
Piven and Cloward, the hope for poor people’s movements lies primarily in moments when
large-scale changes undermine political stability, and the poor engage in insurgency. Following such protest, concessions are o�en withdrawn, but some become permanent. Id. at 34-35.
This phenomenon does not mean, however, that formal organization is antithetical to movement success or that protest is the only means to achieve movement goals. Rather, there is a
contingent relationship between protest politics and conventional political engagement. See
Sanford F. Schram, The Praxis of Poor People’s Movements: Strategy and Theory in Dissensus Politics, 1 PERSP. ON POL. 715, 716-18 (2003).
PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 41, at 21-22.
See id. at 24-26. Thus, poor people are in a weaker position to use disruption as a tactic for
inﬂuence because they frequently do not perform roles on which major institutions depend,
or those who manage their institutions o�en have little to concede. They also have less ability
to protect themselves from reprisal. Id. at 25-26.
See id. at 222.
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remaining on strike for months. By September, the government abandoned its
proposed increase. 374 In Los Angeles, in recent years, incidents of tenant rent
strikes have increased in the face of rising rents and deplorable housing conditions, with tenants, organized by the Los Angeles tenants’ union, winning some
signiﬁcant victories in both local policy and private rent arrangements. 375 Meanwhile, in the last few years, hundreds of thousands of public-school teachers in
the United States have engaged in mass strikes, winning substantial improvements in salaries, beneﬁts, and education funding even in states with Republican
legislatures and no formal union rights. 376 During the COVID-19 pandemic,
strikes by essential workers at Amazon, Whole Foods, Target, FedEx, and elsewhere, and protests by nurses and other healthcare workers, forced attention to
urgent health and safety concerns. 377
Law can facilitate eﬀective protest through several mechanisms. First, it can
aﬃrmatively provide the right to strike across domains. That is, law can and
should explicitly grant the right of workers, tenants, and public beneﬁciaries to
engage in concerted action, including protests and strikes. Simply creating a
right is not enough, however. Second, law must also provide protection from
both private and state reprisal—and protection must be meaningful and broad
in scope. Thus, the law must not only prohibit employers from ﬁring workers
for striking (as private-sector labor law does, but much public-sector law does
not); it also must prohibit permanent replacement of those who strike and
374.

See Bangs, supra note 328, at 48.
See Armando Aparicio & David Zlutnick, These Tenants Are Leading the Largest Rent Strike in
LA History, NATION (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/these-tenants-areleading-the-largest-rent-strike-in-la-history [https://perma.cc/34UA-BVL6]; Rob Kuznia,
Los Angeles Tenants Increasingly Engaging in Rent Strikes amid Housing Crisis, WASH. POST (June
2, 2018, 6:38 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/los-angeles-tenants-increasingly-engaging-in-rent-strikes-amid-housing-crisis/2018/06/02/6b91c340-65af-11e8a768-ed043e33f1dc_story.html [https://perma.cc/8NFZ-V4VN]; Tracy Jeanne Rosenthal,
101 Notes on the LA Tenants Union, COMMUNE (July 19, 2019), https://communemag.com/101notes-on-the-la-tenants-union [https://perma.cc/VH6T-82RK].
376. See Michael Sainato, U.S. Teacher Strikes Generated Victories. So Why Are They Ready to Strike
Again?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2019, 2:00 AM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2019/aug/29/us-teacher-strikes-generated-victories-so-why-are-they-ready-to-strikeagain [https://perma.cc/X6SL-N39L]; Andrew Van Dam, Teacher Strikes Made 2018 the Biggest Year for Worker Protest in a Generation, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2019, 11:22 AM EST),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2019/02/14/with-teachers-lead-more-workers
-went-strike-than-any-year-since [https://perma.cc/WL6S-XU2F]; see also Kate Andrias,
Peril and Possibility: Strikes, Rights, and Legal Change in the Age of Trump, 40 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 135, 145-48 (2019) (describing collective action by teachers).
377. See Shirin Ghaﬀary, The May Day Strike from Amazon, Instacart, and Target Workers Didn’t Stop
Business. It Was Still a Success, VOX (May 1, 2020, 6:28 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/5/1/21244151/may-day-strike-amazon-instacart-target-success-turnout-fedexprotest-essential-workers-chris-smalls [https://perma.cc/2PZN-2HC6].
375.
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provide strong penalties and enforcement mechanisms. 378 Similarly, the law
must prohibit tenants from being evicted or harassed and beneﬁciaries from being cut oﬀ or having their beneﬁts reduced.
Third, the law must protect the right to engage in eﬀective concerted action,
even when such action is disruptive. For example, the law should not only provide workers at a single employer the right to strike and to demonstrate peacefully in front of their employer, nor should it only provide tenants the right to
protest their particular landlord. Rather, and in contrast to current labor law, the
law could also oﬀer some protection for secondary boycotts and sympathy strikes
across multiple domains, and it could permit nontraditional strikes short of full
or indeﬁnite stoppages. 379 To be sure, limits ought to exist on the right to engage
in disruptive protest. Protests must be peaceful, eschewing both destruction of
property and violence against individuals. But the right to protest becomes ineffective if it is cabined to prevent disruption.
Finally, the law should protect protests and strikes that have the political process as a target and the “common good” as a goal. 380 Current labor law achieves
this to a point: the Supreme Court has held that the NLRA protects workers’
concerted activity that occurs through political channels, but only insofar as the
activity relates to employment issues. 381 The NLRB has also concluded that
workers may not be protected if they strike for an exclusively political cause. 382
Despite these restrictions—and others present in public-sector labor law—workers have frequently struck to advance the common good and to inﬂuence political
decisionmaking. Consider the 2019 Chicago Teachers’ strike, during which
teachers demanded not only better wages and beneﬁts and smaller class sizes,
but also housing assistance for new teachers, staﬀ to help students and families
in danger of losing housing, and other steps to advance aﬀordable housing in

378.
379.

380.
381.

382.
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See supra Section III.D.
See Craig Becker, “Better than a Strike”: Protecting New Forms of Collective Work Stoppages Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 354 (1994) (describing how the courts
and the NLRB “have sharply restricted the range of protected strike activity,” including restrictions on nontraditional strikes); Gourevitch, supra note 88, at 9-11 (arguing for a more
expansive conception of the right to strike); Kate Andrias & Brishen Rogers, Rebuilding
Worker Voice in Today’s Economy, ROOSEVELT INST. 37 (Aug. 2018), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-Rebuilding-Worker-Voice-201808.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9UKK-ZSQ4] (“Congress should repeal the broad restrictions on secondary boycotts. These restrictions are in signiﬁcant tension with First Amendment law as it has developed in recent years.”).
See, e.g., McCartin, supra note 175.
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 569-70 & n.20 (1978).
Memorandum from Ronald Meisburg, Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to All Reg’l Dirs., Oﬃcers-inCharge, and Resident Oﬃcers, Memorandum GC 08-10, at 2 (July 22, 2008).
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the city. 383 A law designed to reduce political inequality would grant protection
to this kind of collective action.
For many, the preceding recommendations regarding strikes will be controversial, if not entirely objectionable. In a liberal society, traditional paths of political power—voting, lobbying, participation—remain preferred. Our recommendations aim to strengthen those channels and to make disruption and
contestation less likely. But history and social-science research leaves little doubt
that disruptive concerted action is also essential for working-class and poor people to have a reasonable chance of success at achieving a redistribution in political
(and economic) power. 384
conclusion
Skeptics will object that none of this is possible. If elites wield so much power
in the political sphere, why would they ever permit reforms that would

383.

See Amanda Novello, Richard D. Kahlenberg & Andrew Stettner, The Chicago Teachers Strike
Is a Fight for the Common Good, CENTURY FOUND. (Oct. 28, 2019), https://tcf.org/content
/commentary/chicago-teachers-strike-ﬁght-common-good
[https://perma.cc/7ZXSF5NH].
384. When law creates and empowers organizations, it also typically imposes duties and constraints on those organizations. Corporate law imposes duties of care, loyalty, and faith, as
well as disclosure obligations. Charitable nonproﬁts operate under various disclosure and
governance obligations; they are also constrained from engaging in political activity. Labor
law imposes a duty of fair representation on unions, as well as signiﬁcant disclosure requirements; obligations of democratic governance and nondiscrimination; restrictions on expression; and an obligation of independence from the employer, in what Cynthia Estlund has
termed a quid pro quo. Estlund, supra note 153, at 171-77, 193-234.
A discussion of what duties law should impose on newly empowered social-movement organizations is beyond the scope of this Article. Diﬀerent contexts will warrant diﬀerent speciﬁc
designs, and the question of constraints and duties implicates a vast body of organizational
literature and diﬃcult choices. But, at the very least, social-movement organizations ought to
be independent from—in other words, free from domination by—those with whom their
members bargain; they ought to be inclusive (i.e., prohibited from discriminating on the basis
of race, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, disability, religion, or other
protected status); their leaders ought to operate under basic ﬁduciary duties to their members,
with obligations of ﬁnancial disclosure; and organizations ought to be required to maintain
democratic governance structures. These requirements are consistent with good-governance
guidelines generally. They also may help facilitate the organizational strength of social movements over time by minimizing “oligarchization, co-optation, and the dissolution of indigenous support.” MCADAM, supra note 41, at 56. At the same time, it is essential that duties imposed by law not work to defeat the very purpose of a law of organizing: to enable poor and
working-class individuals to form organizations that can exercise eﬀective political power. Cf.
Estlund, supra note 153, at 225-28 (describing restrictions on labor picketing as indefensible
under a quid pro quo analysis).
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fundamentally weaken their power while strengthening countervailing
forces? 385 The point is well taken. Reforms suggested in this Article will be difﬁcult to achieve, particularly at the national level in the short term.
Yet the obstacles are not insurmountable. The power of the wealthy ebbs
depending on circumstance and alignments, and several factors can enable economically progressive legislative change. First, government tends to respond to
the concerns of poor and working-class voters when those concerns become particularly salient. Second, divisions among elites can create openings for redistributive reform, as can elite sympathy with the cause of less aﬄuent fellow citizens—or worry that failure to act will produce even more radical change. 386 In
addition, the federalized nature of our government creates openings for legislative change at the state and local level that can, in turn, increase the likelihood of
reform at the national level. 387 Crucially, moreover, the growth facilitated by
supportive laws in one locality can enable federated organizations to export their
power to other localities and ultimately to the national level. 388
There is reason to believe that several of these dynamics are present today.
To state the obvious, the COVID-19 pandemic has made the economic plight of
poor and working-class Americans highly politically salient. The resurgence of
organizing among workers, tenants, and debtors that has occurred in response
to the pandemic—and that has highlighted the inequities of how the pain of the
pandemic is distributed—has only increased this salience, as have the extraordinary protests organized by Movement for Black Lives. 389 Voters are clearly
385.

386.
387.

388.
389.
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Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 631, 637 (2006) (“[A] self-defeating proposal is one whose diagnosis and prescription
make inconsistent assumptions about agents’ desires, beliefs, or opportunities. . . . [I]t might
oﬀer a prescription that is motivationally inconsistent with the diagnosis. Given the diagnosis,
the actors who have the ability to adopt the prescription have no desire to do so.”).
See GILENS, supra note 11, at 81 (describing the responsiveness of oﬃcials when elite and lowincome preferences overlap).
See JAMILA MICHENER, FRAGMENTED DEMOCRACY: MEDICAID, FEDERALISM, AND UNEQUAL
POLITICS 1-83 (2018) (describing federalism dynamics of Medicaid expansion); Jamila Michener, Medicaid and the Policy Feedback Foundations for Universal Healthcare, 685 ANNALS, AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116, 125-30 (2019) (showing that well-designed laws enacted in progressive states and localities can demonstrate the eﬃcacy and plausibility of reform, create
administrative capacity, and expand supportive constituencies in ways that increase the likelihood of reform both in other states and at the national level).
See Andrias, supra note 26, at 51-57 (describing how the Fight for $15 campaign leveraged early
gains in progressive states to spread the campaign in other states).
See Hannah Appel, There Is Power in a Debtors’ Union, DISSENT (July 12, 2019),
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/there-is-power-in-a-debtors-union
[https://perma.cc/X7BX-PRHX]; Kate Logan & Shay Totten, The Seeds of Rural Progressivism, DISSENT (2019), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/the-seeds-of-rural-
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concerned about these issues and increasingly support bold policy initiatives to
address them. For example, a huge majority of voters now say they would prefer
the federal government take “major, sweeping action”—rather than “modest action”—to address the economic impact of the pandemic.390 There is also strong
support for the proposition that “[t]he devastation triggered by coronavirus
means we have to both address the immediate economic needs and work to fix
problems in our economy—like inequality and poverty—that made us all more
vulnerable.”391
These trends extend political shifts that have been developing since the recession of 2008. Thus, majorities in both red and blue states now express support for minimum wage increases and for labor unions.392 Elite opinion shows
progressivism [https://perma.cc/L8QE-ZZ2F]; Karen Narefsky, All of a Sudden, Housing Is on
the Agenda, JACOBIN (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/11/housing-berniesanders-elizabeth-warren-2020-presidential-election
[https://perma.cc/PD35-2KK5];
Scheiber, supra note 35; The New Fight for Racial Justice, NATION (Aug. 27, 2014),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/new-fight-racial-justice
[https://perma.cc
/EN26-YCZT]; cf. DANA R. FISHER, AMERICAN RESISTANCE: FROM THE WOMEN’S MARCH TO
THE BLUE WAVE 6-42 (2019) (discussing the rise of anti-Trump organizing). For legal analysis
of some of these movements, see Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93
N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 446 (2018), which describes “[t]he contemporary wave of radical social
movements” as “revisit[ing] and complicat[ing] the terrain of rights”; Andrias, supra note 26,
at 70, which discusses the Fight for $15 and related movements as embracing a “new, still
embryonic, labor law . . . commit[ted] to collective power rather than individual rights”; Andrias, supra note 376, at 148, which argues that recent labor struggles, such as the 2018 West
Virginia Teachers’ strike, are emblematic of a “labor law that moves away from narrow, bureaucratic, and legalistic forms of worker representation toward more sectoral, worker-driven,
and political forms of organization”; Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132
HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1616 (2019), which presents the “abolitionist conception of justice” as one
that “presents a formidable challenge to existing ideas of legal justice . . . [and] one where
punishment is abandoned in favor of accountability and repair, and where discriminatory
criminal-law enforcement is replaced with practices addressing the systematic bases of inequality, poverty, and justice”; and Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 394
(2016), which explores how organized cop watching provides the basis for “a critique of the
prevailing notion of community participation in policing that privileges consensus over conflict.” See also sources cited supra note 44 (describing organizing eﬀorts among workers, tenants, debtors, and recipients of public benefits).
390. National Online Survey, GROUNDWORK COLLABORATIVE 7 (Apr. 29, 2020), https://groundworkcollaborative.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Groundwork-Collaborative-ToplineResults-042920.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4X8-Y3AU].
391. Id.
392. Leslie Davis & Hannah Hartig, Two-Thirds of Americans Favor Raising the Federal Minimum
Wage to $15 an Hour, PEW RES. CTR. (July 30, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/07/30/two-thirds-of-americans-favor-raising-federal-minimum-wage-to-15-anhour [https://perma.cc/F4SX-S4FC]; see also Alexia Fernández Campbell, Missouri Voters Just
Blocked the Right-to-Work Law Republicans Passed to Weaken Labor Unions, VOX (Aug. 7, 2018,
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similar changes: economists, once largely skeptical of both worker-organization
and minimum-wage laws, are now increasingly expressing support. 393 From
Medicare for All to a $15 minimum wage, from student-debt relief to fundamental labor-law reform, redistributive policies are being seriously discussed by national political leaders in a way they have not been for at least a generation. 394
This shi� in opinion is already reﬂected in policy changes in progressive state
and local jurisdictions. In California, for example, the governor has extended
union-negotiated terms to the entire grocery industry to ensure that safety and
health standards reach all the grocery workers in the state. 395 It is safe to say that
such a move, with its suggestion of European-style tripartite sectoral bargaining,
would have been unthinkable a short time ago. In fact, numerous progressive
reforms—ranging from new rights for workers excluded from federal labor law
to enhanced protections for tenants—have been enacted at the state and local
level in jurisdictions with progressive majorities and active organizations among
low- and middle-income residents. 396 The extent to which experimentation at
the local level is legally permissible will vary based on the organizing context. In
some cases, like labor law, signiﬁcant federal-preemption hurdles exist. 397 In
other areas, like tenant rights, preemption is not an obstacle. But in both contexts, and in others as well, some local and state experimentation is both possible
and imperative, laying the groundwork for future federal reform.
Of course, once legislative majorities exist, backlash is a concern, as is conservative judicial resistance. Particularly in recent years, where progressive localities have engaged in innovative economic policymaking, conservative states
have clamped down through aggressive preemption rules, 398 and courts have a

393.

394.

395.
396.

397.
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11:55 PM EDT) https://www.vox.com/2018/8/7/17655690/missouri-election-proposition-aright-to-work [https://perma.cc/Q4PF-FZ6U] (rejecting a “right-to-work” law through
voter referendum).
See, e.g., Mark Thoma, As the World Changes, So Does Economics, CBS NEWS: MONEYWATCH
(Feb. 5, 2016, 5:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/as-the-world-changes-so-doeseconomics [https://perma.cc/22R4-GAND].
See Eric Levitz, The Le�-Wing Realignment of American Politics Has Already Begun, N.Y. MAG.:
INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 23, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/01/the-republicanparty-is-moving-le�-on-economic-climate-policy.html [https://perma.cc/3M5U-B2ZR].
Cal. Exec. Order N-51-20 (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/4.16.20-EO-N-51-20-text.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZTK-B36V].
For a discussion of worker organizations’ recent successful eﬀorts to bring about law reforms
at the state and local level, see Andrias, supra note 26, at 46-57. For recent tenant organizing
eﬀorts and housing-law reform, see sources cited supra note 375.
Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1153, 1154-55 (2011); see also Andrias, supra note 26, at 91 (describing the NLRA’s preemption regime).
Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1164-84 (2018).
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long history of interpreting ambiguity in law against the interests of the poor
and working class. 399 To some extent, legislation can be designed with this history in mind—for example, through the inclusion of clear purpose statements,
unambiguous text, and provisions that limit courts’ injunctive power. And with
respect to political backlash, as E. E. Schattschneider famously argued, “New
policies create a new politics.” 400 That observation will have particular relevance
in our context. A�er all, laws designed to enable organizing will be particularly
eﬀective at generating their own political durability precisely because they will—
explicitly and intentionally—build constituencies with the power to ensure the
laws’ survival. 401
None of this is to suggest that enacting laws to facilitate organizing among
the poor and middle class would be easy; none of it is to predict that such enactment would be likely. Of course, the kinds of laws we propose here would face
intense opposition. Those who currently wield unrivaled power will vigorously
object to laws that enable their power to be countervailed. Those who have had
disproportionate—sometimes unfettered—inﬂuence over our politics will object
to the diminishment of that inﬂuence. But, in a democracy, these objections must
be overcome. And that is exactly what the reforms we propose are meant to enable.

399.

FORBATH, supra note 159, at 150-54; Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 1591, 1594 (2016); Kate Andrias, The Fortiﬁcation of Inequality: Constitutional Doctrine and
the Political Economy, 93 IND. L.J. 5, 10-12, 18-23 (2018); Klare, supra note 90, at 268-70.
400. E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF: A STUDY OF FREE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN PRESSURE POLITICS, AS SHOWN IN THE 1929-1930 REVISION OF THE TARIFF 288
(1935).
401. See Sarah F. Anzia & Terry M. Moe, Do Politicians Use Policy to Make Politics? The Case of PublicSector Labor Laws, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 763, 763-70 (2016) (describing how public-sector
labor laws enacted in the 1960s and ’70s created a powerful new interest group favoring progressive causes and candidates); Patrick Flavin & Michael T. Hartney, When Government Subsidizes Its Own: Collective Bargaining Laws as Agents of Political Mobilization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI.
896, 907-09 (2015) (arguing that collective-bargaining regimes function as agents of political
mobilization); cf. Keith Gunnar Bentele & Erin E. O’Brien, Jim Crow 2.0?: Why States Consider
and Adopt Restrictive Voter Access Policies, 11 PERSP. POL. 1088 (2013) (documenting how the
Republican Party has used policy to demobilize their political adversaries); Alexander HertelFernandez, Asymmetric Partisan Polarization, Labor Policy, and Cross-State Political Power-Building, 685 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 64, 65-69 (2019) (describing conservative policy
elites’ eﬀort to weaken unions in order to shi� the balance of organized power and electoral
strength in American politics). See generally Levinson & Sachs, supra note 27 (describing how
political actors use functional legal changes to entrench their policies and positions).

635

